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Abstract 
 
This study deals with untold or underemphasized epidodes in Mexico’s agricultural 
history.  Drawing on sources from Mexico’s Colegio de Postgraduados, interviews, and 
archives in the United States and in Mexico, this dissertation highlights some of the 
major debates and visions that determined farming in Mexico during the 1950s and 
1960s.  It also details how those people chosen to deliver modernization to Mexican 
farmers demanded a reorientation to the direction of agronomy.
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation began with two frustrations.  After reading some of the 
scholarship dealing with Mexican agriculture in the twentieth century, I was struck with 
how often authors mentioned the Rockefeller Foundation (RF).  This was because RF 
officials and the Mexican government signed a small venture to improve farming in 
Mexico in 1943 that became the basis for huge changes in the Mexican countryside.  
Yet, I still thought that there was more to Mexican farming outside of RF work and 
scientists.  Thus, my first immature frustration was a desire to write about Mexican 
agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s minus a monolithic RF presence.  I wanted to write a 
study about agriculture in the middle of the twentieth century without dedicating too 
much discussion to the work done by RF workers and their partners between 1943, 
when the Mexican government and Foundation leaders began their collaboration to 
improve agricultural production, and 1966.  My second frustration dealt with broaching 
the same topic without disproportionately relying on RF archival material in the United 
States.  I always found it odd that more than one historian had traveled to New York to 
study the history of farming in the deserts, jungles, and highlands south of the Rio 
Grande. 
 But the research process immediately taught me that my dissertation would be 
incomplete without consultation of the Rockefeller Foundation Archives.  RF scientists 
led projects during three different decades that transformed the Mexican countryside, 
and my desire to minimize the impact of these efforts amounted to a flawed approach.  
Moreover, the success of RF work in Mexico served as a model for similar projects in 
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the “developing” world during the 1960s and 1970s.  I consequently made an obligatory 
visit to Tarrytown, New York, which proved fruitful.     
 I found a small degree of success in dealing with my second frustration.  Talks 
with several agronomists and a series of accidents led me to the Efraím Hernández 
Xolocotzi archive.  Hernández was arguably Mexico’s most influential botanist of the 
twentieth century at the country’s most important public agricultural college, the 
Escuela Nacional de Agriculture (ENA; the National College of Agriculture).  An 
eccentric scientist with a strong personality, he was known for zealously championing 
campesino (peasant) modes of agricultural production during a period in which fealty to 
empiricism, Neo-Malthusianism, and technocratism held primacy in Mexican academic 
circles.1  Some of Hernández’s last students took time to compile his letters, reports, 
and notebooks to build an unofficial archive after he died in 1991.  After months of 
digging through this cache of semi-organized boxes and items in file cabinets, I realized 
that I had found material related to episodes in agricultural history that scholars had 
either glossed over or not yet discussed. 
 This dissertation, therefore, is a contribution to modern Mexican agricultural 
history.  It deals with untold chapters in rural development from the early 1950s to 
1967, a period known as the heyday of the “Green Revolution.”  Primarily relying on 
sources from the Hernández archive, material from the college where he taught, oral 
histories, and other records from Mexico’s national archives, I scrutinize the people 
who shaped farmers’ futures, and these people’s policies.  I also discuss some of the 
                                                
1 In this dissertation, I use campesino to mean a peasant farmer or someone who practices subsistence 
farming. 
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figures who imagined the country’s rural future in alternative ways, particularly the 
agronomy students chosen to deliver modernization to growers.   
 
FROM SMALL VENTURE TO “REVOLUTION” 
The “Green Revolution” has roots going back at least to 1940.  After attending 
the presidential inauguration of Mexico’s Manuel Ávila Camacho, U.S. Vice President 
Henry Wallace returned to the United States and subsequently opened discussions with 
representatives from the Rockefeller Foundation about the possibility of taking the 
organization’s efforts and resources to Mexico City.  In July 1941, RF leaders 
sponsored a trip by three premier U.S. agronomists to tour the country and assess the 
possibility of Foundation work south of the United States.2  About two years later, 
Marte Gómez, Mexico’s Minister of Agriculture, agreed to open the Office of Special 
Studies, which would oversee the training of young men and would lead research 
projects to improve production levels of basic crops (maize, beans, and wheat).   
 Thus began what Gómez later suggested was Mexico’s “agricultural 
revolution.”3  What became known as the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) proved 
to be a productive endeavor for more than two decades.4  Hundreds of students worked 
as interns at MAP installations, and at least five hundred young men received RF-
                                                
2 This was not the Foundation’s first project in Mexico or in Latin America.  RF researchers, for example, 
led public health campaigns in Mexico during the early 1900s; see Armando Solórzano, “Sowing the 
Seeds of Neo-Imperialism: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Yellow Fever Campaign in Mexico,” 
International Journal of Health Sciences 22, no. 3 (1992): 529-554; and Anne-Emmanuelle Birn, 
Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico (Rochester, NY.: 
University of Rochester Press, 2006).  Consult Marcos Cueto’s edited volume for studies related to Latin 
American efforts; Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
3 Marte R. Gómez, Escritos agrarios (Chapingo, Estado de México, Mexico, Colegio de Postgraduados-
Escuela Nacional de Agricultura, 1976), 25-27. 
4 The Program officially lasted through 1965.  However, some people have suggested that RF 
involvement in Mexican agriculture has not ended because of the presence of the International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center.    
4 
supported scholarships to study agriculture at U.S. colleges.  With assistance from the 
Rockefeller Foundation, Mexican leaders opened the country’s first graduate college 
dedicated to agricultural research in 1959.  The government also opened a handful of 
experiment stations staffed with a small army of botanists, pathologists, geneticists, and 
other trained personnel.  “Green Revolutionaries” like Ed Wellhausen, Norman 
Borlaug, and their interns fulfilled MAP goals and more, as volume levels and yields for 
basic grains increased substantially, and research on disease resistance improved 
tremendously.5  Mexico became self-sufficient in wheat production by 1956, and in 
subsequent years, the country became an exporter of certain crops.  In many corners of 
the countryside, growers transitioned from subsistence farming with beasts of burden 
and a coa (digging stick) to farming with genetically-altered seeds, synthetic fertilizers, 
and modern equipment. 
MAP work proved so impressive early on in its existence that Foundation 
officials and governments around the world initiated similar projects.  Colombian 
leaders began a partnership with the Foundation in 1950.  Six years later, programs in 
Chile and India began.  The Filipino government and the Ford and the Rockefeller 
Foundations cooperated to open the International Rice Research Institute in 1959.  Over 
the course of the 1960s, agricultural technology – particularly improved wheat seeds – 
and experiences that began in Mexico helped countries like Pakistan and India 
substantially increase production levels.  Dwarf wheat seeds developed under the 
leadership of Norman Borlaug eventually helped Indian and Pakistani officials avoid 
                                                
5 For a comprehensive inventory of the Mexican Agricultural Program, see Delbert Myren, “The 
Rockefeller Foundation Program in Corn and Wheat in Mexico,” in Subsistence Agriculture & Economic 
Development, Clifton R. Wharton Jr., ed. (New Brunswick, NJ.: Aldine Publishing Company, 2008): 438-
452. 
5 
serious threats of famine during the late 1960s.  In the same decade, other improved 
wheat seeds that had their origins in Mexico also helped in Turkey.   
In March 1968, William Gaud, an administrator for the U.S. Agency of 
International Development, delivered a short speech that alluded to the work that had 
begun in Mexico and had spread around the world.  His message was that support for 
international aid, primarily agricultural assistance, to the “developing world” should 
continue.  But it was a phrase in Gaud’s introduction that became famous.  
Development professionals, he said, were “on the verge of an agricultural revolution.”  
Then he summarized proof of his claim: Pakistan would have a record-level wheat 
harvest in 1968 because of high-yielding seeds; improved seeds would help India 
achieve self-sufficiency in different grains within four years; Turkey’s upcoming wheat 
harvest looked extremely promising; and high-yielding rice seeds would soon ensure 
that the Philippines would not have to import its most important grain.  These and other 
advances, Gaud continued, “in the field of agriculture contain the makings of a new 
revolution…I call it the Green Revolution.”6  The term became synonymous with 
modern agricultural science – fertilizer-responsive seeds, agribusiness, and controlled 
irrigation as a key component to farming – and many people in 1968 argued that the 
many “miracle seeds” helped offset famine in different corners of the world.  
Norman Borlaug won the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the “Revolution” 
nearly three years after Gaud’s words.  Wheat seeds that he and others developed had 
allowed governments in the “non-affluent world,” particularly Asia, to avoid food 
shortages.  Near the end of his Nobel Lecture in 1970, Borlaug said that the “green 
                                                
6 William S. Gaud, “The Green Revolution: Accomplishments and Apprehensions” (speech delivered 
before the Society for International Development, Washington, DC., March 8, 1968), 
http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/topics/borlaug/borlaug-green.html.  
6 
revolution has won a temporary success in man’s war against hunger and deprivation; it 
has given man a breathing space.”7  The award represented a crowning moment for 
work that the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government had begun more 
than two decades earlier.  
Scholarship about the “Green Revolution” dates back decades and can be 
categorized under two different rubrics.  The first of these two, which began in the 
1970s and lasted through the 1990s, amounts to a series of critiques against the Green 
Revolution.  Authors criticized unequal access to inputs necessary for farmers, 
environmental decay from pesticides and fertilizers, and operational advantages towards 
large-scale farming for specific export crops.  With few exceptions, works from Harry 
Cleaver, Bruce Jennings, Stephen Lewontin, Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, and Angus 
Wright discuss the shortcomings of the Green Revolution in different places.  Published 
in 1976, Alcántara’s study describes in exhaustive detail the socioeconomic 
consequences related to the introduction of modern agriculture into Mexico.  Jennings’s 
small book has a similar critical tone towards the Mexican Agricultural Project.  
Wright’s The Death of Ramón González (1990) highlights the ecological damage and 
contradictions stemming from the introduction of modern agriculture into the Mexican 
countryside after the 1940s.  These early works contain substantive arguments and 
insightful discussions, but the authors also seem bent on making pointed indictments 
instead encouraging nuanced discourse.8  
                                                
7 Norman Borlaug, “Nobel Lecture: The Green Revolution, Peace, and Humanity,” Nobelprize.org, Nobel 
Media AB 2014, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1970/borlaug-lecture-html.  
8 These works include Harry M. Cleaver, “The Origins of the Green Revolution” (PhD diss., Stanford 
University, 1975); Kenneth A. Dahlberg, Beyond the Green Revolution: The Ecology and Politics of 
Global Agricultural Development (New York: Plenum Press, 1979); Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, 
Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socioeconomic Implications of Technological Change, 1940-1970 
(Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1976); Bruce H. Jennings, 
7 
 This pattern changed over the course of the 1990s.  Studies became less focused 
on disparaging the Green Revolution and the shortcomings of “miracle seeds,” and 
more about studying how the Revolution was connected to the politics of the Cold War.  
John Perkins made the case that advances in botanical sciences intersected with 
geopolitics during the Cold War.  Joseph Cotter and Karin Matchett drew on several 
sources to shift the focus of the scholarship onto Mexico, and both offered instructive 
histories about agricultural development during the twentieth century.  Over the last few 
years, Nick Cullather and Tore Olsson adopted transnational approaches.  Cullather 
demonstrated scientific agriculture’s role in U.S. Cold War policy in Asia.  Olsson’s 
study brilliantly chronicles the origins of RF agricultural work in Mexico, describing 
how a handful of reformers remade the rural American South and how some of these 
men partnered with likeminded visionaries in Mexico to remake the rural landscape 
there.9   
                                                                                                                                          
Foundations of International Agricultural Research: Science and Politics in Mexican Agriculture 
(Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1988); Stephen Lewontin, “The Green Revolution and the Politics of 
Agricultural Development in Mexico since 1940” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1983); Andrew 
Pearse, Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of Want: Social and Economic Implications of the Green Revolution 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); David A. Sonnenfeld, “Mexico’s ‘Green Revolution,’ 1940-1980: 
Towards an Environmental History,” Environmental History Review 16, no. 4 (1992): 28-52; and Angus 
Wright, The Death of Ramón González: The Modern Agricultural Dilemma (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1990).  Vandana Shiva shared a similar tone in an Indian context; The Violence of the Green 
Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and Politics (London: Zed Books, 1991).  Exceptions to 
this category are Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change: The Green Revolution and Development in the 
1970s (New York: Praeger, 1970); Deborah Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The 
Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953,” Social Studies of Science 16, no. 3 (1986): 457-483; and 
Anneliese Markus de Kennedy, “The Office of Special Studies: A Study of the Joint Mexican Secretariat 
of Agriculture – Rockefeller Foundation Program in Agriculture, 1943-1963,” (PhD diss., University of 
North Carolina, 1973). 
9 See Gilberto Aboites Manrique, Una mirada diferente de la Revolución Verde: ciencia, nación y 
compromiso social (Mexico City: Editorial Plaza y Valdés, 2002); Joseph Cotter, Troubled Harvest: 
Agronomy and Revolution in Mexico, 1880 – 2002 (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2003); Nick Cullather, 
“Miracles of Modernization: The Green Revolution and the Apotheosis of Technology,” Diplomatic 
History 28, no. 2 (2004): 227-254 and The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in 
Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Jonathan Harwood, “Peasant Friendly Plant Breeding 
and the Early Years of the Green Revolution in Mexico,” Agricultural History 83, no. 3 (2009): 384-410; 
Karin E. Matchett, “Untold Innovations: Scientific Practice and Corn Improvement in Mexico, 1935-
8 
While I recognize the transnational trend, I also think that room exists in the 
scholarship for the traditional nation-centered approach towards examining the Green 
Revolution.  To that end, this dissertation discusses how important actors managed 
agricultural development in Mexico from the early 1950s to 1967.  It deals with the 
debates and conflicts that government officials, educators, and students had vis-à-vis 
their country’s rural future after the introduction of modern agricultural science.  How 
did Mexicans manage agriculture after the Rockefeller Foundation substantially 
downsized its operations from the country after 1961?  What were some of the 
alternative visions that people considered and advocated?  How did Mexicans deliver 
the Green Revolution to farmers?       
 Chapter One begins with the last question.  I trace how the governor of the State 
of Mexico, Salvador Sánchez, began an agricultural extension program to help his 
constituents via the demonstration lot method, which had its antecedents in the 
American South.  One of my two claims is that Mexicans led the efforts to deliver what 
is known as “La agricultura de Iowa” (U.S. Midwest-style agriculture) to farmers.10  
This thesis counters an inference – that the Green Revolution was an attempted 
transplantation of Iowa on the Mexican campo - that I gathered from some studies.  The 
chapters also demonstrates that Sánchez and other leaders in Mexico thought that 
growers would adopt modern farming by seeing it or hearing about it.  I contend that 
                                                                                                                                          
1965” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2002); Tore Carl Olsson, “Agrarian Crossings: The American 
South, Mexico, and the Twentieth-Century Remaking of the Rural World” (PhD diss., The University of 
Georgia, 2013); Servando Ortoll, “Orígenes de un proyecto agrícola: la Fundación Rockefeller y la 
Revolución Verde,” Sociedades Rurales, Producción y Medio Ambiente 4, no. 1 (2003): 81-96; John H. 
Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997).   
10 I thank many of the Mexican agronomists who I interviewed for leading me to this argument.  “La 
agricultura de Iowa” is not a pejorative term, according to what I gathered from Mexican agronomists and 
researchers.   
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one of the precepts for agricultural development after 1954 was the rule that those 
people armed with science degrees needed to instruct growers, particularly peasants, 
how to cultivate their crops.    
 The second chapter recounts Efraím Hernández’s early life and how he adopted 
a peculiar approach to botany that was antithetical to what Sánchez’s program 
advocated.  I describe how a trip to Mexico after high school exposed Hernández to the 
privations among the country’s peasantry and inspired him to promise to return to help.  
After he returned, I discuss how Hernández spent years canvassing the countryside and 
developed a profound respect for subsistence farming methods - so much that he 
considered campesinos as sources of agronomic knowledge.  Such inclinations 
frustrated him after he became a professor at Mexico’s Escuela Nacional de Agricultura 
(National College of Agriculture), which is the setting for the third and fourth chapters 
of this study.   
 Known as Chapingo, the Escuela Nacional was the site of the Green 
Revolution’s educational birthplace, as well the site where the fealty to agricultural 
science met its end in Mexico.  Commitment to modernizing farmers on the part of the 
Mexican government, philanthropy from the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and 
support from international lending agencies turned the college from an institution that 
lacked textbooks and laboratories throughout much of its existence into a college with 
money to spare and worthy of global recognition.  By the 1960s, the school became the 
place where students from all over the world learned advanced agriculture and were 
taught that they were the people who would fuse science with agrarian reform to help 
peasant farmers, and consequently, help fulfill one of the ideals of the Mexican 
10 
Revolution.  Things, however, failed to unfold so seamlessly, as many members of the 
agronomic vanguard became disillusioned for a number of reasons over the course of 
the early 1960s. 
 The final chapter chronicles the shutdown that took place at Mexico’s 
agricultural colleges during the summer of 1967.  I describe how a small campus protest 
morphed into a national shutdown, with many students demanding an overhaul of the 
prevailing model of agricultural education, and by extension, a reassessment of rural 
development.  Drawing from informant records, oral histories collected by officials at 
Chapingo, and the Hernández archive, I make the case that the unrest in 1967 
represented the symbolic end of Mexico’s Green Revolution.     
 Before this historic protest, the first chapter deals with the optics and sounds of 
the Revolution in the 1950s.  Mexican officials, I argue, encouraged growers to adopt 
modern farming via appeals to their senses - seeing the results of utilizing improved 
seeds and techniques, and through hearing about agricultural advances.  I claim that 
leaders banked on the idea that agriculturalists had to be told how to grow their crops 
because such a methodology had worked with farmers in the United States.  This 
approach to rural development, as we will see, had built-in flaws and drawbacks.                
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CHAPTER ONE  
MEXICO’S AVATARS OF MODERN FARMING: 
THE DISCOURSE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
DELIVERING “LA AGRICULTURA DE IOWA” TO MEXICO11 
 
 
And it is useless to try to convert it [Peru’s agrarian problem]…into a technical-
agricultural problem for agronomists. – José Carlos Mariátegui, “The Problem of Land” 
(1928)12 
 
On July 4, 1952, agronomist Antonio Sánchez mailed a threatening letter from 
his Federal Ministry of Agriculture office in Mexico City to a colleague, Enrique 
Caballero, in Torreón, Coahuila.13  “Despite the many instances,” the letter began, “in 
which this office has reminded you to mail your monthly labor reports to us, as of today 
we have yet to receive anything from you for February, March, April, and May” of the 
current year.  Using unflattering language, Sánchez mentioned that it was “illogical” of 
Caballero to think that he could be paid for months without reporting on his extension 
activities during that period.  The letter, thus, served as a last reminder for Caballero to 
fulfill his duties.  Otherwise, “higher authorities” would soon become involved and 
harsher consequences would likely follow.14         
Caballero’s reply cannot be found in the Ministry of Agriculture records, but he 
likely would not have been shocked to receive such a biting correspondence from 
Mexico City.  Shortly before Sánchez’s letter, Mexico began an important agricultural 
                                                
11 “La agricultura de Iowa” is a familiar saying in Mexico that connotes industrial farming, along with 
idyllic, yeoman images. 
12 José Carlos Mariátegui, “The Problem of Land,” in Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality, 
trans. by Marjory Urquidi (Austin: University of Texas, 1971), 32.   
13 The term agrónomo translates to agronomist.  Generally, the term is associated with an official who has 
formal training in different areas of agriculture.  These areas include botany, ethnobotany, agronomic 
engineering, land surveying, livestock, extension, and hydraulic engineering.   
14 Antonio Sánchez Hidalgo, “Encomiándolo a rendir sus informes de labores,” July 4, 1952, Secretaría 
de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos (hereafter SARH), box 211, Archivo General de la Nación, 
Mexico City (hereafter AGN). 
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extension project.  The program became supported by the federal government, by the 
state’s governor, and by the Rockefeller Foundation that represented a wholesale effort 
to disseminate newly-generated crop seeds, fertilization methods, and cultivation 
techniques that researchers at the Office of Special Studies (OSS) had developed for 
nearly a decade.  As discussed in the introduction, researchers like Edwin Wellhausen 
(EJ), J.G. Harrar, Norman Borlaug, and their Mexican interns had been hard at work 
breeding seeds that increased yields substantially and conducting research towards 
improving agricultural production levels in Mexico.  By 1951, some Mexican leaders 
found it high time to ensure that the technology and know-how arrived to farmers.  With 
a small corps of agronomists beginning to trickle back to Mexico after advanced study 
at U.S. universities, armed with degrees in agricultural sciences, the time had arrived for 
these men to translate what they had learned abroad into action.15  The State of Mexico 
pilot program represented an opportunity to deliver modern agronomy to farmers.    
The scholarship concerning the history of Mexican agriculture after the 1940s 
has a certain trajectory.  In 1941, Paul Mangelsdorf, Elvin Stakman, and Richard 
Bradfield conducted the famous survey of Mexican agriculture for the Rockefeller 
Foundation (RF) and subsequently recommended that the foundation expand its 
operations in Mexico beyond its previous work in public health.  Two years after the 
survey, the Office of Special Studies opened in Mexico City.  Led by leaders in their 
respective fields from the United States and aided by Mexican interns during the 1950s 
and 1960s, the office received credit for developing high-yielding, disease-resistant 
maize, wheat, and bean seeds.  By the 1970s, after Norman Borlaug received the Nobel 
Peace Prize for his work towards developing wheat strains that allowed much of Asia to 
                                                
15 Based on all records that I have reviewed, all but one OSS intern was male. 
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avert famine, criticisms of what became known as the “Green Revolution” became 
common among critics of development, environmentalists, and anthropologists.  
Scholars justifiably discussed the unequal access to “Revolution” technology, the 
success of this technology under optimal circumstances and inputs (e.g., synthetic 
fertilizers, irrigation, large-scale farms), and environmental damage stemming from the 
technology.16     
Following this critical vein, some authors have implied that the “Green 
Revolution” constituted a transplantation of U.S. agriculture in the Mexican 
countryside.  That is, RF workers mistakenly tried to transfer “La agricultura de Iowa” 
into the Mexican countryside.  It follows that blame for many of the negative 
characteristics associated with the Green Revolution and the stories of declension in 
post-1940s Mexican agriculture fall on U.S. figures like Borlaug, Henry Wallace, and 
RF leaders.17  In his assessment of the Green Revolution, historian Adolfo Olea-Franco 
argued that “the ‘green revolution’ was a planned business strategy and in no way a 
                                                
16 See Ryan M. Alexander, “Fortunate Sons of the Mexican Revolution: Miguel Alemán and His 
Generation, 1920-1952” (PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2011); Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change: 
The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970s (New York: Praeger, 1970); Kenneth Dahlberg, 
Beyond the Green Revolution: The Ecology and Politics of Global Agricultural Development (New York: 
Plenum Press, 1979); Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, Modernizing Mexican Agriculture: Socioeconomic 
Implications of Technological Change, 1940-1970 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, 1976); Stephen Lewontin, “The Green Revolution and the Politics of Agricultural 
Development in Mexico since 1940” (PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 1983); Andrew Pearse, 
Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of Want: Social and Economic Implication of the Green Revolution (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1980); Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, 
Ecology and Politics (London: Zed Books, 1991); John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green 
Revolution: Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Perkin, 
“The Rockefeller Foundation and the Green Revolution, 1941-1956,” Agriculture and Human Values VII, 
no. 3&4 (1990): 6-18; and David Sonnenfeld, “Mexico’s ‘Green Revolution,’ 1940 – 1980: Towards an 
Environmental History,” Environmental History Review 16, no. 4 (1992): 28-52. 
17 For examples, see Deborah Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture: The Rockefeller Foundation 
in Mexico, 1943 – 1953,” Social Studies of Science 16, no. 3 (1986): 457-483; and Angus Wright, The 
Death of Ramón González: The Modern Agricultural Dilemma (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). 
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philanthropic enterprise to end hunger in the world” (emphasis mine).18  Until recently, 
the scholarship about the history of Mexican agriculture has been one of Yankee 
domination and the inference that RF researchers mistakenly tried to turn the campo 
into something similar to the U.S. Midwest.19 
Sources do not uphold this narrative, however.  I argue that if there was an 
intentional agricultural model transfer, Mexican agronomists played a larger role in 
trying to implant a derivation of Iowa to the Mexican countryside than did Rockefeller 
Foundation researchers, U.S. politicians, or agribusiness vendors.  As referenced above, 
extension agents by 1951 were trying, in earnest, to professionalize and systematize the 
delivery of modern agricultural development to farmers.  And as Sánchez’s letter to his 
colleague suggests, agricultural extension carried weight with the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  In other words, state leaders unequivocally led the effort to carbon copy 
U.S.–style agronomy.  To prove this, I utilize the most widely circulated agricultural 
journals of the 1940s and 1950s, along with extension agents’ reports from the State of 
Mexico, to highlight how much Ministry of Agriculture chiefs and politicians, 
beginning in 1951, sought to install the demonstration lot method and county agent 
system south of the Rio Grande.  Within five years, a state pilot program became the 
                                                
18 Adolfo Olea-Franco, “One Century of Higher Agricultural Education and Research in Mexico (1850s-
1960s), with a Preliminary Survey on the Same Subjects in the United States” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2001), 721. 
19 See Tore Carl Olsson, “Agrarian Crossings: The American South, Mexico, and the Twentieth-Century 
Remaking of the Rural World” (PhD diss., The University of Georgia, 2013); Jonathan Harwood, 
“Peasant Friendly Plant Breeding and the Early Years of the Green Revolution in Mexico,” Agricultural 
History 83, no. 3 (2009): 384-410; Joseph Cotter, Troubled Harvests: Agronomy and Revolution in 
Mexico, 1880-2002 (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003); Servando Ortoll, “Orígenes de un proyecto 
agrícola: La Fundación Rockefeller y la Revolución Verde,” Sociedades Rurales, Producción y Medio 
Ambiente 4, no. 1 (2003): 81-96; and Karin E. Matchett, “Untold Innovations: Scientific Practice and 
Corn Improvement in Mexico, 1935-1965” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2002); and Edward D. 
Melillo, “The First Green Revolution: Debt Peonage and the Making of the Nitrogen Fertilizer Trade, 
1840-1930,” American Historical Review 117, no. 4 (2012): 1028-1060. 
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basis for a national program, adopted and supported by Mexico’s federal government.  
And by 1959, the attempted grafting of Iowa-style agriculture onto Mexico’s 
countryside was all too evident.  My contention, then, is that the model of 
transplantation was derived in the United States, but Mexicans delivered such a scheme.   
The other substantive discussion in this chapter concerns Mexicans’ adoption of 
the discourse of modern agricultural development.  In their roles as experts, trained in 
the United States, Mexico’s extensionists embraced a discourse – a body of ideas and 
vocabulary that defined practices and courses of action – that endowed peasant farmers 
with certain needs and characteristics.20  They regarded peasant growers (campesinos), 
who made up the majority of the agriculturalists with whom they worked, as an 
ensemble of antiquated subjects who lived in misery and destitution.  But agronomists, 
trained in modern sciences and having access to high-yielding seeds and modern 
techniques, possessed the technology and knowledge to make campesinos modern 
farmers, and by design, innovative, “progressive” citizens.  In their work, however, 
agronomists exercised a top-down method of instruction.  They talked at peasants; they 
did not talk with peasants.  In the calculus of agricultural development, extensionistas 
and their leaders overlooked the human element in their work.  Thus, they neglected the 
histories and knowledge, particularly local agronomic knowledge, of the subjects with 
whom they worked.  Consequently, this chapter also deals with how Mexican leaders 
attempted to deliver “development” – in this case, agricultural development.   
 
                                                
20 Anthropologists Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson, both of whom deal with Michel Foucault’s 
theories about discourse, influence my ideas related to development.  See Escobar, Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2012); and Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
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EXTENSION AS PANACEA 
 Extension refers to the dissemination of agronomic research to those people who 
possibly stand to benefit from new cultivation methods and technology.  With the 
professionalization and advances in agricultural research in Europe during the 1800s, 
leaders in universities, private organizations, and in governments took it upon 
themselves to ensure that the advances reached constituents or clients.21  To different 
ends, extension agents go to their audience to train and promote new technologies (e.g., 
fertilizers, genetically modified seeds) or cultivation methods (e.g., crop rotation, pest 
management, soil utilization).  They deliver services via an array of techniques that 
historically have included demonstration lots, movies, lectures, radio programs, nature-
study programs, and hands-on instruction.   
 For much of the first half of the twentieth century, Mexico’s agricultural 
extension services were miniscule, almost nil.  Until the 1940s, public institutions of 
scientific research were limited to the Department of Science at the National University 
in Mexico City.22  Because of a lack of funding and an emphasis on professional 
research prior to the Mexican Revolution, what could have been labeled as extension 
did not begin until 1911.23  For much of the second half of the nineteenth and early 
                                                
21 For discussion of the history of early state-led extension efforts, see Jonathan Harwood, Europe’s 
Green Revolution: The Rise and Fall of Peasant-Friendly Plant Breeding (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
22 Hebe M.C. Vessuri, “Academic Science in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” in Science in Latin 
America, ed. Juan José Saldaña, trans. Bernabé Madrigal (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 215. 
23 This is not to suggest that Mexico was devoid of scientific research in botany or agriculture.  I am 
suggesting that research towards the public remained minimal.  For examples of advanced research 
derived in Mexico, see Rick A. López, “Nature as Subject and Citizen in the Mexican Botanical Garden,” 
in A Land Between Waters: Environmental Histories of Modern Mexico, ed. Christopher R. Boyer 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012): 73-99; Jeri Reed, “The Corn King of Mexico in the United 
States: A South-North Technology Transfer,” Agricultural History 78, no. 2 (2004): 155-165; Alejandro 
Tortolero Villaseñor, Notarios y agricultores: crecimiento y atraso en el campo mexicano, 1780-1920 
(Mexico: SIGLO XXI, 2008); and Karin E. Matchett, “At Odds Over Inbreeding: An Abandoned Attempt 
at Mexico/United States Collaboration to ‘Improve’ Mexican Corn, 1940-1950,” Journal of the History of 
Biology 39, no. 2 (2006): 345-372. 
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twentieth centuries, the National College of Agriculture, the country’s largest institution 
of higher education, trained students on how to manage peon labor on haciendas (large 
estates with feudal labor conditions) rather than on generating scientific research.24  
According to one report, a “reduced number of técnicos [agents] and installations” were 
spread thinly around the country when it opened.  The office remained small in the 
decade after its founding.  By 1922, an extension department, then called the Office of 
Regional Agronomists, counted only twenty-two field workers who were charged with 
serving millions of farmers.  The name of the department changed to the Department of 
Agricultural Development by 1936, and its agents were called Agrónomos Regionales 
(Regional Agronomists).  In terms of the number of staff members, it remained 
minimal, with only forty employees.25  The bureau where agrónomos worked closed in 
1941 – another telling symbol that officials gave to extension.26    
 Extension lacked in qualitative terms, too.  Agrónomos Regionales received 
instruction from a headquarters in Mexico City and replicated what they were told by 
supervisors in their respective geographic zone.  The problem with such a method of 
extension was that Mexico has an extremely diverse topography, growing regions, 
altitudes, and climates that should have allowed for adaptation to farmers in a specific 
region.  Moreover, the research and its dissemination, per the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
Agricultural Survey Commission in 1941, were severely inadequate.  Lacking 
transportation, men (records do not suggest women were allowed any role in extension 
until the early 1950s) spent their days answering letters and passing out leaflets.  Most 
                                                
24 Ramón Fernández y Fernández, Chapingo hace 50 años (Chapingo, Mexico: Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura, 1976). 
25 Informe, No date listed, SARH, box 184, AGN. 
26 Nathan L. Whetten, Rural Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 334-335. 
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important, perhaps, the men in charge of the research stations around the country 
merely carried out the orders of “a more or less competent man who sits at a desk.”  A 
field worker was “not an independent investigator, neither by training, nor permission.”  
If he displayed any skills, he likely received promotion to a desk job.27   
 This situation changed by the mid-1940s with the availability of researchers and 
resources after the opening of the Office of Special Studies (OSS).  For years, diffusion 
of research results generated by OSS staff members consisted of distribution of Folletos 
Técnicos (Technical Pamphlets) or Folletos de Divulgación (Distribution Pamphlets), 
which were reports of an academic nature, to farmers.28  Growers in the surrounding 
OSS researcher centers also visited the centers’ grounds for Días de Demostración 
(Demonstration Days) or they were invited to see demonstration lots that researchers 
had arranged – in a variety of ways – on local farmer’s plots.29  Stakman et al. describe 
the method: “One corn farmer was interested in obtaining seed of one of the strains 
under test,” and E.J. Wellhausen, head of maize research at the Office of Special 
                                                
27 Elvin Stakman, Paul Mangelsdorf, and Richard Bradfield, “Agricultural Conditions and Problems in 
Mexico: Report of the Survey Commission of the Rockefeller Foundation,” August/September 1941, p. 
55, Archivo del Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias (hereafter 
AINIFAP), Biblioteca Nacional Forestal “Ing. Roberto Villaseñor Ángeles,” Mexico City (hereafter 
BNF); Anneliese Markus de Kennedy, “The Office of Special Studies: A Study of the Joint Mexican 
Secretaríat of Agriculture – Rockefeller Foundation Program in Agriculture, 1943-1963” (PhD diss., 
University of North Carolina, 1973), 42.   
28 For a small sampling of these pamphlets, see E.J. Wellhausen, “Comparación de variedades del maíz 
obtenidas en el Bajío, Jalisco y en la Mesa Central,” Folleto Técnico no. 1, Programa de Agricultura 
Cooperativo de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería y la Fundación Rockefeller (December 1947); 
E.J. Wellhausen and L.M. Roberts, “Rocamex V-7: Una variedad sobresaliente de maíz para sembrarse 
de riego en la Mesa Central,” Folleto de Divulgación no. 3, Oficina de Estudios Especiales, Secretaría de 
Agricultura y Ganadería (August 1948); J. J. McKelvey and D. Parker, “Nuevos insecticidas,” Folleto 
Técnico no. 2, Oficina de Estudios Especiales, Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (October 1948); N. 
E. Borlaug, J. A. Rupert, and J. G. Harrar, “Nuevos trigos para México,” Folleto de Divulgación no. 5, 
Oficina de Estudios Especiales, Secretaría de Agricultura y Ganadería (June 1949).  Pamphlets formerly 
located at AINIFAP, BNF. 
29 To convince farmers to try new seeds and methods, Norman Borlaug sometimes resorted to wrestling 
with farmers.  Per one former MAP fellow, Borlaug challenged farmers to a wrestling contest.  If he won 
the match, then the farmer would grow OSS seeds or farm as advised.  Unidentified, interview with the 
author, Montecillo, Estado de México, Mexico, August 4, 2013. 
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Studies, gave the farmer some seeds.   Afterwards, the farmer agreed to manage his 
field “throughout the season as directed” by OSS staff members.  The man had a 
“fabulous crop” that became the showcase at a field day that President Miguel Alemán 
(1946-1952) visited.  “Farmers had never seen such corn!” according to Stakman et al., 
and word spread to the Mexican press about the fruits of OSS research.  One field day 
became the feature story in El Universal, one of Mexico City’s most-widely read 
dailies.30  The demonstration lot and field day method (some included dinners for 
attendees), combined with the distribution of bulletins “written at the popular level in 
Spanish,” and a traveling slide show accompanied by lectures to farmers, as Deborah 
Fitzgerald discussed, became the go-to way of extension by 1949.31   
 The demonstration method of extension had a history that was familiar to OSS 
leaders from the United States.  It had its roots in a campaign led by Seaman Knapp in 
the early 1900s in the US South.  To combat the boll weevil that hit crops in the South, 
Knapp founded a program that sought to improve agricultural practices among farmers. 
Knapp’s agents located farmers and convinced them to implement an agricultural 
package on their lands to improve their practices and thereby eradicate boll weevils.  
Part of the package promoted by Knapp workers included the use of improved seeds, 
increased fertilization, and mechanization.  Advice to farmers also included technical 
advice concerning early planting or eradicating cotton stalks after harvesting.  Agents 
also promoted crop diversification to break the cycle of monocrop conditions in the 
South, which had contributed to the boll weevil epidemic in the 1900s.  Interstate 
commerce laws prevented Knapp from getting federal USDA support to spread what 
                                                
30 Cited in E.C. Stakman, Richard Bradfield, and Paul C. Mangelsdorf, Campaigns Against Hunger 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 200-201. 
31 Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture,” 471-472. 
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came to be known as the “Knapp method.”  But he received help from the Rockefeller 
Foundation in 1906, when the foundation’s General Education Board agreed to support 
him in states outside of Texas, where his work had begun in Terrell.32  This method of 
allowing farmers to see modern farming became known as the demonstration lot 
method. 
 To complement the method, Knapp also directed his efforts at youth.  He 
promoted youth Boy’s Corn Clubs and Girl’s Canning Clubs.  His reason for reaching 
out to the youth was straightforward: if a younger generation of farmers would adopt 
agricultural scientific farming, their parents would do the same.  As Deborah Fitzgerald 
summed up, “He reasoned that no farmer would want to harvest a yield poorer than that 
of his son.”33  Nearly a decade after Knapp’s work began in the South, the 
demonstration method and government-sponsored extension services were codified into 
law after Congress passed the Smith-Level Act, which created the USDA’s Cooperative 
Extension Service, in May of 1914.  The county extension agent, a professionally-
trained person who traveled to farms and establishments to deliver consultative services 
to local growers on everything from home economics to 4-H educational initiatives, had 
come into existence.  Agricultural improvement and modernization among farmers was 
a matter of farmers seeing how to improve and being told by experts how to improve.  
Extensionists were the foot soldiers who delivered advice and guidance.            
                                                
32 For more information concerning Knapp and U.S. extension, see Joseph C. Bailey, Seaman A. Knapp: 
Schoolmaster of American Agriculture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); Roy V. Scott, The 
Reluctant Farmer: The Rise of Agricultural Extension to 1914 (Urbana, IL.: University of Illinois Press, 
1970); and for a sense of the racism of Knapp’s workers, and more on his program, see the last chapters  
of O.B. Martin, The Demonstration Work: Dr. Seaman A. Knapp’s Contribution to Civilization (Boston: 
Stratford, 1926).  For a very critical discussion about Knapp’s legacy, see James Giesen, Boll Weevil 
Blues: Cotton, Myth, and Power in the American South (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 
136-137. 
33 Fitzgerald, “Exporting American Agriculture,” 460. 
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As we will see, the demonstration method came about in Mexico in small steps.  
Via local media outlets, OSS staff members spread word in areas near research centers 
about a field day.  Farmers arrived to tour the grounds at the center.  Led by an intern 
agrónomo or one of the U.S. researchers, visitors saw fields grown with the latest-
generated seeds under different experimental conditions meant to maximize yields and 
visual appeal.  They learned about the latest methods for combating pests or plant 
diseases, and they heard advice on cultivation techniques.  Having studied at many 
land-grant universities in the United States and having been trained by some of the most 
respected foreign researchers in their fields, agents who delivered the tours and talks 
casted themselves as experts vis-à-vis their audiences.   
Embedded in this model of instruction by agrónomos lay prejudices and 
assumptions.  Articles in agricultural journals during the 1950s and 1960s are littered 
with articles that revealed the attitudes that extension agents had towards peasant 
farmers.  In December of 1948, Augusto Pérez, delivered a paper that underscored 
agrónomos' ideas and modern technology’s role in improving peasants’ lot in life.  “In 
Latin American countries,” Pérez began, “where much of the peasant populations are 
comprised of indigenous peoples,” agricultural improvement remained paramount.  Yet, 
despite the advancements of agrarian reform after the Mexican Revolution, new forms 
of communication technology, new machinery and credit for peasants to purchase the 
equipment, and the use of new fertilizers, peasants remained at the “margins of the 
advancement of agricultural science.”  They continued to be day laborers, “less 
appreciated than a unit of farm machinery.”  In Pérez’s estimation, this situation was 
due in part to peasants’ lack of formal education.  Citing the Yucatecan Maya as a case 
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in point, he argued that campesinos would soon enough gain the know-how and Spanish 
language to become more capable farmers.  Then they would appreciate the social 
reforms of the Mexican revolution and the benefits of modern science.  Education and 
literacy would destroy the “mental prison” of Mayan religious beliefs in the 
metaphysical and other religious ceremonies that were counter to modern science, 
which collectively forbid the Maya from “progressive ideas.”  Furthermore, without 
literacy and training in modern agriculture, peasants and indigenous groups would never 
gain the requisite skills to apply for credit from banks to increase their crop yields and 
thus their income.  The lot of Indian peasants in 1950s Mexico, in Pérez’s reading of 
history, was linear: Indian peasants needed literacy to overcome their supernatural 
beliefs in order to understand Spanish and modern science. Literacy and science offered 
solutions to the problems of millions of campesinos.34 
Pérez, however, alluded to a method that would help peasants: agricultural 
extension.  It came from a model that had “magnificent results” in the United States.  
Farmers north of the border possessed a “modern mentality” and realized the wonderful 
benefits from extension.  If Mexico’s extension service received more support, then 
peasants would effectively understand the benefits they stood to gain from the 
“magnificent” method from the United States.35  In his conclusion, Pérez suggested that 
it was of capital importance that government leaders would supplement extension with 
“help[ing]” peasants with literacy and learning how to speak Spanish “for the 
Revolución and la Patria.”36  The conflation of the social and political circumstances of 
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peasants with science-shall-solve-complex-problems approach was all too evident.  
Furthermore, extension would serve as a technical palliative to peasant farmers’ 
adjustment to modernization.  
The tone and substance of Pérez’s article became the lingua franca among 
agronomists in relation to how agronomists discussed peasant agriculture.  While they 
respected many growers’ cultivation methods, they also saw potential for improvement 
via modern science and easy transfer of this science via a method from the United 
States.  They saw their potential to transform peasants in their work.37  Tierra, the 
journal where Pérez’s ideas were published, became the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
official magazine in 1950.  It became the organ to help and guide farmers “who needed 
so much help in their pursuit of progress” on their farms and in their homes.38  The 
growing body of agronomists in Mexico regarded peasants, who numbered at least three 
million (and about 10 percent of the population), as subjects in need of guidance in 
agriculture and education.39  Just as important, agrónomos saw themselves as workers 
who owned the skills and knowledge that were essential to peasants’ deliverance from 
pre-modern farming.  Science in the modern world, according to an editorial in Tierra, 
had become important in all human activities.  And it was imperative, according to one 
writer, for agrónomos to find “effective methods” for campesinos to utilize and benefit 
from the fruits of modern science.40  In Mexico, as historian Nick Cullather said about 
Asia during the Cold War, science “offered a unique medium” for inculcating 
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democratic and “progressive values” in their pursuit to modify the psychology of 
peasants.41  Left out of Mexican agronomists’ conception of agricultural development 
was consideration of what campesinos may already have known about agriculture, their 
cultures, and their histories.       
 
TEACHING PEASANTS  
The most commonly used of these effective methods of agrónomos taking 
science to peasants would be, as Pérez suggested, agricultural extension based on a 
model from the United States.  By 1949, young Mexican men had traveled to the United 
States where many of them witnessed U.S.-style extension.  They had seen the 
cooperative efforts between county extension agents and land-grant universities.  
Having interned and worked in the Días de Demostración at OSS research stations, 
many of the young agronomists decided to take what they saw as a transferable system 
to Mexico.  Salvador Sánchez, one of those who had studied U.S. agriculture and had 
by the early 1950s gained a position of influence in politics, was most responsible for 
ushering in modern extension in Mexico. 
Sánchez embodied the Mexican ingeniero agrónomo who sought to rectify 
problems in the Mexican countryside via techniques and technology from the United 
States.  The son of peasant parents in Atlacomulco, State of Mexico, he was born in 
1912.  He earned a scholarship from the government to attend a high school in the state 
of Hidalgo to study agriculture.  In 1935, he graduated from Mexico’s premier 
agricultural studies college.  After graduating, he taught botany in northern Mexico 
                                                
41 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010), Introduction, Kindle edition. 
25 
before he took a trip to study citrus fruit production in the United States.  Upon 
returning, Sánchez went to work for National Bank of Ejido Credit, the state-funded 
bank mandated to offer credit to ejidatarios (communal land owners) after the Mexican 
Revolution.  From the 1944 to 1946, he worked for the Ministry of Agriculture.  In 
1946, he became the Director of the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, simultaneously 
serving as a state senator in Mexico’s national congress. While in charge of the 
department, he became “well acquainted with [J.G.] Harrar [Director of the Mexican 
Agricultural Program] and the research program of the Office of Special Studies.”42  In 
the same year, he was one of the founders of Tierra, which became the journal of the 
national Ministry of Agriculture in 1950. Influential people like Sánchez, and other 
Rockefeller Foundation fellows, as historian Joseph Cotter wrote, “praised the MAP 
[Mexican Agricultural Program] and its hybrids, attended U.S. universities, and 
worshipped U.S. science.”43  Six years after founding the country’s largest agricultural 
journals, Sánchez became the governor of the State of Mexico.44 
He took office in September of 1951 with ambitious plans.  During his 
campaign, he gave more than four thousand talks with people in his state, and it became 
clear to Sánchez that agricultural production was low.  Farmers, he said in an interview, 
“cannot solve their own problems and do not even have a clear idea of their most urgent 
needs.”  Proof, he indicated, was evident because throughout his campaign tour, not one 
farmer asked if his administration would help provide farmers with fertilizers, “despite 
it being of capital importance in farming.”  In addition to farmers not knowing their 
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own needs, he delineated other issues in the state: soil erosion because of monoculture; 
low crop yields; lack of irrigation (88 percent of the state lands were irrigated by 
unreliable seasonal rain for irrigation); under-utilized lands that could be converted into 
productive pasture lands; and “many years of irrational [forest] exploitation.”45   
Upon taking office, Sánchez already had plans in mind.  To solve each of the 
state’s problems, members of his staff were going to install meteorological stations 
around the state to get to know its climatic zones.  Researchers would then determine 
which crops thrived best in different areas.  The erosion problem would be solved via 
reforestation campaigns.  Interested farmers would also gain easier access to credit to 
purchase agave plants to restore the health of the soil in many areas of the state.  To 
help diversify crop yields, the Sánchez administration was to distribute hybrid seeds.  In 
relation to a lack of irrigation, his administration planned on capturing rain water in 
lakes.  With help from the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources, Sánchez planned on 
digging deep subsoil water wells and tap groundwater resources as deep as 60 meters.  
In dealing with forest exploitation, a team of researchers had already begun a forest 
inventory to find out what areas of the state required reforestation.  To supplement these 
efforts, workers at nurseries had begun growing trees to be planted in many areas, with 
the hope that forest coverage could return to 1920’s levels.  These same nurseries would 
provide seed materials to plant around the state to diversity crop production.  Among 
the plants that should go into production when Sánchez became governor were apples, 
pears, peaches, quince, walnuts, avocadoes, oranges, bananas, and cherimoyas.  Some 
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of the “most modern milking instruments” and fine livestock were also on the way to 
help increase dairy production in the state’s expansive valleys.46   
An agenda of such reach required manpower and resources.  Sánchez noted that 
plans were already in place.  To ensure that the efforts in Sánchez’s plans arrived to 
farmers, he founded an agricultural extension department.  They would “orient farmers 
in their work.”  The extension workers would help farmers “realize and enjoy the 
different parts” of Sánchez’s program.  Benefits of the state project, however, could not 
come to reality solely on the efforts of the state’s finances and the government’s 
cooperation with farmers.  The federal government and other agencies would help.  “I 
have no doubt that it will be easy,” Sánchez finished, “to get cooperation between 
interested farmers and the government.  And we will successfully solve the current and 
future agricultural problems in the state.”  Interviewers left Sánchez’s office “convinced 
in his [Sánchez’s] faith in his mission,” and confident about the future and the will 
needed to accomplish the program in the State of Mexico.47 
Weeks later Tierra writers followed Governor Sánchez to the Office of Special 
Studies research station on the campus of the National College of Agriculture in 
Chapingo to witness a Demonstration Day.  He arrived with important company.  In tow 
were county supervisors from his state, who, Sánchez commented, “should do 
everything they could to help spread the word about government plans to resolve the 
grave rural problems in the state.”  Interns and students at the station divided up the 
functionaries and gave them tours through the different fields dedicated to different 
research.  They visited small plots dedicated to forage and grass research; the bromine 
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and panic grasses appeared promising towards helping to reverse soil erosion.  Visitors 
learned about Rocamex H-1, hybrid maize that was in its testing stages but looked to 
have promising yield levels.48  The experimental wheat fields highlighted the day.  
Visitors, including Sánchez, “politely assaulted” the bus that drove people around the 
grounds to go see about 2,000 wheat strains being generated by researchers.  At the 
wheat fields, Norman Borlaug lectured on the seeds in the works that would hopefully 
be resistant to the latest species of chahuixtle (rust disease).49  
The day ended with an overwhelming appeal to visitors’ visual senses at the lots 
under the Office of Special Studies in Texcoco, a town about ten kilometers from 
Chapingo.  Strategically located alongside the highway that went from Chapingo to the 
city of Texcoco, farmers had planted lots with maize, wheat, sorghum, potatoes, beans, 
grasses, and other crops.  A harvesting machine stripped potatoes from a field, allowing 
visitors to see the “abundance” of legumes and to realize that “potatoes, contrary to 
what state local farmers thought, could in fact be grown” in the region.  At the maize 
fields, according to Tierra writers in attendance, E.J. Wellhausen discussed the 
advantages of recently-developed hybrid maize.  Wellhausen stood in front a large pile 
of shucked ears of hybrid and chalqueña (a regional landrace) maize to “make plain and 
obvious” the superiority of hybrid maize.  He then lectured on the size difference in ears 
and mentioned the 54 percent yield superiority that hybrid maize versus local maize.  
The day concluded following the tour of the demonstration lots.50 
                                                
48 As a symbol of their cooperative efforts, many seed varieties developed by the Office of Special 
Studies were labeled “Rocamex” to signify the cooperative efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation and 
Mexico. 
49 “La Oficina de Estudios Especiales Demuestra que…” Tierra VI, no. 11 (November 1951), 714-715 
and 747. 
50 Ibid.  A landrace is a domesticated plant (and animal) species of a given ecological region.  
29 
 
 
Image 1.1  E.J. Wellhausen and Salvador Sánchez, both at right-center, demonstrating the superiority in 
size and yield of hybrid maize versus local landraces (from Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Biblioteca 
Central, Tierra, November 1951). 
 
The Demonstration Day represented a pitch for agricultural technology.  Center 
interns and researchers delivered lectures on the most up-to-date seed technology in 
Mexican agriculture.  Guests received advice from experts, such as Borlaug and 
Wellhausen, in agricultural technology, and how and why they should promote hybrid 
seeds, and introduce new crops to their constituents.  The demonstration lots, Tierra 
authors noted, was alongside a busy road, for Mexicans to see “progress” in a tangible 
form.  In delivering their promotions to the visitors, Wellhausen and interns produced 
with piles of local and hybrid ears of maize for visitors to appreciate the superiority of 
agricultural technology.  The maize on display and the aesthetic appeals to visitors 
represent something similar to what historian Nick Cullather called the “apotheosis of 
technology.”  In his examination of IR-8 rice deployed throughout Southeast Asia 
during the 1960s, technicity referred to “the use of a technology…to visualize a 
boundary between tradition and modernity.”51  The visual appeals displayed in 
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Chapingo to Sánchez and company were spectacles meant to charm visitors by simply 
looking at the crops.  Writers for Tierra led one to believe that visitors were captivated 
with what they saw, the equivalent of the experience that José Arcadio Buendía had the 
first time he saw ice in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude.52  
Unsaid yet explicitly clear was the suggestion that the benefits of modern agricultural 
technology – in this case, corn – had arrived to Mexico, and, with the notable yield and 
size superiority of hybrid maize versus local strains, it was all too clear why Mexican 
farmers should opt for hybrid seeds.  And by extension, it was incumbent for the 
officials that Governor Sánchez had invited to the day’s events to make sure that their 
constituents be introduced to modern agricultural technology. 
This much was clear in an elegiac Tierra editorial written about the day in 
Chapingo.  The writer praised Sánchez because of his zeal and interest in improving 
agriculture, which had a “capital importance.”  He also commended the efforts of OSS 
researchers, saying that they had “made good on their offer towards improving the 
country’s agriculture.”  The demonstration day, the writer added, symbolized “a step 
forward” for Mexico.  But, he concluded, “a more organized, formal manner was 
needed to ensure that farmers” received the technology displayed and methods taught in 
Chapingo.  Farmers needed an extension service “constituted of técnicos trained in 
dissemination, who tour the countryside and effectively sermonize the gospel of 
progress.”53   
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Another editorial echoed these words a couple months later.  The author spelled 
out the gravity of técnicos’ gospel and a rationale for adopting modern agricultural 
technology: 
Farmers, by nature, are suspicious, and – at times, with plenty of reasons - do  
not accept easily change that disrupts their routines, which were tested over  
many generations, but deficient.  To convince them, it is necessary to capture  
their trust and show them, via demonstration, what they really need.  The  
intimate union between research and practice is the only way to advance our  
agriculture down a path towards a new era of progress and wellbeing.54 
 
Wellhausen added urgency to an extension program in the same Tierra issue.  “The 
experimental work,” taking place in Mexico, “had no value if it did not arrive to 
farmers, who could not conduct experiments, but could utilize new things.”55     
 
Image 1.2  Norman Borlaug at a Día de Demostración discussing wheat rust disease with visitors (from 
Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Biblioteca Central, Tierra, August 1952). 
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Image 1.3  A técnico, at left-center, explains advances in wheat breeding at the Santa Elena Experiment 
Station día de campo (from Gobierno del Estado de México, Dirección de Agricultura y Ganaderia, 
Campo Experimental Agrícola Santa Elena, Informe Num. 1, 1952 – 1954, Archivo Efraím Hernández 
Xolocotzi, September 1954). 
 
Sánchez wasted no time in making sure that a professional extension program 
began in his state.  He consulted with J. George Harrar, at the time the Director of the 
Mexican Agricultural Program and in charge of the Office of Special Studies, if his 
office would support a pilot extension program.  Harrar offered a “strong 
recommendation” of support for the idea, and in January of 1952, a program began.56  
With funding from the state government and the Rockefeller Foundation, Sánchez 
invested nearly $3 million to build a new research station in Santa Elena in the Toluca 
valley.  The money allowed for the purchase of 50 hectares of land that had previously 
been an hacienda.  Equipped with water wells and buildings to house experiment 
stations, service roads on the grounds, tractors, and a modern laboratory, the station 
represented a substantial investment in money and planning.  According to one of his 
bulletins, the center had several purposes: production of high-yielding agricultural seeds 
adapted to climate conditions in the state, entomological studies and prevention, soil 
studies, seasonal crop studies, fertilizer development, herbicide production, and forage 
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development.57  Between the Santa Elena and Chapingo research stations, the State of 
Mexico had, according to an interview E.J. Wellhausen gave months after the extension 
program began, “enough experiment stations to produce the materials with respect to 
new varieties of crops, or through the experimental work, for the entire state, to cover 
all the different regions in the state.”58  
 
 
Map 1.1  State of Mexico (from http://www.travelbymexico.com/estados/estadodemexico). 
 
With an idea of the flora, topography, and climate zones of the state, Sánchez 
and his staff divided the state into eight geographic regions, each of which ranged in 
size from about 2,000 to 5,000 square kilometers of land.  Researchers assessed each 
region according to the crops grown there, the communications available in the region, 
topography, and climate.  Sánchez assigned each zone a regional agronomist.  Covering 
an expanse of the 119 municipios (similar to a county in the United States), they were 
each provided a vehicle for travel and distributed operating funds, and unlike Mexico’s 
older extension service department, the agronomists had autonomy to accommodate 
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their zones, minus interference from Mexico City.59  Their assignment: “to take the 
materials and knowledge or results that have been obtained in experiment stations and 
extend them to the farmers” in their regions.60  Like U.S. county agents during the early 
1900s and those who had been a part of Seamann Knapp’s demonstration scheme, 
agents would roam around their zone and “with time, all the farmers would get to know 
him.”  “He would,” said Wellhausen, “gain the confidence of peasants, which was 
naturally important.”  Agents would recommend the right suggestions and not 
administer bad or false advice.  “He first needs to demonstrate, on a small scale, 
everything that he recommends,” so that farmers will later “adopt what they have seen 
in the demonstration plots, and the program will be complete.”61  Sánchez’s pilot 
program with the Rockefeller Foundation had an almost mechanistic methodology for 
changing farmers.     
 
Image 1.4  Salvador Sánchez was the designer of Mexico’s agricultural extension program after 1951 
(from Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Biblioteca Central, Tierra, October 1951). 
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THE ORIGINS OF IOWA IN MEXICO 
 Sánchez’s state pilot program spawned profound changes over the next decade.  
From the first day of the program, Sánchez later said, the utmost concern was to “give 
countenance to the mandate that the people” gave him when he became governor.62  
The cadre of agronomists in his state grew from seven to nearly two dozen, and their 
responsibilities expanded tremendously.  With some difficulties, they represented what 
Deborah Fitzgerald called, in reference to the engineers who led the change towards an 
industrial ethos among farmers in the United States, “carriers of cultural change.”63  
Agrónomos led rural household construction programs for peasants.  They managed 
rural sanitation initiatives, led rural youth programs, and founded a vocational college 
for teenagers of peasant extraction.  These cultural engineers were so successful that 
early in the life of Sánchez’s project the Mexican president praised the type of work that 
they delivered to growers.  The state program became the origin of national agricultural 
extension.  Promoting a pedagogy that showed and told peasants what do, the 
extensionists gave birth to the modern system of Mexican agricultural extension.  The 
extensionistas also became foot soldiers who attempted to deliver U.S.-style agriculture 
to Mexico. 
 The first year of the program was frustrating at times for Sánchez’s state agents.  
Available reports from the state indicate that the extension workers dealt with the 
vagaries of nature and a lack of supplies.64  Most important, they dealt with the human 
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element of extension.  Farmers often lacked faith in the extension workers, and the 
workers’ frustration is evident in their reports.  Dagoberto Aguilar, working in the 
northeastern part of the state, began his report from April with unpromising terms.  
During his first months, he had, “despite much work trying to convince them,” not 
identified one farmer to cooperate with the project.  Generally, he reported, locating a 
farmer who was amenable towards allowing his land to become a demonstration lot was 
difficult because doing so “entailed obligations and expenses that were unnecessary,” 
according to growers.  Aguilar, therefore, found it more effective to hold informal talks 
with small groups of farmers, “small conferences” during which he gave advice about 
seed selection and disinfection, and fertilizer usage.65  Alfredo González had more luck 
than Aguilar in a central part of the state with finding demonstration lots, but 
Michoacán 21, the hybrid seed that he had been sent to promote, proved to be a failure 
in his zone.  He asked for the Santa Elena research station to send a maize more 
acclimated to his zone’s climate, keeping in mind that a compatible maize variety will 
“keep the interests of farmers” in his area.66  Some months later, González had some 
luck, saying that he “celebrated some talks” with peasant wheat farmers in his area.  In 
this same report, he reported that rain and hail in the central part of the state had 
undermined local potato crops, but recently introduced potatoes yielded a good 
harvest.67 
                                                
65 Dagoberto Aguilar Vergara, “Se rinde informe trimestral de labores,” April 17, 1952, SARH, box 211, 
AGN.   
66 Manuel Lezama Mayorga, “Se rinde informe trimestral de labores,” July 5, 1952, SARH, box 211, 
AGN. 
67 ----, “Rindiendo informe trimestral de labores de esta Jefatura,” October 6, 1952, SARH, box 211, 
AGN. 
37 
 Severe challenges in the early days of the program notwithstanding, agents in 
the State of Mexico program adjusted to circumstances in their zones, and more 
importantly, they began to believe confirm their faith in the demonstration method.  
One summer report from Dagoberto Aguilar, the same worker who had terrible luck 
finding cooperative farmers, shows how quickly fortunes changed.  Months after 
reporting that he had challenges, he continued to roam his zone, and things had 
improved.  He was, in contrast to previous reports, holding talks with small groups and 
had, “with regularity,” begun trips around his zone to consult with farmers with a new 
tact.  He utilized a gradual approach to not “profoundly modify” farmer’s practices; 
instead, he “introduced better daily practices.”  This way “farmers to get used to small 
changes that will ultimately improve their current agricultural practices that do not align 
with the modernization of our [Mexican] agricultural system.”68  A report by Felipe 
Delgado reported that “despite the noble intentions” of the project he was carrying out 
in his zone, “he has yet to find someone who was not resistant” to parts of the work he 
conducted.  At a ranchería, farmers opposed the parts of the program because they 
thought that it would offer their community “not one benefit.”  But he had not 
“neglected, in no way, the importance” of his project in his zone.  Hence, he had no 
problem with intervening in disputes among local peasants over irrigation sources 
between different groups and land invasions.  Moreover, he discovered a new form of 
agricultural diffusion: motion pictures.  Borrowing films from the U.S. embassy and a 
local DuPont vendor, Delgado claimed that farmers “reacted favorably to this type of 
education.”  Finally, he had arranged for farmers to visit demonstration lots in use “with 
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the objective that they personally witness the magnificent results of using good seeds 
and following the advice that modern agricultural techniques has to offer.”69    
 If there was any doubt that Mexican agronomists considered peasants incapable 
agriculturalists and that extension represented an avenue for improvement, one need 
only read a reaction to Sánchez’s program in agricultural journals of the day, and the 
calls that followed from agronomists for more extension services.  After opining that 
agrónomos needed to convince government officials that agriculture was an art and a 
science that needed to be advised to farmers by “expert advice” and “needed to have the 
benefit of scientific research,” Gonzalo Blanco begged for a larger extension service.  
Agents, he suggested, were obligated to pressure the national Ministry of Agriculture to 
establish a national program that would be serviced by “well-prepared in their apostolic 
mission” of delivering science to the countryside to “banish forever quackery, 
ignorance, risk” and the hunger that so many Mexican peasants suffered.  He finished: 
“We [agrónomos] must try to dignify, 'technify' our damned national agriculture.”70 
In 1953 President Adolfo Ruiz and the Minister of Agriculture, Gilberto Flores, 
decreed a national emergency plan to increase maize and corn production.  In 
accordance with the plan, according to one editorial, the president provided extra funds 
and manpower to help farmers in designated areas increase maize and bean 
production.71  Extension, specifically accelerating the delivery of advice to farmers via 
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the demonstration method, was also one of the key parts of the emergency plan.72  
Writers like Alfonso Díaz del Pino offered an extensive solution to low agricultural 
production, particularly maize.  On one hand, he agreed with others, arguing that it was 
the departure of many farmers to work as farmhands in the United States in the Bracero 
Program that added to stagnation in national production levels.73  On the other hand, the 
more salient reason was that manufacturing in Mexico had increased, and workers left 
the countryside as wage laborers.  He also said that maize farmers continued “the 
traditional method that had been practiced for hundreds of years, with negative results.”  
He implored farmers to modernize, and specifically, take note of demonstration plots 
that offered, in “plain view,” the methods they should adopt.74   
Another writer argued that agriculture was, relative to other sectors of the 
national economy, growing “at a rhythm without comparison.”  But agricultural yields 
of important crops remained low because of “poor practices” among farmers who 
“because of ignorance or a lack of resources.”  Additionally, the irrigation works taking 
place around the country, the credit becoming available to farmers, the highway system 
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being constructed in the country, and the other works on the part of governmental 
institutions would be for not if Mexicans did not “see the reality in which peasants, 
those that make up the rural population [of the country], live.”  Peasants, he added, 
“need training, an objective education of how to get the most from their parcels of land, 
their water resources, how and when to apply fertilizers, different types of high-yielding 
seeds, combating diseases, etc.[,] etc.”  The author suggested that extension agents 
should be people who “speak in a language appropriate” to the farmers in their zones.  
When they “hear and see” and later implement the advice that the lessons that agents 
taught, campesinos “shall be convinced that they are contributing to their own 
improvement and that of their communities, and ultimately, to their patria.”  After 
elaborating on how extension agents embodied the sources that shall educate peasants 
and explaining how extension workers shall, by default, contribute to the social and 
economic progress of Mexico, the author implored the government to increase support 
for extension services.75   
A few months later in the same magazine, Francisco García echoed a similar 
logic.  Using methods that ranged from “the most elementary to more technical 
methods,” extension agents were mandated to adjust their work to their constituents.  
This was important because “as farmer’s practices and income improve, they will 
discover a new path and new ways of working will translate into improvements in 
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peasant’s economic, social, and cultural lot in limitless ways.”  García added that 
Mexican agriculture was “rather elementary,” and farmers “need such rudimentary 
lessons that they appeared to be aberrations as people in the twentieth century.”  
Millions of peasants who lived in misery were “irrationally exploiting their land, 
compounding their problems and, everyday, making their lot in life tougher because of 
a lack of someone to guide them” and somehow show them how to improve their lives, 
via the most “elementary” of practices.76 
Such thoughts about peasants were common among agrónomos, and the answer 
to address campesinos’ agronomic inertia was extension.77  Agronomists assigned to 
peasants certain characteristics and traits.  By conceptualizing peasants in these terms, it 
followed that they needed to be shown how to cultivate, to see and learn.  Armed with 
training and know-how in modern agricultural methods and technology from the United 
States that they venerated, and being advised to do so by their foreign mentors like 
Borlaug, agrónomos pleaded to leaders in Mexico to expand efforts to aid peasants.  
Not mentioned in the pleas for the expansion of the extension was the idea that an 
expansion offered vocational legitimacy and more jobs for agrónomos.  The logic that 
they employed made all too much sense to many agronomists in the early 1950s. 
Sánchez and company overlooked other important considerations in their work.  
By traveling to farmers and bestowing their “modern,” non-elemental knowledge, 
extension became a hierarchical form of instruction.78  Advice concerning fertilizers, 
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soil maintenance, and other lessons in modern agriculture constituted a body of 
knowledge gifted by extensionists to peasants.  The process of educating the masses of 
farmers was equivalent to what Paulo Friere, one of Latin America’s most famous 
spokesmen for peasants, called the banking concept of education.  Modern knowledge 
was “a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those 
whom they consider to know nothing.”79  While they sympathized with peasants’ lot in 
life, extensionists neglected the possibility that campesinos might know what they were 
doing as farmers.  Extension precluded any serious study of local knowledge and 
consideration for factors of the communities in which they worked, such as culture and 
history.  
Less than two years after it began, Sánchez’s program started receiving praise 
from outsiders and from him.  Not solely based on increased agricultural production, the 
project, according to one writer, had “great achievements and deep importance.”  In his 
second annual report on the project, Governor Sánchez explained to constituents that 
the program dealt with issues ranging from “farmer education” to the founding of an 
agricultural machinery center.  Changing the state departments that dealt with 
agriculture, he divided the Sub-ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry into 
three separate departments.  In relation to each of the areas of emphasis in President 
Ruiz’s agricultural Emergency Plan, Sánchez’s report said that despite a bad rainfall 
year, the state should make up for the shortfall with a strong winter wheat harvest with 
Santa Elena 52, a seed developed at the Santa Elena research station.  Bean production 
appeared favorable in the southern region of the state, which helped the federal 
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government’s national emergency plan.  To deal with the thousands of hectares that 
were subject to erosion in the state, extension agents had “applied diverse methods of 
objective learning” to teaching soil conservation “with the idea of correcting the waste 
[and] deterioration of soil.”  Project workers had distributed 54,500 kilograms of 
imported tubers in 1952 to build a potato industry in the state.  The next year, they 
distributed nearly double this amount, 94,468 kilograms.  Fertilizer distribution went 
from 6,800 tons in 1952 to 10,000 tons the following year.  In relations to improving the 
livestock industry in the state, ten imported bulls with good bloodlines had been 
responsible for producing more than 600 head of cattle within two years.  Although 
twenty-four counties had outbreaks of Dengue fever, affecting more than one-hundred 
thousand heads of cattle, Sánchez mentioned how extension agents had vaccinated more 
than half of the effected heads.  To address reforestation in the state, workers had 
planted more than 1.7 million trees around the state.  Sánchez and company also 
promoted the formation of cooperative farming efforts.  Funding for local credit unions 
grew from $1.6 million in 1952 to $11 million in 1953.  This same year Sánchez opened 
a machinery plant that housed machines to help growers with soil rotation, and 
fallowing fields.80   
At the heart of these efforts was Sánchez’s corps of extension agents.  “The 
results obtained,” Sánchez’s second annual review said, from these agents “suggests 
that they are the fundamental elements in the government’s agricultural program.”  The 
number of demonstration lots, which represented the “most effective way to convince 
farmers about the greatness of technical agricultural practices,” had increased from 
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seventeen in 1951 to thirty-two by the end of 1953.  The diversity of crops in these lots 
varied from maize, wheat, and beans, to potatoes and other horticultural products.  The 
agronomists had also organized conferences at which they trained rural schoolteachers 
to help “spread the vigorous pulse” that campesinos needed.  These Regional Teacher 
Training Centers provided extensionistas venues during which they gave teachers 
lessons in modern agricultural techniques that teachers would hopefully share with their 
students.  To spread the work that extension agents promulgated and notices about the 
research being generated at the state’s two research centers (Chapingo and Santa Elena), 
six bulletins had been distributed throughout the state.  The Ministry of Hydraulic 
Resources and the national Agrarian Department provided funding to ejidatarios who 
had received land near Lerma, in the center of the state, and extensionistas taught the 
beneficiaries how to steward their new irrigation resources and land.81     
 Sánchez’s administration received substantial federal government support for his 
state program, particularly from functionaries with a background similar to his own.  In 
1953, Joaquín Loredo became the Chief of Agricultural Extension in the national 
Ministry of Agriculture and a coordinator in President Adolfo Ruiz’s emergency plan.  
Loredo was a Rockefeller Foundation (RF) fellow and, like Sánchez, had trained in the 
United States.  After graduating from the National College of Agriculture, he received a 
scholarship to Cornell University in 1947.  After earning his Master’s degree from 
Cornell, he returned to Mexico to serve as the assistant director in the soils research 
department for the Office of Special Studies.82  According to a 1954 RF annual report, 
he received $1200 “to visit the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
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various state service centers.”83  Within months of the visit to USDA centers, Loredo’s 
offices began supporting Sánchez’s program by appropriating federal funds to the 
program and adding twelve more extension agents.84   
Other agronomists shared a high opinion and conviction about U.S. extension.  
In 1954, Gabino Vázquez, a writer for one of Mexico’s non-state agricultural journals, 
visited the United States to learn more about USDA’s Department of Agricultural 
Extension.  He shared details about his trip in glowing terms, eulogizing about county 
agents in the United States and their work with poultry farmers and 4-H clubs, and the 
Domestic Economy courses that Demonstration Agents imparted on North American 
women, which taught how farmers “live better utilizing their own resources, via lectures 
and demonstrations about home economics, the kitchen, hygiene, childcare, sewing.”  
He all but demanded that Mexico adopt an identical replica.  In almost malinchista 
terms, he finished the summary of his visit with “The Extension Department and 
Information Services that saturate the American rural environment, with numerous 
publications, and radio, television and theater productions, make it possible that 
American countryside becomes more prepared for technical agricultural development 
that yields abundance, creating an environment of prosperity and human dignity in this 
country [the United States] where the majority of the country’s wealth comes from its 
exemplary populace.”85   
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With financial support from the federal government and vocal support from the 
likes of Vázquez, Sánchez opened a small vocational school for students of “campesino 
extraction.”86  Located in Chalco, the Agricultural and Livestock Technological School 
offered intensive courses in different parts of modern agricultural technology.  
Instructors taught five intensive courses of eight weeks each throughout the calendar 
year.  Any literate farmer eighteen years of age or older could participate free of charge.  
Students learned the most elementary of lessons, such as how to watering household 
gardens, to more advanced lessons like how to use sprayers and dusters to combat plant 
diseases.  They also gained hands-on experience in grafting, pruning, or planting trees, 
and mixing fertilizer.  Instructors also taught meat packing, cheese production, and 
vegetable canning.  The school’s goal was that course participants would take what they 
learned to their town or ejido and “impart progress to their region,” with the idea that 
“farmers would copy and put into practices the new agricultural techniques.”87      
Students “learned by doing things” in Chalco (emphasis in original).  Mornings 
consisted of formal instruction, with lectures and books.  In the afternoons 
extensionistas utilized “new and novel” techniques that one article called, 
“audiovisual.”  That is,  
farmers learn [by] watching movies, overhead images, photographs, and 
maquetas [dioramas; models] of every lesson that the instructor wishes to plant 
in the students’ minds, successfully doing so with a certain of ease because the 
lessons that penetrate the eye or the eye is easily retained in the mind.88     
 
                                                                                                                                          
Norteamérica,” México Agrícola II, no. 14 (February 1955), 23-24 and 34.  Malinchista is a term that 
indicates a Mexican who venerate or prefer foreign customs vis-à-vis local customs, aesthetics, culture, 
etc. 
86 De la Cruz, “El Estado de México Segunda el Programa Presidencial en Material Agrícola,” 769. 
87 “Hacia el Progreso y Bienestar Rural,” Tierra X, no. 6 (June 1955), 496-497. 
88 Ibid. 
47 
The school graduated hundreds of students after its opening, and according to what 
Tierra writers implied, aided towards accomplishing the goal of establishing Mexico’s 
ascendance as a country, as well as “progress and rural wellbeing.”89   
 
Image 1.5  Farmers at the Agricultural and Livestock Technological School in Chalco (from the 
Biblioteca Central, Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Tierra, June 1955). 
 
  
The same year that congratulatory articles began appearing in journals, the 
essence of Sánchez’s program expanded into other areas.  Mexico’s Secretary of 
Agriculture Gilberto Flores, who also had a penchant for modernizing Mexican 
agriculture, began pushing a Mexican version of 4-H clubs.90  Called Rural Youth 
Clubs, these organizations operated under the mandate of capacitating “children and 
young adults of both sexes about agricultural production, poultry and domestic animal 
exploitation, via application of modern techniques that help their families to increase 
their incomes and improve their nutrition.”  Collaborating with the Ministry of 
Education, extension agents traveled to schools in their assigned zones to select students 
who ranged ten to eighteen years old who would work together on cooperative and 
individual projects.  Such undertakings included poultry farming, honey making, or 
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cultivation and maintenance of family gardens.  Agents also took club members to visit 
research stations, demonstration lots, and reforestation projects.  Home visits by 
extension agents, to check on socios’ family gardens were common.  By 1955, 
extension workers in Sánchez’s state oversaw more clubs than any other state in 
Mexico.91  In the same year, one fawning editorial mentioned how youth clubs had 
functioned for many years in countries like the United States and in other countries.  
The author added that the clubs ensured that the rural class was to become “well-trained 
and open to modern ideas.”92    
The substance of Sánchez’s fourth annual report had not changed much since his 
first one.  Engineers had modified canyons stemming from the Lerma River so that 
when heavy winds passed through them, erosion damage remained minimal.  Fertilizer 
usage among farmers had increased five times since the program’s inception.  State 
farmers, according to Sánchez, “had overcome the well-known resistance to behavior 
habits,” and thus, farmers were adopting improved seeds.  The dairy and livestock 
sectors had improved.  More than two million trees had been planted to help in the 
reforestation efforts.  Some extension agents helped with a rural outreach program that 
offered advice on hygiene to peasants and household issues, particularly to women, 
about issues such as nutrition and child health.  Días de Demostración continued, too.  
The caption next to a picture in the article containing Sánchez’s report contained a 
photograph similar to those of Norman Borlaug and E.J. Wellhausen leading a 
demonstration day in the early 1950s.  It read: “Farmers and ejidatarios periodically 
meet at research stations and, via lecture from agrónomos, they realize, on their own, 
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the advantages of the methods and variety of seeds that they are recommended.”  
Sánchez proudly opened his report saying that the program in his state was helping the 
“national battle” that Mexicans had undertaken against low maize and bean production.  
He added that the program’s results were small, but he remained certain that “we are 
explaining and showing the values of agricultural promotion; we are gaining the 
understanding and sympathy from the interested groups; we are identifying and 
coordinating our programs with those of the rest of the country, conscious that only in 
this manner shall we accomplish our governmental responsibilities.”93 
Sánchez’s extension agents held an equally high opinion of the project.  At a 
conference, Gilberto Mendoza said that he and others were parts of a program that 
delivered an all-encompassing program.  Moreover, staffers carried out their work “with 
much fondness” and “with the hope of generating” new traditions among campesinos.  
These traditions, they hoped, “after translated into the future, will make life in the 
countryside easier.”  The self-congratulatory words about how the importance of 
extensionists work continued, as Mendoza explained, was that extension constituted “an 
aggregate of simple knowledge and skills,” with which one could attain positive results 
quickly, that was apart from “complicated science.”  “It was, in a certain way, the 
method to make sure that many groups scarce of urbanity…received the results of 
research and scientific speculation reduced to simple rules and capable of adaptation 
and application by the subjects to whom they were imparted.”94 
 Such self-congratulations translated into the monthly agent reports.  This much 
was clear by Saúl Rodríguez’s report from the summer of 1955.  At an ejido in 
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Miraflores, his advice to farmers helped combat spider mites “with much success” after 
applying sulphur as an insecticide.  A downpour of rain and hail, Rodríguez implied, on 
one of his maize demonstration farms in Chalco damaged the local maize, but did 
nothing to the H-1 and H-124 hybrid stalks of maize.  He told a supervisor in Toluca, 
“You will appreciate some of the photos I have included of the criollo maize that was 
affected by the hail.”  Just outside the city of Amecameca, Rodríguez had taken three 
groups of ten farmers to visit a maize demonstration lot that showed the contrast in size 
versus local brands of maize.  To this same lot, he took his rural youth club school 
group so that “at a young age they gain a clear understanding about the advantages that 
one obtains by using improved seeds and fertilizers.  On top of seeing this lesson, they 
will extend these lessons to their classmates and parents.”  The nine huertos familiares 
(home gardens) that he managed were “great successes.”  They were “no longer 
producing for the immediate families who owned the gardens, but also served as a 
lesson to neighbors.”  He finished the report with a discussion about new demonstration 
lots that he had begun during the month and numbers taken from the state 
meteorological stations in his zone.95 
 That same year, some of Rodríguez’s colleagues shared the same tone in their 
reports.  Francisco Escobedo described how a maize lot displayed the visible difference 
between H-1 hybrid maize with and without organic material and with fertilizers 
applied.  He included a picture of two of his newly recruited rural youth club from an 
elementary school at Ejido “La Tenería.”96  In Atlacomulco, another colleague did the 
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same work of organizing clubs in his zone and, as he reported, delivering lectures to 
several groups about current problems like “maize diseases in the region, and their 
control, conservation of soil moisture, fertilizers, etc.”97  By all indications, the 
demonstration method and youth outreach that were part and parcel of Sánchez’s 
program were effective. 
During the same year, 1955, Sánchez’s program received other nods, explicitly 
and implicitly.  One article in México Agrícola titled “The State of Mexico, Standard-
bearer of Agricultural Progress” sang about Sánchez’s program.  It detailed the different 
parts of the program – the training center in Chalco, the Trabajadoras Sociales program 
aimed towards helping campesinas become more active in civic and household duties, 
rural teacher agricultural training programs, equine breeding program, and dairy 
cooperatives.  The author made special mention of Santa Elena research station, with its 
“tangible results” like the H-124 hybrid maize and its research on wheat and other 
products.  Of particular interest to the author was the extension system that Sánchez’s 
program advocated.  He mentioned that the State of Mexico’s extension program 
coincided with the formation of the National Committee for Agricultural Planning.  The 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock organized a meeting of every state in the country 
to organize a national plan for agricultural extension.  The program in the State of 
Mexico served as the model by which other states “would unify the possible applied 
programs” on a nation-wide basis.98  Sánchez’s program, in other words, was a model to 
be emulated in all of Mexico. 
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Image 1.6  An extensionista with his Club (from Archivo General de la Nación). 
 
Three months after the article in México Agrícola Sánchez’s state program 
appeared to have earned the notice of Mexico’s highest politician.  President Adolfo 
Ruiz gave his annual state of the union to the country over the radio.  He mentioned that 
Mexicans had attained the stated goals for the agricultural emergency plan begun in 
1953.  Farmers had produced 4.5 million tons of maize to match the stated goal.  
Growers had also met goals for wheat production.  Furthermore, expectations for bean 
production were short of the 500,000 tons sought, but the amount that farmers produced 
was enough to satisfy national demands.  Ruiz finished his introduction by saying that 
Mexico shall continue with irrigation projects and credit to farmers would remain 
accessible.  Then he finished with nods to activities that were part and parcel of 
Sánchez’s program (though he did not specifically mention the State of Mexico 
program): “The use of mechanical equipment will spread.  The use of improved seeds 
will intensify, as will the fight against plant disease.  With these items, and with the 
accompanying soil conservation practices, and the ever-increasing use of fertilizers, our 
campesinos are learning a new concept of their labor and its yields.”99  In only four 
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years, Sánchez’s program became the standard-bearer for agriculture in all of 
Mexico.100   
 
MEXICO’S NATIONAL EXTENSION PROGRAM 
National officials did not waste time in almost entirely carbon copying 
Sánchez’s program on a national scale.  By 1956, programs similar to Sánchez’s rural 
outreach initiative began receiving praise in other states.101  Officials made credit 
available to many farmers to purchase machinery, seeds, and other inputs.  Federal 
funds went towards meteorological stations and research stations around the country.  
Rural Youth Agriculture Clubs increased in scope of their projects and in membership 
numbers.  The number of extension workers increased (see Table 2.1).  It was difficult 
to identify differences between Sánchez’s program of the early 1950s and the one 
adopted by the federal government years later.  Agronomists’ presumptions and 
prejudices towards peasants continued, too, as well as the top-down approach to 
extension.  The only change involved the use of certain new technologies for extension.  
By 1959, evidence of Mexicans trying to implant U.S.-style agriculture was clear on a 
national scale. 
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Table 1.1 Number of workers in Mexico’s agricultural extension department between 1922 and 1967 
(from various sources).102 
 
The campaign to convince peasants to try modern seeds and listen to 
extensionistas was amplified after 1955.  In Tierra’s February issue, an editorial 
underscored the acceleration and methods by which government implored farmers to 
change.  José Uribe, a farmer in Ameca, Jalisco, had recently won a contest to see 
which de temporal (seasonal irrigation) farmer had the highest maize yield in a given 
season.  Uribe farmed an “unheard of” amount of 6,824 kilograms of maize per hectare.  
It was an extraordinary yield, according to the editor.  What was the “magical formula 
that Sr. Uribe applied to find himself suddenly at the head of Mexican maize 
producers?” the editor inquired.  He answered his own rhetorical question.  Uribe’s 
marvelous harvest “was not about any abracadabra, but about a good farmer, someone 
who knows their region and used to giving their all to their lands.”  But there was more.  
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“Destroying his routine, Sr. Uribe resolved himself to listen to the lessons from 
agrónomos and apply to a ‘T’ the letter of techniques they recommended: good 
preparation of the soil, application of better fertilizers for his soil, hybrid maize (H-
309), application of labor at the right time to combat against freezes, and many other 
techniques in line with high yields.”  The editorial concluded with a reminder to readers 
that Uribe had opened a new road towards progress.  His example also proved that there 
were farmers “who were not obstinate towards progress…many farmers were eager to 
utilize advanced agricultural methods.”103  Almost in an overt appeal to prove to readers 
that Uribe’s story was not exaggerated and true, two Tierra writers traveled to Ameca to 
interview him and gave more details about his success story.104 
 At times, some agronomists tried other methods to send their gospel to farmers.  
José de la Cruz, one of the founders of Tierra, was the guest on a radio show in the 
northern state of Durango.  After allowing de la Cruz to introduce his background, the 
interviewer asked: “You know that many farmers persistently use old cultivation 
practices because they think that what they learned from their fathers or grandfathers is 
most appropriate.  Do you think that Tierra has managed to modify this belief in an 
appreciable number of farmers?”  De la Cruz responded that he was certain that 
extension workers with the Ministry of Agriculture had succeeded in convincing 
“thousands of new farmers, ejidatarios, and ranchers applied technical advice” about 
everything from crop rotation, fertilizer application, and methods for combating disease.  
He was confident that farmers were interested to learn and apply modern science.  
Before encouraging farmers to write Tierra with any technical farming inquiries, de la 
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Cruz commented on how useless it was for all the government-sponsored research and 
work to be done if farmers “did not feel an impulse” to progress.  “Every farmer who 
has tried improved seeds, fertilizers on their soil, and other aspects related to modern 
practices, has to become a constant advertiser,” de la Cruz concluded in the short 
interview.105 
Months later President Ruiz also recognized extensionists in what he said was a 
fine year of agriculture for Mexico.  He began his annual presidential address with 
positive words: “National agriculture increased past 1954-1955 goals – and I say with 
all due cause – with earnest and because of understanding by our farmers and peasants 
in general.”  Then he outlined proof of the progress made in agriculture.  Wheat 
production was 400,000 tons greater than the previous year, so much that important 
reserves were possible to help regulate prices and supplies.  Despite bad weather during 
the current fiscal year, there was enough maize for national consumption, and the 1956-
1957 cycle appeared promising.  Oils produced from coconuts, cotton, peanuts, and 
sesame seeds all saw productive years.  Officials opened seven new agricultural 
research stations.  And, the president added, “extension services gave technical 
instruction to peasants” at more than two thousand demonstrations and agents had 
participated in 44 agricultural expositions during the previous year.106  
By 1956, then, the Mexican president, agronomists, and leaders in the Ministry 
of Agriculture had not changed the program that they adopted from the State of Mexico.  
They remained convinced that if peasants could hear and see the fruits of modern 
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agricultural technology the prophecy of improving their cultivation would be self-
fulfilling.  Highlighting José Uribe’s story in Jalisco, they utilized vignettes of everyday 
farmers who saw the light in modern techniques and technology.  They invited readers 
to imagine themselves as Uribe, the campesino who decided to listen to what 
agronomists had to say and benefitted immensely.  De la Cruz’s radio interview 
revealed that Mexicans continued to have prejudices about peasants’ stubbornness and 
ignorance, but leaders in the agronomic world remained convinced that once farmers 
were introduced to technology they would change.  And President Ruiz’s address 
explained how much extension had grown and how much his administration supported 
the efforts.   
Praise for extensionistas’ work continued in 1957, as did the encouragement for 
farmers to consult with an extension agent.  One Tierra writer underscored the work of 
an extension agent.  Farmers should consider agents “a kind of lay missionary,” charged 
with imparting “the Gentiles [with] agronomic material: the good word that multiplies 
the tassels [of corn] and reverberates in the landscape.”  The author explained how 
extension works - agents traveled to their assigned zones to study local conditions and 
areas for improvement, followed by them visiting with as many farmers possible to 
deliver advice.  “But individual contact with farmers” was always limited.  Hence, 
agents found other methods for working with famers, such as demonstration lots, trips 
to Días de Demostración, model ranches, and radio programs.  Agents employed 
whatever method they could “to convince farmers of the need and convenience of 
abandoning routine trails and enter, as a result, on the road to progress,” which was the 
goal for farmers and their families.  The author concluded: “Readers, if you are already 
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in contact with the Extension Department in your area, continue to take advantage their 
advice; if you are not, search for their name… and solicit their help, which will be very 
valuable.”107  
If there were changes in the federal administration of extension, it was in scale.  
Field Days remained the same in coverage in agricultural magazines and journals, and 
the content remained the same.  In 1956, for example, at the Chapingo OSS research 
station, interns “objectively explained how to grow hybrid maize” and showed visitors 
fields well adapted to the region.  Visitors also saw “with their own eyes” the effects of 
fertilizers and crop rotation.108  In Guanajuato two years later, a similar Demonstration 
Day took place at another station and the method with visitors was no different than 
other days since the late 1940s.  Farmers, an article noted, “wanted to obtain more 
adequate training” about their crops.  Hence, they listened to experts about the latest 
research on local crops.109  The next month, another magazine published a summary of 
another Demonstration Day at the OSS research station in Veracruz, where groups 
toured the grounds while specialists informed visitors about their work and showed the 
results “in plain view.”110  One year later, demonstrations days continued in the same 
format in Ciudad Obregón, Sonora.111  Thus, by 1957, demonstration days had not 
substantively changed, but their larger geographic breadth was evident. 
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According to extension agents’ monthly reports, too, little had changed in the 
methodology for reaching out to farmers – again, except for geography.  Federal 
extension reports from after the mid-1950s, after the State of Mexico pilot program 
became well-known among national political leaders, read almost identically to ones in 
previous years, when Salvador Sánchez’s program had begun.  One report from José 
Saucedo, located in the state of Coahuila, described him spending most of November 
touring demonstration lots, schools, and ejidos.  He nearly spent every day of the last 
week of the month “giving demonstrations,” at one point he delivered eight talks at two 
ejidos in a single day.112  Jupiter Barrera, based in northern Mexico, reported about 
giving away improved bean seeds to farms that would attract local growers.113   
Certain characteristics become noticeable in the extension reports, which 
collectively reveal how extensionists and Mexico’s leaders embraced a discourse, a 
constructed mode of knowledge that defined possibilities and realities, that deduced 
agriculture to simply planting seeds in the soil and tending to the plant afterwards.  
Reports became more quantitatively derived, more technical.  Extension was derived in 
numbers – how many bulletins agents gave away, how many people attended, what 
brand number of fertilizer or seed they promoted, how many school gardens they 
visited.  Agents offered no explanation why their lots were successful or how many 
farmers attended.  They assumed that because people attended demonstrations or 
lectures that extension was effective; numbers of those in attendance were rarely 
consistent and, many times, agents did not report how many people attended.  
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Noticeably absent in the reports from the 1950s – and in future reports – was any 
qualitative discussion.  Agricultural extension continued to be a one-sided affair in 
which those regarded with knowledge and expertise expounded to those who needed 
said expertise.  Agents presumed that their method functioned effectively minus any 
discussion – farmers understood because they were told how to farm and saw the results 
of modern technology.  They disclaimed any interest in the ecological, economic, 
social, political, and cultural matrix in which they diffused this technology, however, 
because of development discourse that they embraced. 
The visual and auditory teaching techniques aimed at farmers took on new forms 
by the 1960s.  By 1959, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Office of Special Studies 
began producing 16-millimeter films, which aired in black-and-white and in color, for 
farmers.  With the expansion of the Extension Agricultural Department, agents began 
trying to, according to one report, “find ways of making information accessible to 
farmers” and films became a common tool.114  One magazine article gave details about 
some of these movies.  In “Protect Your Harvest,” Juan, a make-believe farmer, 
purchases a granary to protect his season’s yield with extra money from a previous 
harvest.  An extension agent “visits him [one day] and lends him an insecticide 
sprayer,” and Juan and his wife successfully label their grains on a shelf in the storage 
unit.  Juan appeared in another film, “Bean Farming.”  In this instance, he grows beans 
with help from an extensionista.  An agent advises him to select a genetically improved 
variety, which he plants on one side of his land.  On the other side, he plants a “popular 
bean,” which is attacked by plant disease.  Another make-believe agent visits Juan and 
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convinces him to plant improved seeds and to use a new insecticide.  “At harvest,” 
according to the film’s synopsis, “Juan becomes convinced that it is better to farm with 
improved seeds and work with the modern technical advances.”  Listed at the top of the 
catalog of films available to farmers was the cliché, “A picture teaches more than a 
thousand words.”115  In the same year of the release of such films, agents traveled with 
what were called “moveable audiovisual service units” that aired movies to farmers.116    
The appeal to senses was not limited to motion pictures.  “Voces del Campo” 
(The Voices of the Countryside) represented the apogee of agronomists’ methods to 
convince farmers of the accolades and advantages behind agricultural technology.  It 
was a radio program that, according to the earliest record available, began in 1959 to 
“take information to the country’s farmers that is useful as answers to current issues” 
and to deliver notices concerning techniques and practices.  While not able to cover 
every corner of Mexico – at its height in 1966, the program aired out of 107 
transmission stations - “Voces del Campo,” aired hundreds of weekly programs on 
Sundays two to three times a day in the late 1950s through at least 1967.  During one 
trimester, SAG officials broadcast 5,000 programs in twenty-six states.  Programs began 
as technical advice on how and why farmers should plant soy or other products to a 
social program dealing with Mexico’s troubled youth.117 
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Two program transcripts exemplify agronomists’ faith in science and 
technology, and their regard for farmers’ knowledge.  A 5 June 1959 program began 
with a song titled “Mi Linda Tierra” (“My Beloved Land”), followed by the program’s 
slogan: “’Voces del Campo,’ [Voices from the Countryside] it is the program of 
progress, dedicated to all farmers in this region, every Sunday at the same hour” on a 
“privileged” radio station.  The disc jockey followed with an introduction to the 
ingeniero and reminded listeners that the Department of Agricultural Extension had 
programs airing “all over the Republic with the aim of more contact with all of you who 
work” the soil.  Another song played before the extension agent explained to listeners 
about a disease that was, at the time, affecting alfalfa crops.  “To ensure that alfaferos in 
your region were not susceptible to the disease,” the ingeniero advised, “consult an 
extension agent.”  In the same program the agent announced the winners of a contest of 
maize yields in the state of Jalisco.  Congratulating the winners, he assured listeners that 
they could also enjoy hybrid maize.  The program finished with the agent inviting 
farmers to substitute maize for sorghum, mentioning that it could be used for human 
consumption, “industrial sale,” and as forage.  “We recommend that you do whatever 
possible to grow it [sorghum] on your land,” and if they had any doubts, “consult the 
ingeniero in your area and they will, with pleasure, tell you what to do” (emphasis 
mine).118 
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The next week a program aired with an ingeniero trying to convince farmers to 
grow sesame seed and soy.  He opened his segment by saying that “Among the oilseeds 
that had an industrial demand were sesame seed and soy.”  His explanation for 
switching to sesame seed cultivation, he said, was the plant’s short growing period, the 
minimal amount of labor that it demanded, and how little water it required.  
Furthermore, “In concerns to markets, sesame seed was an easy sell, at a good price, 
and national demand had yet to be met…and it could be exported.”  In reference to soy, 
the agent attempted to entice listeners by saying “currently, there exist markets 
interested in industrial production of soy.”  Concluding the program, he said to listeners, 
“My farmer friend….if possible for you to farm oilseeds on your land, do it!  I assure 
you that you’ll have strong earnings and you’ll help to supply national markets.”  If 
listeners had questions, they should locate their nearest extension agent, and “with 
pleasure” they would help “for NOT ONE CENT!” (emphasis in original).  The 
program ended with a reminder that the Department of Extension was “a combined 
effort of the State and the people, to achieve progress and the wellbeing the peasant 
family” of Mexico.119   
The national Extension Department became a marketing department by 1959.  
Agents broadcasted programs all over the country radio segments in which they 
attempted to instill into Mexican farmers – millions of whom still practiced subsistence 
farming – an entrepreneurial, industrial approach to farming.  They encouraged farmers 
to “progress” and grow crops that required little labor, few costs, and ones for which 
remuneration was high.  Hybrid maize yields spoke for themselves and ingenieros 
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hinted to listeners that they, too, could partake in such wonderful bounties.  Agrónomos 
encouraged growers to behave like businessmen – to abandon or downsize cultivation 
of traditional crops like maize in exchange for plants like soy, sorghum, or sesame seed 
because these plants had market demands.  Extensionistas were rural transformers.  
They possessed the knowledge and materials for agricultural modernization and it was 
on their shoulders to transform the ethos of Mexican farmers.120   
The year that the first “Voces del Campo” began, the same industrial, 
entrepreneurial ethos that characterized U.S. agriculture during the first half of the 
twentieth century was visible in Mexican agriculture.  In April, T.E. Marlow, a manager 
for International Harvester in Mexico wrote an article in México Agrícola about 
agricultural technology and machinery.  He opened the article saying that Mexican 
agriculture had the power to increase production and, via “technology with rational 
farming,” it was paramount for everyone interested in the progress of this great country 
had the “moral duty to work together intelligently and dynamically to achieve economic 
harmony.”  The time had arrived to produce more and Mexicans had the tools and 
machines in their hands to achieve progress.  “We have the wonderful soil and water 
needed to germinate generously underneath our benign climate.  The only thing left to 
do was put into action the army of farmers to work…so they can acquire the available 
machinery and repair those that they have in use, and provide them with seeds, 
fertilizers, insecticides, etc. that they need.”  He finished by saying “We should train in 
the use and service of agricultural equipment.  In a word, [we should] enthuse them so 
that they throw themselves into a project that stimulates their motivations.”  The article 
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contained images of men with sombreros in a field learning how to use a tractor and 
another photo of men staring at an image from a projector that detailed how to operate 
heavy equipment.  These images are contrasted with a peasant behind oxen that pulled a 
plough.  The picture’s caption read: “Modern machinery offers more production with 
less effort, which contributes towards freeing farmers from a brand of slavery that 
employs crude and rudimentary tools…This farmer, despite all his efforts, will scarcely 
be able to provide for his family.”121 
Four months later, México Agrícola featured an article about a field day at the 
Santa Elena research station that further captured the fealty – in bombastic terms - that 
agronomists paid towards science and the gravity of the technology available to 
Mexican farmers.  In attendance were representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
governor of the state, state director of the Department of Agriculture and Livestock, T. 
E. Marlow of International Harvester, a professor from Cornell University, head of the 
Extension Department in Mexico, and a handful of government officials.  According to 
the article, three thousand special attendees were “witnesses to the extraordinary 
advances in productive techniques” at the research center.  They were there to celebrate 
the center’s accomplishments since its opening and showcase the center’s latest 
advances.  Since agriculture offered the material toward the wellbeing of humanity “it 
was only right to make agriculture respond to the demands created by demographic 
growth and the need to elevate equally the living standards for everyone, via the 
intensification of rational agriculture with the use of improved seeds and mechanical 
procedures.”  The duty of making sure that the work done at the research center 
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“transformed and multiplied as gifts for humanity” demanded the “selfless dedication” 
of the researchers at Santa Elena.  Visitors to the center toured the poultry research 
center, which would soon offer subsidized services to poultry farmers.  They learned 
about other advances: the predicted increase in maize production from 80 tons to 600 in 
the year to come because of varieties developed at the center; and Toluca I, a barley 
variety that was worthy of being exported to other states in Mexico and foreign 
countries.  The article proudly concluded that Santa Elena, “without a doubt,” will 
“grant a new impulse to implant rational agriculture” in the State of Mexico and every 
state in the country.  A prominent image in the article was a photo of the governor of 
the state atop a diesel tractor.122 
At the end of that year Thomas E. Marlow of International Harvester led a 
sponsorship deal with the Mexican Department of Extension.  Along with 
representatives from Shell Mexico, Universal Tractors, Sears, Roebuck, DDT Products, 
Diamond Leaf of Mexico, DuPont, Ralston Purina, and other transnational businesses, 
Marlow and other members of a committee of donors were finalizing details about a 
sponsorship that the companies would provide towards “new and dynamic” rural 
agricultural youth clubs in Mexico.  Companies from the United States had collaborated 
to support an expansion of Mexico’s version of 4H clubs by one hundred chapters in the 
next twelve months.  The committee members agreed to offer $1,000 to the 
extensionista who they judged to have performed most outstanding in expanding the 
program.123  Representatives from U.S. agribusiness firms had noticed the work that 
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extension workers did and they wanted to fund an expansion of the work they did with 
future Mexican farmers.   
If U.S.-style agriculture is attached to certain characteristics, then by 1960, 
leaders in Mexico had gone a decade trying in earnest to copy the mode of agricultural 
development north of the border.  Improved maize, beans and wheat seeds, and 
fertilizers had translated into greater yields and income for U.S. farmers, thus Mexican 
leaders pushed the same technology on their farmers at demonstration days and 
demonstration lots.  Mechanized agriculture was common in the United States, so 
leaders in Mexico offered accessible credit to farmers to purchase equipment like 
tractors.  An image of the State of Mexico governor sitting atop a diesel tractor at the 
Santa Elena research station in 1959 and T.E. Marlow’s article about ploughs pulled by 
oxen suggest that farmers should have embraced mechanized agriculture.  Finally, if 
one characteristic of U.S. agriculture was the presence of agribusinesses, then one only 
need to consider the partnership that Mexico’s extension department made with 
International Harvester, Sears and Roebuck, DuPont, and other companies to expand 
agricultural youth clubs.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Many Mexicans thought that by 1959 they had an outstanding model of 
agricultural development.  The country had a national research apparatus that generated 
maize and wheat seeds that were worthy of being sent abroad.  There was a corps of 
capable agronomic researchers spread out in research centers around the country. This 
group of workers had found, they thought, effective methods for delivering modern 
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technology and the knowledge and rationale for its use to millions of needy farmers and 
campesinos.  Furthermore, the model for agricultural development that Mexican leaders 
adopted had worked in the United States.  It was a mobile archetype that Salvador 
Sánchez and others had championed and worked to import to Mexico.    
 Some people, however, saw the contradictions in the attempt to implant a 
derivation of Iowa in the Mexican campo.  They had reservations about the idea of 
transplanting an agricultural system that had its antecedents from a place extremely 
different in culture, languages, and history from Mexico’s.  They also had frustrations 
about extensionistas and their disregard for campesinos’ knowledge about agriculture.  
Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi is the topic of the chapter that follows.       
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CHAPTER TWO 
A DISSENTING VOICE: EMBRYONIC RUMBLINGS AGAINST THE 
GREEN REVOLUTION 
 
I am cognizant of the truth in the half-truth that ‘the shoemaker should stick to his 
shoes’...It is not the function of the agricultural program to solve or undertake the 
[sociological] studies suggested, but it is its function to suggest that studies be made of 
the non-agricultural effects of its wonderful achievements in agricultural technology in 
Mexico. – Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi, 1956124 
  
Apparently we aim to achieve agricultural development in a population whose social, 
historical and philosophical antecedents are different from those of the society whose 
agricultural development we would like to use as a norm. – Efraím Hernández, 1980125 
 
 
If the extension efforts discussed in the previous chapter constitute evidence that 
the Mexican state thought that peasant agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s was 
backwards and needed to improve, and that Green Revolution technology was going to 
facilitate this change, then Efraím Hernández’s career represented the antithesis to such 
a discourse.  If the rule in Mexico during the 1950s and 1960s seemed to be that few 
people expressed reservations about how the diffusion of technology was a top-down 
process devoid of consideration of indigenous agricultural knowledge or local dynamics 
like culture or history, then Hernández was the exception.  Decades before scholars 
critiqued the Green Revolution for its disregard of local knowledge, ecological damage, 
and the consequences of technology, Efraím Hernández had vocalized many of the 
                                                
124 Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi, “Need to Supplement the Agricultural Program with Sociological 
Studies, Which Would Define the Repercussions of the Technological Advances,” folder 
Correspondencia del año 1955, June 27, 1956, Archivo Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi (Archivo EHX 
hereafter), Colegio de Postgraduados, Centro de Botánica, Montecillo, Estado de México, Mexico 
(COLPOS hereafter). 
125 ----, “Traditional Agriculture and Development,” folder Agricultura tradicional y desarollo, August 25, 
1980, Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
70 
common criticisms that came later.126  Ironically, he was also part of the “revolution’s” 
earliest and most formative years.      
This chapter has three objectives.  First, I introduce Hernández to readers 
outside of the Mexico.  While an academic legend to many Mexican botanists, 
agronomists, and anthropologists, and known to some historians, Hernández remains an 
obscure figure outside of his country.  Scholarship concerning Mexican agriculture after 
the early 1940s typically – and justifiably – focuses almost exclusively upon sources 
derived from the United States, principally the Rockefeller Foundation Archives.127  
Historians are familiar with figures like Norman Borlaug, E.J. Wellhausen, and Paul 
Mangelsdorf.  Usually discussed by scholars in critical or laudatory terms, these names 
and their influence continue to be prominent in the scholarship concerning modern 
Mexican agricultural history.  There are, however, other figures whose works merit 
discussion. Efraím Hernández is one these people.  Consequently, this chapter 
chronicles his background to underscore his origins as a peasant, to a graduate of the 
Ivy League, to a respected agronomist by the 1950s, and finally, to a detractor of what 
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eventually became known as the Green Revolution.128  Thus, much of this chapter will 
explore Hernández’s early life and career.     
Second, this chapter discusses the person who inspired Hernández’s approach to 
science and pedagogy: Liberty Hyde Bailey.  By the time the two met in 1948, Bailey 
was a revered educator, botanist, and philosopher. He was no longer an administrator at 
Cornell University, a position that he held decades before 1948.  But Hernández already 
knew plenty about the octogenarian’s influence in botany and his approach to science, 
agriculture, and life.  Bailey, this chapter demonstrates, imbued his work as a scientist 
with a purpose.  Research, Bailey argued over his career, should contribute to 
something greater than publications, and the results of research should be beneficial and 
accessible to groups outside of the academy.  Scientists, moreover, should be willing to 
challenge traditions and trends in their fields; science should not be considered 
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sacrosanct and inflexible.  These were truisms that Hernández “transnationalized,” as he 
took them to Mexico amid a period during which statistics and facts held primacy.   
Finally, this chapter discusses the early years of Hernández’s career after his 
arrival back to Mexico in 1938.  Following high school graduation in 1932, he returned 
to Tlaxcala, the state of his birth, and saw what he called the “privations” in Mexico’s 
countryside.  He vowed to again return.129  Between the time of his repatriation and 
1953, when he became a professor of botany professor, Hernández held several jobs, 
each of which took him to almost every region of the country.  During those years, he 
gained an incipient understanding of campesino agriculture.  He also began to note 
flaws in the strategy for agricultural development in Mexico (i.e., what later came to be 
known as the Green Revolution), and expressed vague criticisms.   Nevertheless, his 
complaints became motivation for Hernández to dedicate his career towards undoing 
the “Green Revolution.” 
 
FROM TLAXCALA TO ITHACA 
Until a couple years before his death in 1991, many of Hernández’s closest 
students and colleagues knew only a limited amount about his background.   Each of the 
persons interviewed knew that he was from the state of Tlaxcala.  They were aware of 
his family moving to the United States and that he had worked his way through Cornell 
University.  Some knew about the challenges that his family faced as immigrants to 
New York City during the Great Depression.  But many of them were reticent to ask 
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more details.  In 1985, however, Xolo, as his Mexican students and friends called 
Hernández, discussed his childhood and formación. 
 Born in the throes of the Mexican Revolution in 1913, Efraím Hernández 
Xolocotzi did not live in the town of his birth for a long time.  He was born in San 
Bernabé Amaxac de Guerrero, a small village about 140 kilometers east of Mexico 
City, in Tlaxcala, at the time one of the poorest states in the country.  Antonio 
Hernández and Micaela Xolocotzi, Efraím’s grandparents, were some of the town’s 
earliest registered inhabitants.  Antonio participated in settling the town, going as far as 
building the town’s first Catholic chapel.  No record remains on why, but don Antonio 
converted from Catholicism to Methodism between his settling in San Bernabé Amaxac 
in 1878 and the early 1910s.  Soon thereafter Bibiana Guzmán, a schoolteacher, arrived 
in the town.  She taught elementary classes at the school that don Antonio founded 
inside his home, which took in children who were orphans and homeless because they 
lost one or both parents during the Mexican Revolution.  By 1913, she and Luis 
Hernández, the youngest of don Antonio and doña Micaela’s eleven children, had four 
boys of their own.  Efraím was the youngest.  For the first few years of his primary 
schooling, he attended school with his mother’s indigent students.130  
 When Efraím returned to San Bernabé years later, he described the town.  “In 
1938, the town’s center at the edge of a canyon consisted of a small plaza, a Catholic 
church (part of which was [still] utilized as a school), one building made up of two 
levels for the local government and older businesses.”  A dirt road marked the only 
route to the nearest urban areas, which were miles away.  Thin power lines supplied 
electricity to a handful of homes in town.  Most houses had private bathrooms and 
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temascales (ancient Mesoamerican vapor sweathouses).  Public bathhouses still existed 
in town.131     
 San Bernabé Amaxac was an agricultural village.  The majority of its residents 
were farmers.  Efraím’s father, according to one person who met him, was short in 
height and had calloused, powerful hands that gave away his occupation as a 
“trabajador de campo” (peasant farmer).132  The eastern part of the town’s thin and 
sandy soils permitted farmers to grow only rain-fed maize.  A little further away, one 
found soils utilized to grow beans, potatoes, squash, and peas.  Farmers in areas with 
irrigation grew maize, alfalfa, and some hortalizas (horticultural products - cultivated 
plants for household consumption or for ornamental use).  Underneath sandier parts of 
the soil in these areas, farmers used the shade provided by tree undergrowth to cultivate 
lentils and other crops during the winter.  Residents divided the lands with more rainfall 
into terraced parcels on which they grew maguey for pulque.  Other growers tended to 
other types of trees: tejocote (similar to crabapple), peach, apple, white zapote (small, 
fleshy fruits from the Sapotaceae family), and white cedars.  An adequate water supply 
remained an uncertainty in town, even for the small factories in the village.  Yet, 
agriculture and small industry could not keep residents there, as many left to “open new 
economic horizons” as a wage laborers elsewhere.133               
 Problems of another sort affected the Hernández family in San Bernabé, so 
much so that they eventually left Tlaxcala.  Some of the Catholics in town did not take 
kindly to the alternative spiritual beliefs of the Hernández household, particularly don 
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Antonio’s decision to become a Methodist.  Not even Bibiana’s role as a schoolteacher 
for less-fortunate children in town, helped to “diminish friction” and they left Tlaxcala 
in 1915.134  Hernández never gave the exact reasons that his family left, but his short 
autobiography makes clear that part of the reason was religious intolerance on the part 
of people in his family’s hometown.  For the next eight years, don Luis and family lived 
in several places, including Mexico City and Puebla.  In 1922, Bibiana’s oldest son left 
for the United States to work as a bracero and his mother, some of his aunts, and 
Efraím followed.  Bibiana’s husband eventually returned to his seven hectares of land, 
that he called “’man’s roots,’” in Tlaxcala.135  A young Efraím learned English in New 
Orleans from, as he later expressed, “magnificent” teachers.  The stay in Louisiana was 
short, however, as the family moved to New York City in 1926.   
 The academic success continued in New York.  Hernández attended Stuyvesant 
High School, located in southeastern Manhattan, an area that in the late 1920s and early 
1930s was undergoing its own social transformation inspired by the bohemian 
movement among its many Jewish and Italian residents.  The school to a handful of 
Nobel Prize winners, Stuyvesant’s student body was extremely competitive.136  Parents 
wanted their children to attend the school, Hernández said, because its rigors secured 
many students college admission, which helped overcome the anti-Semitism and other 
forms of discrimination practiced by admissions departments at some state universities 
in New York.137  Efraím shined at Stuyvesant.  Jerry Schur, one of his science teachers, 
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had good memories of Ef, as Hernández was called by many of his friends.  In a 1959 
letter to his former student, Schur wrote that he was “very fond” of Ef and that he had 
“high hopes” for him in science.138  At the time of Hernández’s graduation in 1932, he 
earned one of the highest graduating marks in the school’s history and he left school 
with the plan to become an electrical engineer.    
Growing up in a bohemian neighborhood, Hernández found a love for traveling 
while in high school.  Along with friends, he hitchhiked to the Midwest, visited national 
parks, and saw much of rural New York.  In exchange for food or lodging, the boys 
offered their labor.  In one instance they picked fruit.  Other times, they simply asked 
larger grocery stores for food or slept “wherever we were allowed permission.”139  One 
trip with a friend after graduating from high school in February of 1932 was to Mexico, 
and they found their way to San Bernabé.  Upon arrival at the town’s outskirts, the 
recent graduates asked residents in a hut for directions on how to find don Luis 
(Efraím’s father).  “Who is looking for him?” asked one the hut residents in town.  “I’m 
his son, Efraím,” Hernández replied.  Pilar, the man from the hut and his uncle, soon led 
the youngsters to don Luis.  The coming days involved a couple episodes of heavy 
pulque drinking and touring San Bernabé.  Later, minus his friend, Efraím saw more of 
Mexico, going east from Tlaxcala through the state of Veracruz to the country’s east 
coast.140 
The trip to Mexico was a transformative experience.  Hernández saw the 
disciplined lifestyle that his father and other campesinos practiced, and he noticed some 
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of the intricate ways that farmers overcame natural obstacles like a lack of irrigation, 
mountainside plots, and the vagaries of rain-fed agriculture.  More important, he 
witnessed the conditions in which millions of rural Mexicans, particularly those in 
central Mexico, lived.  According to his notes, many of the peasants he saw dealt with a 
lack of potable water.  Electricity remained a luxury in the villages that he visited.  
Meals for many people consisted of beans, peppers, and tortillas.  “On Sundays,” people 
added “a piece of chicharrón (fried pork crackling)” to meals.141  The low standards of 
living disturbed him as he traveled to Veracruz to catch a bus bound for New York.   
The Federal Census Office conducted a study of rural Mexico between 1931 and 
1933 that offers quantitative details about the countryside that Hernández saw during 
his trip.  According to the report, nearly one fourth of the residents in the more than 
3,000 villages were comprised of residents who spoke an indigenous language.  In the 
northern part of the country, the population was primarily ethnic whites or mestizos.  
Indians only made up 1.3 percent of the population in Nuevo León and the percentage 
was slightly higher in Tamaulipas.  Southern Mexico’s situation was different: 
Yucatán’s was more than 93 percent Indian and Oaxaca at nearly 78 percent Indian.  
About one half of the communities retained some form of communal landholding, 
especially in Oaxaca, Puebla, and Guerrero.  Rural wages in more than 80 percent of the 
country were one peso or less per day.  Tiendas de raya (company or plantation stores), 
a remnant of the hacienda system in which worker’s wages were paid in kind instead of 
cash, could still be found in some rural places.142 
                                                
141 Hernández, “Avances, JUNIO 1989,” Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
142 Frank Tannenbaum, “Technology and Race in Mexico,” Political Science Quarterly 61, no. 3 (1946): 
365-383. 
78 
Other parts of the study underscored the level of rural isolation in the country.  
“Mexican agriculture,” Tannenbaum reported, “is still in many places a hoe 
agriculture.”  “’Fire agriculture’” (i.e., slash-and-burn) remained prevalent in many 
places.  In more than 90 percent of the villages studied, residents did not own tractors, 
seed drills, cultivators, threshing machines, steel plowing implements, or shelling 
machines.  In terms of rural isolation for many Mexicans, the statistics are not 
surprising.  Nearly 2,000 of the more than 3,000 villages under consideration did not 
have a store.  Railroads were largely outside of most village limits.  Towns rarely had a 
post office.  Automobiles existed in fewer than 10 percent of the villages.  Telephone 
communication was absent in about nine out of every ten villages, thus most places 
were “without telephone communication with the outside world.”143    
 Not long after its revolution, then, the Mexican countryside was isolated in more 
than one way.  Culturally and linguistically, the country was fragmented.  Despite a 
constitutional mandate restricting their presence, vestiges of a pre-revolution, feudal 
economy remained with tiendas de raya.  Technology vis-à-vis agricultural production 
remained, by certain standards, antiquated, un-mechanized, and resembled that of 
centuries past.  Land tenure, too, continued to be a problem.  Finally, villages were 
geographically isolated.  Many Mexicans had extremely little contact with the “outside” 
world.  Mexico’s “imagined community,” as scholar Benedict Anderson named the 
term for the modern nation-state, was nebulous.144                  
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 Hernández later shared the impressions of his visit in 1932.  He found it difficult 
to overlook the “penury and many privations.”145  Before returning to New York, while 
still in Mexico, Hernández had made up his mind that he would return.146  Realizing 
that an undergraduate degree equipped him with a limited amount of skills and 
expertise, he nevertheless made up his mind to “somehow help.”  Besides, he added, in 
the United States there existed “an extremely competitive environment, one in which 
individuals had to sacrifice themselves to attain certain levels of material comfort.”147  
He soon abandoned the plan of becoming an electrical engineer and decided to study 
agronomy.  
These new plans and reality, however, were not compatible.  Being a resident of 
New York and having the grades required for admission, Hernández could have easily 
gained admission into the nearest university with an agricultural curriculum.  But 
funding for school was a problem.  Like many migrant families to the United States, 
Hernández’s education through high school involved large sacrifices on the part of his 
family.  It had been a household project - his mother and oldest brother had funded the 
secondary educational expenses.  After discussing the plan to study agriculture, though, 
his mother and brother admitted that they could not afford to help with any more than 
two years of college.  Thus, Hernández attended the State Institute of Applied 
Agriculture, a vocational institute, in Farmingdale, New York.  The institute was, 
according to what one of its directors in 1924, a “finishing school in vocational 
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agriculture, training specifically for country life and closely allied fields.”148  Hernández 
later acknowledged that the school allowed him to practice agriculture, and a job on a 
dairy farm helped pay for expenses.   While there, Hernández finished at the top of his 
class.149  In a recommendation letter, the institute’s director, Halsey Knapp, wrote, “He 
[Hernández] has proved to be an earnest, serious, thorough and careful student who 
seeks to be unprejudiced in his approach and fair in his judgment.”  And, “Mr. 
Hernandez has always been particularly interested in those fields in which human 
values are dominant.  I believe that he has a real contribution to make in such fields.”150      
Hernández matriculated at the Agricultural College at Cornell University in June 
1934.  But his savings from working on the farm did not last long.  Like other students 
in college during the Great Depression, Hernández defrayed costs by washing dishes at 
a campus fraternity house.  His performance in classes eventually earned him a 
scholarship.  By year three of college, with a part-time job as a dishwasher to help 
living expenses, a scholarship to help with tuition, and a second part-time job at the 
university’s herbarium, graduation soon approached and the future looked promising.  
Cornell University’s Agricultural College, by the 1930s, was one of the flagship 
institutions in its field.  Along with other universities like the University of Wisconsin, 
Iowa State University, and Michigan Agricultural College, it ranked among the best in 
agricultural education in the country.  By 1913, it had the largest faculty among all 
colleges in the United States.  Also around the same time, Cornell had nearly as many 
graduate students attending as every agricultural school combined.  Since its 
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inauguration, it was not uncommon for administrators to seek (and, many times, attain) 
whatever talent they wanted.  During the late 1920s and early 1930s, administrators in 
the college counted Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his wife Eleanor as supporters 
(Roosevelt served as New York’s governor in the late-1920s).151   
Innovation on the part of administrators and teachers at Cornell explained the 
school’s reputation and success.  The college had begun extension programs with local 
farmers early after its formal inauguration in 1903.  It was not uncommon for Cornell 
students to lead workshops in any number of different areas of agricultural study, with 
the idea that the college’s mission was to help New York farmers.  Part of their 
curriculum included community outreach programs that involved devising methods for 
disseminating agricultural technology to local growers, dairy farmers, or any interested 
New Yorkers.  One pioneer in agricultural education and technology, Henry A. 
Wallace, said that the extension program at Cornell was better than he had seen in any 
western state in the country.  The college had also been one of the first in the United 
States to offer courses focused on something more than the outside of the productive 
side of agriculture, including rural sociology and outdoor art.  Administrators 
encouraged students to enroll in classes outside the “hard sciences,” such as in 
anthropology, philosophy, and education.  Such innovation and flexibility paid off for 
students, as, according to one estimate, 85 percent of graduates gained positions at other 
colleges and the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA).152    
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THE MAN WITH A SMILE THE SIZE OF A CRESCENT MOON 
Much of the success of the college was because of the vision and efforts of 
Liberty Hyde Bailey.  Administrators at Cornell hired Bailey away from Michigan 
Agricultural College to teach horticulture in 1888.  Within a couple years, he became 
the dean of the agricultural college, a well-known philosopher about topics ranging 
from ecology and conservation to rural education, and a nationally-sought after speaker 
whose contacts included New York politicians and more than one U.S. president.  He 
was also one of the country’s leading botanists.  Based on the interviews with several of 
his closest colleagues and students, Hernández never elaborated much on the source of 
his intellectual inspiration.  He did, however, mention to one student that Bailey was his 
“role model, if not hero.”153    
Bailey was, in his own words, “born against the primeval forest” of South 
Haven, Michigan, in 1858.  He spent his youth “on the farm cut from the forest” that his 
father, a devout Puritan, built after the family moved to the frontier from Vermont.154  
When not working on the family’s farm, he spent many days exploring his 
surroundings.  This included haunts to local caves where he collected snakes or turtles; 
bird watching was another hobby to which he dedicated many hours as a child (he later 
lamented the extinction of the passenger pigeon).  Plants constituted a special 
fascination, and he studied everything about them intensely – their growth patterns, 
shapes, seeds, and colors.  The studying paid off, as Bailey was grafting apples in his 
father’s and neighbors’ orchards by the age of ten.  As a teenager, he began public 
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speaking to local crowds, with topics ranging from grafting to birds.  A farmer who 
believed that all men should earn their daily keep, Liberty Hyde Bailey, Sr., thought that 
his inquisitive son “will never be worth his salt.”155     
 The senior’s youngest son turned out to be a better scholar than apple grafter.  A 
small detail about any subject easily piqued Bailey’s interest.  In grade school, after 
gaining permission from his father to read Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species, Bailey 
became intrigued with evolution (later, this fondness for evolution was evident in his 
studies about the domestication of plants).  But it was Darwin’s use of the term a prori 
that motivated Bailey to learn Latin.  Asa Gray’s Field, Forest and Garden Botany 
furthered Bailey’s interest in botanical studies.  In 1878, after meeting respected 
botanist William James Beal, Bailey enrolled at the Michigan Agricultural College 
(MAC) in East Lansing.  Having studied under Gray, who counted Charles Darwin 
among his correspondents, Beal had a strong academic pedigree.156  Gray also was a 
leader in the small class of U.S. scientists who helped make systematic botany and 
taxonomy comparable with that in Europe, which for most of the nineteenth century 
was more advanced.157  Four years after arriving at college, Bailey graduated, and with 
a recommendation from Beal, he worked as Gray’s assistant.158       
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 At age twenty-six, Michigan Agricultural College hired Bailey to teach 
horticulture.  It was at his alma mater that he began displaying some of the eccentricities 
and characteristics that made him famous.  As a researcher, he made a point of making 
his work accessible to the general public.  Talks Afield: About Plants and the Science of 
Plants (1885), one of his earliest books, published in his first year as a professor, 
attempted to make professional botany available to rank-and-file farmers.  This trend 
continued the next year with a speech-turned-monograph entitled The Garden Fence 
(1886), which argues that the imaginary border between trained biologists and farmers 
was a metaphorical “fence” that needed to be overcome.  Bailey’s involvement in the 
community in Michigan also added to his notoriety, as he traveled the state delivering 
talks to farmers at National Grange meetings or county fairs. With students in tow to 
these events, it was no surprise that they adored him and that he rejected professional 
customs like the discouragement of fraternization between faculty and students.  Also 
during the same decade, Bailey became the country’s expert on Carex (commonly 
known as sedges).159 
 That Michigan Agricultural College was one of the country’s first land-grant 
college was not a fact that Bailey took lightly.  Signed into law by President Abraham 
Lincoln in 1862, the Morrill Act granted every state federal land where states could 
endow colleges with the mandate to teach practical agriculture, engineering, and 
military science.  Universities and higher education prior to the act had largely been 
inclined towards studying the sciences and “the classics.”  Having grown up on a farm 
in the frontier, Bailey took to heart MAC’s mission.  In 1904, he would say that the 
agricultural colleges in the land-grant college system had the mission of transferring 
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science to farmers.  A college of agriculture, however, “really stands for the whole open 
country beyond the bounds of cities….These institutions mean not one iota less than the 
redirecting of the practices and ideals of country life.”  Land-grant colleges, he added, 
had to “begin to formulate a new social economy.”160  From his early days as a 
professor, Bailey accorded lofty meanings and goals to his role as an educator and 
botanist.    
 His pedagogical methods were unorthodox, especially when compared to the 
rote memorization that was common in colleges at the time.  A normal lecture or 
traditional exam was anathema.  While he thought that a student must have the 
discipline needed to sit and study a topic for hours, Bailey also thought that students 
should infuse their studies in science with some imagination.  According to the author 
of Bailey’s most exhaustive biographer, sometimes he walked into classrooms already a 
couple sentences into a lecture.  And the lessons “fired their [student’s] imagination.”161  
Exams were just as atypical.  In one exam, students read a short prompt on the 
chalkboard: “Tell me about the strawberries.”  Students then were required to elaborate 
on the botanical facts about strawberries.  But they could also discuss a strawberry’s 
beauty, its aroma, or its shape.  Bailey was not adverse to a student integrating 
aesthetics into their work.  At Cornell, his house became a gathering place where 
professors and students recited poems on Sunday nights.162   
 In 1888, after having delivered a lecture series at Cornell University, Bailey 
received an offer for a position in Ithaca, which he accepted.  His legend grew in New 
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York.  As a professor, his demanding and unorthodox pedagogical methods continued.  
As a researcher, Bailey helped gain horticultural studies respect among professional 
botanists, which during the 1890s, a time in which the biological sciences lacked an 
emphasis on making research relevant to the general public.  In 1892, he was a founding 
member of the still-existing Botanical Society of America.163  He also became a pioneer 
in botany with his work on controlled experimental breeding, particularly hybridization.  
His publications while at Cornell included Cyclopedia of American Horticulture (1900) 
and Cyclopedia of American Agriculture (1909), which are both still required texts at 
some schools and agencies that study American flora and agriculture.  Not long after 
being established in New York, Cornell, the land-grant school in the state, published 
bulletins for farmers in the area to help with the most mundane – yet practical – farming 
issues for local growers.  During the years in which Bailey participated in these 
extension activities, he wrote about half of all of the college’s bulletins.164   
 He took seriously this extension work.  After Cornell’s College of Agriculture 
earned state funding from New York’s governor in 1893, he became the chief of an 
outreach program designed to help local farmers, such as Cornell’s winter-course 
programs for local farmers.  Another part of the program was didactic, involving 
Cornell students gaining hands-on farming experience and learning from farmers who 
interacted with the students.  The same year the extension programs began on campus, 
Bailey gave a speech to the Agricultural Association at Cornell, which underscored the 
lofty and demanding ideals that he assigned to agricultural education and extension.  
The speech began with a description of how education in the United States had over the 
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last couple decades become opened to all social classes.  “And if the life of the state is 
the life of the individuals which compose it,” he said, “then it is the privilege – the duty 
rather – of the state to promulgate education.”165  But colleges of agriculture 
inadequately helped farmers because “the colleges have not adapted themselves to the 
farmer’s needs.”  Colleges promoted an education that did not allow “the elasticity 
which shall enable studies to be taught in their proper times or manner, and it does not 
fit well into the leisure or unproductive seasons of the farmer.”166  Extension, therefore, 
must popularize academic work for benefit to farmers, “to inspire all men to better 
things as individuals and as citizens.”   
 Agricultural instruction, as the last paragraph of the speech read, 
 …must be freed from the conventionalisms of mere educational traditions, and  
relieved from all narrow estimates of its scope and value.  It cannot be measured  
by the common pedagogic methods.  It must be cast in a mould (sic) of unique  
pattern.  The education of the great agricultural masses is bound to come.  These  
people, the most numerous in our community, are the last to receive adequate  
instruction in their own occupations.  Agricultural education is therefore the  
coming education.  It is the only great field yet unexplored.  It is also the most  
difficult of exploration.  The state must foster it.  Some institution must come to  
the fore, free from bigotry and convention and inspired with patriotic hope, to  
lead the rising armies on to victory.167    
 
 
Bailey ascribed agricultural education with a holy mandate, and he challenged the 
botanists to modify their practices so that farmers - the group he believed should most 
benefit from agricultural technology and modern science – stood to benefit.  Extension 
had to be tailored to fit the social and historic contexts in which farmers lived and 
worked.   
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With such lofty challenges and ideas, Bailey proceeded to implement innovative 
methods for the overhaul in education that he advocated.  He increased the number of 
farmers’ institutes at Cornell.  Courses outside of the productive side of agriculture - 
home economics, rural sociology, and agricultural economics - received much support 
from Bailey while he was the dean of the college of agriculture.  As Colman Patchin 
writes, Bailey’s goal for instruction and extension “was nothing less than technical 
education based on a sound understanding of scientific principles and supplemented by 
sufficient emphasis on aesthetics and political science to make the student a happier 
individual and more effective citizen.”168    
 The concern for the wellbeing of rural America grew to dominate the later part 
of Bailey’s career in the early 1900s.  Dating back to the 1870s, increased international 
competition and a slow growth in gold production, relative to the world’s money 
supply, led to dramatic changes in the U.S. countryside.  The number of farms more 
than doubled while income on farms lagged severely behind total national income, and 
farmers’ share of this income declined from one-fourth to one-fifth.169  Bailey lamented 
the transformation of the economy from an agrarian economy to an industrial one and 
its effects on farmers.  The countryside-to-cities exodus of the late 1800s and the three 
decades thereafter troubled him to the point that he tended to speak of farmers in idyllic 
terms.  Bailey consigned farmers with metaphysical ties to the land and assigned them 
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romantic notions, similar to the concept that Richard Hofstadter called the “agrarian 
myth.”170   
He began one 1907 speech by saying that “The first or original real occupation 
was the management of the land” and most other trades and jobs stemmed from the 
land.  But, “As the demands of civilization have developed, and particularly as world-
competition has arisen,” as society had become organized in a more complicated 
manner, farmers found themselves being pulled in two directions.  On the one hand, 
they continued to be strong individualists, with an emphasis on self-sufficiency.  On the 
other hand, farmers, by the early 1900s, the government had begun “interfering with the 
land-workers…for the benefit of society at large.”171  Greater demands on the 
countryside by society at large and the intervention of the state had soon left rural 
institutions – Bailey regarded these institutions everything from county fairs to churches 
to rural schools – to die out and the country “has been left socially sterilized.”172  Thus 
it became incumbent on the state to help rural groups.  The countryman, he said, “must 
be able to interest himself spiritually in his native environment as his chief resource of 
power and happiness.”173  In the speech, Bailey again calls on educators to become less 
sterile and more practical.  This overhaul was so important that it would help in the 
“radical revivifying and redirecting of all rural institutions” to help the rural 
populace.174     
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With such demanding tasks for agricultural colleges, Bailey demanded that 
educators have a passion for teaching and creativity in their approaches to science.  
Education, he said, should aim towards something greater than memorization or love of 
knowledge.  If a teacher in the nature-study program that became a part of the extension 
efforts enacted under his watch in New York did not “feel the living interest in natural 
objects which it is desired the pupil shall acquire” or if the teacher’s enthusiasm was 
less-than-inspiring, then they “better let such teaching alone.”175  Science had to be 
dedicated towards improving people’s quality of life.  About facts and the idea of plant 
science staying restricted to university halls and laboratories, as was becoming common 
during the early 1900s in American biological sciences, Bailey bluntly commented, 
“Fact is not to be worshipped.  The life which is devoid of imagination is dead, it is tied 
to the earth.  There need be no divorce of fact and fancy.”  He continued, “What is 
called the scientific method is only imagination set within bounds…Facts are bridged 
by imagination….The very essence of science is to reason from the known to the 
unknown.”176   
Bailey’s ideas did not change after he left Cornell in June 1913.  Over the next 
couple decades he wrote several more books (over his lifetime, at least five dozen books 
if one counts the revisited editions) and avoided public life.  He spent most of his time 
studying botany, with an emphasis on the domestication and taxonomy of horticultural 
plants.  Sometimes risking his life to do so, he collected plant samples from a number of 
places: New Zealand, the Bahamas, Trinidad, Brazil, Venezuela, Western Europe, 
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Puerto Rico, Mexico, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Canada.  The 
number of plant samples grew into the thousands, and in 1935, Bailey donated his 
collection to Cornell.  A site where botanists could visit to help identify plants, it was 
appropriately named the Bailey Hortorium. 
Although scholars justifiably note that many of his visions never became reality 
and despite his romantic regard for farmers, Liberty Hyde Bailey was a pioneer in 
several fields.177  His work with the Country Life Commission stands as a signpost of 
the changing of the United States from a rural country to an urban one.  Cyclopedia of 
American Horticulture remains a foundational text in plant sciences.  Furthermore, The 
Holy Earth, is a required reading for many people who work in environmental studies.  
Aldo Leopold’s “most direct intellectual debt,” Roderic Nash writes, was to Bailey.178  
Scholars can also add Efraím Hernández to the list of people that Bailey influenced 
tremendously.  
The two men met once in 1948.179  After having worked as a volunteer at the 
Bailey Hortorium while an undergraduate at Cornell and having studied botany, 
Hernández had apparently come to venerate Bailey.  Hernández visited Ithaca to see 
about the status of a Oaxacan palm that he had mailed to the hortorium for 
classification.  When the sample turned out to be an unclassified species, Bailey 
recommended the name Synechanthus hernandez, the namesake of the species being the 
person who collected the sample.  Instead, Hernández suggested the name Synechanthus 
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mexicanus, saying that the geographic origins of the plant were more important than the 
person who found it.  Responding with a smile that looked like a “crescent moon,” 
Bailey appreciated such modesty and proceeded to share details about his life dedicated 
towards botany and the conservation of cultivated plants.  In his eighties at the time this 
meeting, Bailey commented on how he was living a “vida regalada,” (“on borrowed 
time”) having lived longer than he had anticipated.  Nonetheless, he continued to study 
and preserve plants.  Hernández said that Bailey taught him “more than he [Bailey] 
could imagine” and his life’s work illustrated an “alternative” to the typical career of a 
biologist.  Hernández shared this story with a group of graduating biology students at a 
university in Michoacán in 1982 – nearly forty years after the incident - because he had 
not forgotten the day he met the person who encouraged him to do what he loved, but to 
work towards a purpose, a greater good.180             
 
ORIGINS OF LA XOLOCOTZIA 
 Before the 1948 sit-down between Bailey and Hernández, the latter’s career as a 
botanist had begun in Mexico.  In the years between high school and the meeting, he 
had finished at Cornell, worked as a government technician in Mexico’s agrarian 
reform, helped the Allies in World War II, and become a respected researcher.  He had 
traveled to the remotest parts of the country and began understanding peasant 
agriculture.  By the mid-1950s, Hernández was arguably the most knowledgeable 
person in the country about Mexican flora and the most well-traveled plant explorer in 
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the country.  As we shall see, he also became a vocal critic of the route that Mexican 
leaders had chosen for the country’s agricultural development.  
 As he had done in high school and during his vocational college days, 
Hernández excelled at Cornell.  He visited with the dean three times while in Ithaca.  
The first time concerned him wanting to take more than the average number of credit 
hours, and the second because he sought permission to take courses in the humanities.  
The last visit was at the request of the dean, who wanted to know why Hernández was 
still a Cornell student, particularly since he had completed the required hours of study 
for a degree from the College of Agriculture.  “I still have more learning to do,” was the 
reply the dean received.181  Near the time of the visit to the dean, classmates asked 
Hernández questions about his plans after commencement.  Some of them laughed at 
the response to their inquiry: “I am going to Mexico.  I am going to help General 
Cárdenas.”182  Having lived through the Great Depression and having witnessed the 
social politics of the New Deal, which involved dozens of scientists, engineers, and 
other academic professionals working to help the economy out of its turmoil, 
Hernández sought to participate in Mexico’s radical social politics of the 1930s.183     
 The Lázaro Cárdenas populist project (1934-1940) was well under way by the 
time Hernández graduated from college in the spring of 1938.184  After labor disputes 
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with foreign interests, particularly British and North American interests Cárdenas 
expropriated the Mexican oil industry.  Cárdenas’s bold move came a few weeks before 
Hernández’s high school graduation.  Before the expropriation, beginning in the 
Comarca Lagunera, one of the most valuable agricultural commodity regions of 
Mexico, Cárdenas had begun state-led agrarian reform.  He eventually distributed land 
to more recipients (811,157) than all previous presidents combined and the average 
number of hectares (22.1) was higher than all his predecessors’ agrarian reform put 
together.185  Also well underway was his socialist project of sending young educators to 
the countryside to secularize education and try to improve the living standards of 
Mexico’s countryside.  Hernández had kept track of the changes taking place south of 
the border, and he wanted to part of the sexenio that, as historian Adolfo Gilly writes, 
“brought reality to the delayed promises of the [Mexican] Revolution.”186      
 He returned to Mexico in July of 1938 and went to Tlaxcala where he spent one 
year living in his father’s house.  Most of this time went towards “relearning Castillian” 
and “drenching” himself in rural life.  He also learned how difficult it was to find a job 
in a country minus contacts.  Eventually, he landed a position with the National Bank 
for Ejido Credit in the state of Tabasco.  Established in 1936, the bank had been opened 
under President Cárdenas’s administration to offer to ejidatarios, but the bank never 
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lived up to its goals due in part because of corruption and poor planning.  Hernández’s 
branch in Tabasco closed in 1942.187   
Hernández began having greater contact with Mexican farmers while working 
for th bank.  He later said of his Tabasco experience, “I really began to learn 
agriculture.”  Hernández observed the roza-tumba-quema (slash-and-burn) method for 
clearing land for vegetation that indigenous groups had practiced for centuries.  He 
learned, too, how tabasqueños used plants and about what he called “plant-man 
interrelationships.”  Most important of the lessons gained in the hot, humid region, was 
“a deeper understanding of the farmers and of their problems and the way they tried to 
solve them.”188  Although he wanted to study more about traditional agriculture in the 
country, Mexico had no viable agricultural research organization in the 1930s.  
 This embryonic understanding of peasant agriculture grew in the next two years.  
After more than six “months of fasting due to a lack of a job,” Hernández landed a 
position with the Office of Foreign Economic Administration (OFEA) of the U.S. 
Embassy.189  The office was a key part of Mexico’s efforts to help the Allies during 
World War II.  As historian Stephen Niblo explains, the office, in exchange for support 
to the Allied war efforts, fostered industrial agricultural production for products like 
edible oils and hard fibers.  Thus, the office controlled Mexican exports of certain 
products that the Allies did not want to end up in the hands of the Axis.  For example, 
the Office purchased Mexico’s sisal for binder twine so that it would not find its way 
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towards helping German agriculture during the war.190  Hernández became an OFEA 
técnico (technician) helping foster the production of castor oil.  To promote castor oil – 
used for manufacturing hydraulic fluid for jacks and brakes on war machines - 
Hernández traveled to a number of states: Sinaloa, Nayarit, Tamaulipas, and Oaxaca.  
Other assignments sent him to the Gulf of Mexico to study oil-bearing palms and to 
Mexico’s Pacific coast for other species (Licania arborea, Jatropha curcas, Garcia 
nutans, Cocos nucifera).  The office also sent him to Sonora, Guanajuato, Veracruz, and 
Yucatán.  During the war, Hernández became, as he proudly later said, “a botanist at the 
service of his country.”191  He participated in Mexico’s efforts to defeat the Axis by 
supplying valuable material to the Allies - arguably as important a contribution as 
Escuadrón 201, the fighter squadron that flew missions in the Philippines in 1945.192   
 “The end of the war meant the end of my job,” Hernández later wrote.193  A 
recommendation letter on his behalf to Mexico’s Secretary of Agriculture in 1945, 
opened a position as a germplasm collector, particularly of maize and beans, with the 
Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP).  As Chapter One describes, the program was the 
institutional progenitor of what later came to be known as the “Green Revolution.”  
After 1943, representatives from the Mexican government and officers from the 
Rockefeller Foundation agreed to begin a joint agricultural program designed to 
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improve basic food production in Mexico.  Also detailed in Chapter One, the 
Rockefeller Foundation opened experiment stations around Mexico, with the program’s 
headquarters, the Office of Special Studies (OEE/OSS; Oficina de Estudios Especiales), 
in Mexico City.  This office became the gathering place for conferences where 
researchers discussed MAP progress and where they scrutinized one another’s work.   
Over the next several years, Hernández made a name for himself in the program, 
in large part because of his background.  He spoke perfect English (with a Brooklyn 
accent that he could never shake) and Spanish, and he was familiar with U.S. and 
Mexican cultural customs.  He had attended Cornell and thus had a familiarity with 
U.S.-style agronomic studies.  Moreover, Cornell, where he had attended college, had 
its own MAP connections, which underscores how Hernández was not outside of 
elements when it came to botanical and agronomic studies.  He likely knew some MAP 
officials from Cornell.  Richard Bradfield, the soils expert on the survey team that in 
1941 made the recommendation for the Rockefeller Foundation to begin an agricultural 
project in Mexico, taught soil studies at Cornell and possibly had Hernández as a 
student.  Albert Mann, MAP’s first director, had been dean at Cornell’s College of 
Agriculture (and a protégé of Liberty Hyde Bailey), and Hernández finished his studies 
during the administration of Mann’s successor at Cornell.  The OFEA work provided 
Hernández more exposure to rural Mexico than any other MAP researcher. His 
linguistic skills and plant collection experience were valuable for the program, as 
historian Markus de Kennedy has indicated.194  According to supervisors, he was an 
“energetic, tough, and fearless” and he was familiar with several of the Indian 
languages spoken in different parts of Mexico.  To compile maize samples in the 
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office’s maize breeding program during the early and mid-1940s, he “made his own 
way - often on foot – into even the most remote villages,” and he eventually compiled 
more than 2,000 maize samples.195  At the time, this was one of the largest collections 
of germplasm ever assembled.  The collection became the basis for one of MAP’s most 
famous studies.   
 A document in the Hernández archive by a friend, Garrison Wilkes, tells the 
story of this major contribution to plant sciences.  In 1989, Wilkes wrote a eulogy for 
Paul Mangelsdorf, another member of the survey team that recommended for the 
Rockefeller Foundation to enter in a partnership to improve Mexican agriculture in 
1941.  In the eulogy, Wilkes discussed the foundation for the concept of landraces in 
plant sciences.  It was the “joint idea” of Mangelsdorf, E.J. Wellhausen, and Hernández 
to draw a large map of Mexico on a patio courtyard floor and place the ears of maize 
that Hernández had collected around the country on the makeshift map.  “After two 
days of labor, over two thousand ears were on the courtyard drying floor and standing 
on top of a step ladder the three could see a pattern of uniformity, hybrid zones and 
uniformity” in colors and shape of the cobs.   The research team noticed “ecogeographic 
adaptation and morphological norms” in the cobs that “fused into landraces.”  They 
successfully identified about 25 ancient races of maize, which, at the time, helped 
describe the evolutionary process of Mexico’s huge maize diversity.  Subsequently, 
they also identified over 300 races of maize throughout Latin America.  With the results 
of the experiment, Mangelsdorf encouraged the MAP officials “to collect and save 
farmer seed because he clearly foresaw the displacement of that germplasm by new elite 
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varieties coming out of the breeding programs” in Mexico, the United States, and later, 
Latin America.  The “formative” experiment by Hernández and company, which 
resulted in the publication Races of Maize in Mexico (1950), as Wilkes shares, 
“preceded the wide recognition of the issue of genetic conservation of maize on a firm 
scientific basis” and the future conservation of agricultural genetic material.196  Only 
owning a Bachelor’s degree while his partners were distinguished researchers in maize 
studies (Mangelsdorf was a respected geneticist at Harvard and Wellhausen was a 
known maize breeder and future director of the Office of Special Studies), Hernández 
was a member of the team that established the basis for future global efforts of seed 
conservation.  The conservation of agricultural genetic diversity in seed banks around 
the world represented one of the most heralded (and ironic) outcomes of the Green 
Revolution.197   
Hernández’s work with the Office of Special Studies eventually earned him, like 
many other young Mexican agrónomos, a scholarship from the Rockefeller Foundation.  
He attended Harvard and completed his Master’s degree program in one year.  His 
thesis, “Maize Granaries in Mexico,” is a study concerning the evolution of maize 
granaries and their importance to social cohesion among indigenous civilizations.  To 
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anyone who knew him, it was no surprise when they saw that some of the sources 
Hernández consulted in his thesis likely included members of his own family.198  
Hernández was also known among the MAP staff for his inclination to approach 
research projects with an eye towards seeing the characteristics of traditional, or what 
some of his colleagues probably called, “primitive” agriculture.  In December of 1945, 
Hernández typed a report addressed to Dr. J. G. Harrar, the Mexican Agricultural 
Project’s first director.  The assignment had three objectives: 1) collection of seeds of 
major crops for research at MAP research stations, especially corn, beans, wheat, and 
potatoes; 2) collection of non-cultivated plants to assess their value as manure, forage, 
or cover crops; and 3) “location of the agricultural and floristic areas of Chiapas for 
orientation in future work of collection.”199  Hernández and his partner (and later life-
long friend), Jack Sharp, thus, explored one of Mexico’s most diverse states for genetic 
material and charted the area for future collections.  It was an enormous task and the 
report likely remains one of the earliest thorough explorations of southern Mexico by 
western-trained botanists. 
Beginning on mules and foot in Mapastepec, at 300 feet of elevation, both men 
traveled much of the state’s diverse terrain.  They went through the Chiapan High 
Plateau and through the cloud forest in the Sierra de Soconusco mountains.  The 
research trip finally ended in the state’s capital, San Cristóbal de las Casas, which rested 
at an elevation of more than 7,000 feet.  They described the coffee area in the 
Soconusco mountains as “highly specialized agricultural areas” that involved plantation 
growers simulating “as closely as possible the original ecological conditions of the 
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area” and the “maintenance of the existing forest conditions” of surrounding areas.  
Below the coffee area, in central Chiapas, the vegetation changed from pine-oak forest 
to shrub and to grassland.  The burning of trees by local farmers in the forests “permits 
a rapid infiltration of grass” for cattle.200   
Surveying the escarpment area of the Chiapan High Plateau, Hernández and 
Sharp found a “prosperous and extensive agricultural region populated by Maya-Quiche 
Indians.”  They also observed the “’milpa’” cultivation system, which “seems to have 
been brought to its maximum efficiency in this area.”  A Mesoamerican household 
crop-growing system, a milpa is a field (mil-li is the Nahuatl “root” for field  and pa 
translates into “field”)  – varying in size from a household plot to larger plots intended 
for larger groups – characterized by, but not limited to, the cultivation of maize, squash, 
and beans.  Milperos typically cleared land for cultivation and employed a method of 
field rotation in which they allowed plots to lie fallow after allowing the most recent 
plot to recover while they farmed in nearby or adjacent plots.  According to Hernández 
and Sharp’s report, three factors explained the efficiency of the milpa system: 1) “the 
natural fertility of the soil and the abundance of atmosphere and underground 
moisture”; 2) “the care displayed in the burning of the fields to be planted”; and 3) “a 
favorable equilibrium between density of population and amount of available 
agricultural land.”  The second factor allowed the undisturbed growth of the acaguales 
(fallow fields) until they were ready for planting.  The last factor enabled farmers to 
practice a specific rotation on the land:  
one year -- corn and beans 
five to ten years -- fallow 
one year -- corn and beans. 
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The report includes other observations, “The disadvantage of this system of agriculture 
is that even under the best conditions only ten percent of the agricultural land can be 
planted during the year.”  Deviation from this cultivation method, “in an effort to 
increase the area planted during the year, would results in a rapid erosion and 
destruction of the soils.”201           
 Hernández and Sharp spent most of their time in Chiapas collecting over 500 
seed samples and other material, as their objectives of their assignment called for, but 
they also took note of the intricate and ecologically complex milpa system.  The humid 
conditions in the tropical areas where the farmers employed the system provided 
atmospheric moisture that growers complemented with underground moisture of the soil 
that the local farmers generated because of their clearings and burnings and the time 
fields were allowed to lie fallow while the soil replenished minerals and other depleted 
resources.  Furthermore, as Hernández and Sharp highlighted in their report, the system 
worked because campesinos did not grow more than their land could yield before doing 
long-term damage to the natural environment’s capacity to sustain their populations.  
Any divergence from this system of cultivation risked erosion and damage to the soils.  
Hernández and Sharp’s discussion of a milpa, put another way, detailed – not in explicit 
terms (Hernández would say so explicitly in later years) – how campesinos conducted 
agriculture in a sustainable manner that involved farmers realizing the edaphic and 
ecological limits of their environment.  The “Ecological Indian,” as Shepard Krech III 
termed the phrase existed for the “Native North American as ecologist and 
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conservationist,” seemed to exist in the mountains of Chiapas, according to the 1945 
report.202   
 We do not know how Harrar and other MAP officers responded to the inclusion 
of a discussion of the milpa system.  Hernández’s archive does not have a response.  
The irony contained in the report of Chiapas cannot be overlooked, however.  
Hernández and Sharp were botanists trained at U.S. universities; Sharp was an expert in 
floristic relations between east Asia and Mexico, and a professor at the University of 
Tennessee.  They both were working under the assignment to survey Chiapas with an 
eye towards collecting genetic material.  What is more, they were both working for the 
Office of Special Studies, which operated under the mandate of improving Mexican 
agriculture, primarily via modern technology like hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and 
irrigation.  Results, as champions of the Green Revolution would argue, were derived in 
measures like yields per acre and tons per harvests.  Production and efficiency were 
quantifiable and visible.  Yet, Hernández and Sharp saw a milpa’s efficiency in 
different terms – the ability of its practitioners to continue its use over a long period of 
time and cultivation that promoted an ecological equilibrium between anthropomorphic 
processes and natural conditions.  Furthermore, Hernández and Sharp found the milpa 
system worthy of careful inquiry among local growers.  
 The next year, Hernández continued the germplasm collection for the Office of 
Special Studies.   His field journals - although inconsistent and sometimes incoherent – 
show that his habit of probing campesinos continued.  One of his entries from 
November of 1946 again shows him prodding peasants for information.  In Buena Vista 
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del Aire, Guerrero, a small town “hidden in the hills” above the Iguala-Altamirano 
Highway, he jotted down terms like “tlacolol” to indicate the “steep moist slopes which 
can not be plowed.”  On the tops of these hills, some farmers had managed to cultivate 
with the help of plows.  He also learned of “huascalot” maize, designated as such 
because of how much roadrunners (huascalot) enjoyed the maize.  On the same page, he 
mentions the grass Tripsacum dactyloides (eastern gamagrass), which “all the local 
farmers mentioned how the seed when planted will become maize in about three to six 
years and some people actually collect the seed and plant it like corn.”203  Not indicated 
in the notes, the campesinos proved to be correct.  Tripsacum dactyloides, indeed, is 
maize’s wild weed ancestor. 
 In Huetano, Michoacán, Hernández talked with other farmers.  “It is said,” his 
notes say, “that maize with thick cobs resist droughts better, that is why ‘costeño’ 
[indicative of the eastern coast of Mexico] type is predominating now.”  When he asked 
campesinos about purple maize brought from the state of Morelos.  “’Very early,’” they 
replied.”  The purple-colored maize was “said to be very early, plants low up to 1.5 m., 
ears borne (sic) very low.”204  Via experience over the years, the growers explained how 
they knew the major characteristics of local versus maize that had found its way there 
via breeding programs, state distribution, natural processes, or farmer-to-farmer contact.  
Far from inexperienced farmers, campesinos had generated their own body of 
agronomic knowledge.  Hernández later said that his time exploring in the field in the 
1940s, as obvious with the instances in Guerrero and Michoacán indicate, were 
educational experiences.  Peasant communities taught him about soil composition, plant 
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morphology, and natural history.  He later remembered his debt to “the members of the 
peasant communities” in Mexico and all of Latin America.205      
 Early on, then, Hernández made a habit of being an unconventional researcher.  
His observation skills helped him see phenomena that many trained plant scientists of 
his time would overlook or neglect to question.  His linguistic skills helped him to probe 
campesinos about the rationale they exercised in their farming practices and understand 
the cultural contexts in which they operated.  His lack of timidity and humility to talk 
with farmers also allowed him to understand (or, at least, grasp) other factors that went 
into indigenous agriculture, like religious and ornamental uses for plants.  More than 
one of his students and colleagues used terms like eclectic and original when they 
described Hernández’s way of looking at botany, agricultural experiments, and plants.   
 Salidas de campo (field and collection trips) were not always entirely about 
collecting plants samples or amateur ethnobotanical research.  Hernández enjoyed 
seeing Mexico’s countryside and the country’s rich biodiversity, and he had memorable 
experiences that he later shared with his students.  The anecdotes demonstrate 
Hernández’s lesson to students that field trips were for science, but work should not 
overshadow enjoying the people one met, or the aesthetics of the places one visited, or 
the experiences one had during salidas.  During one trip in the 1940s, Hernández and 
two foreign partners (Sharp and another from Spain) had collected samples past the 
evening hour and found themselves in a remote village with no chance of securing a 
hotel for the night.  After asking permission, they stayed at the house of a local peasant 
who shared his meal of tortillas and peppers with his visitors.  Hernández and the 
house’s owner enjoyed their meal.  But because they came from places where meals 
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with such spicy peppers were uncommon, Sharp and the Spaniard did not know how to 
nibble and take small bites at the pepper.  They swallowed their peppers whole.  
Hernández chuckled at his partners’ faces, as they sweated and grimaced because of the 
hot peppers.206   
Years later, in another instance, Hernández was on a winter collection trip for 
Tripsacum with students that began in Oblatos Canyon in the state of Jalisco.  The 
group then traveled north to Chihuahua, Chihuahua, at which point the students thought 
they would drive southeast directly to their campus in Mexico City.  Instead, Hernández 
instructed his student, Rafael Ortega, to cross over mountains and drive to Los Mochis, 
Sinaloa.  This was a long detour.  After arriving to Los Mochis close enough to see the 
Pacific Ocean, Hernández promptly told Ortega to begin the haul back to campus.  
When Ortega later asked why the long detour and short stay to the coast, Hernández 
replied nonchalantly, “a conocer” (to know; to experience).  The highway to the coast 
was one of the few that Hernández had not traveled on at the time, and he simply 
wanted to see the route and see the coast.  It had been a trip solely with the purpose of 
visiting a place that he had not yet seen.   As Ortega shared, Hernández had a “longing 
to know, to experience” Mexico.207        
 The curiosity and the eclecticism did not always sit well with bosses in the 
1950s.  One RF researcher from the United States, R.E. Larson who was leaving 
Mexico politely reminded Xolo about his eccentricities.  Larson had enjoyed academic 
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discussions with him at the Office of Special Studies, and he appreciated how 
Hernández presented ideas and the reasoning behind them, but he was “not always in 
complete agreement” with such different “concepts and philosophies.”208  By the mid-
1950s, Hernández had made a reputation for being willing to go against the grain.  The 
Office of Special Studies, in one instance, hired him to study alternative crops in 
Tlahualilo, Durango.  At the time, low international prices were hurting local cotton 
growers.  Having studied the agrostology of the state for some time for the Office, 
Hernández knew the Russian thistle grew well in the state.  He also knew that the low-
maintenance grass was resistant to salts and that the species did not require much 
irrigation – important facts in an arid region of Mexico.  After consulting with local 
peasants, Hernández submitted a report to supervisors, which suggested the idea of 
introducing goats to the area for breeding to help peasants’ income.  Supervisors 
terminated Hernández from work on the project after the report.209    
 He challenged OEE officials in other ways.  On June 27, 1956, Hernández wrote 
a short note to his supervisor, Dr. E.J. Wellhausen, at the time in charge of the Office of 
Special Studies.  Wellhausen was soon to meet with officers from the Rockefeller 
Foundation and MAP officials. Hernández hoped that his boss would bring up a topic 
for discussion at the upcoming meeting.  The letter begins: “In connection with the 
forthcoming meeting of the Advisors of the Mexican Agricultural Program of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, it seems advisable, without implying by this that the suggestion 
to be presented here would escape the keen eyes and minds of said Advisers (sic), to 
emphasize the need to supplement the agricultural program with sociological studies 
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which have as their main objective the clarification and presentation of the social 
tendencies and repercussions resultant of the technological advances achieved during 
the period in which the program has been in effect.”   
The letter continues: the Mexican Agricultural Program “was undertaken [in 
1943] on the postulate that new methods and techniques would help Mexico, as a 
fragment of mankind, be modified.”  Until 1956, there were no reasons to modify 
MAP’s mission.  But “betterment is a function of several factors,” Hernández wrote, 
“among them education in the broader sense, social heredity, and social organization.”  
Thus, “there is the possibility that disequilibrium in the rapidity of development in these 
various factors might occurr (sic) and lead to the nullification, for all practical purposes, 
of the gains obtained in the application of modern technology.”  This nullification, the 
letter followed, had occurred in Mexico.  By certain measurements (i.e., tons of 
products, yields per acre, etc.), agricultural production had increased.  But population 
had also increased.  Yet, there was no “indication of a similar strong trend in studies of 
population.”  The partnership, in short, between the Mexican government and the 
Rockefeller Foundation had achieved its mission, but neglected a concomitant factor of 
increased food supplies.  Hernández concluded the letter, “I am cognizant of the truth in 
the half-truth that ‘the shoemaker should stick to his shoes,’” and that the program 
should stick to its established mission and not undertake the suggested sociological 
study.  The program, though, had the responsibility to suggest or consider studying the 
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“non-agricultural effects of its wonderful achievement in agricultural technology in 
Mexico.”  Minus a formal sign-off, Hernández ended his note.210 
Written in 1956, Xolo’s letter represents an early critique of the Green 
Revolution that scholars have until now have not discussed.  Before historians ascribe 
Hernández an unjustified degree of foresight, however, the letter deserves scrutiny.  The 
harangue was undeveloped.  He suggested that the human element - and as Liberty 
Hyde Bailey would have agreed – must matter in agriculture, and it should matter in the 
calculus of the Foundation’s agricultural program.  But Hernández neglected to 
elaborate how and why people matter.  Instead, he vaguely suggests that technology 
could lead to “disequilibrium.”  Sounding like a technological determinist, he implies 
that technology was not harmless.  Yet, he did not touch on the more substantive issues 
surrounding the rapid introduction of the agricultural technology and rapid 
development: who has access to the technology?; whether the technology is 
sustainable?; and who benefits most from the technology?   Hernández by the mid-
1950s, then, was frustrated with what he saw in Mexican agricultural development, but 
he failed to articulate his grievances more coherently.211   
The complaints and critiques changed substantially in the decade after the letter 
to Wellhausen.  Hernández honed his criticisms against the Mexican Secretariat of 
Agriculture and their disregard towards campesino agricultural knowledge, by simply 
sending extensionistas to “teach” agriculture to peasants.  He also generated a 
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schematic, with a diagram, of the process of agriculture and how technology must 
account for social, cultural, political, and environmental contexts.  His critiques of what 
he thought was Mexicans’ attempt to transplant “La agricultura de Iowa” to the 
Mexican countryside and the shortcomings of the attempt became more substantial, 
saying that the developing world sought “to achieve agricultural development in a 
population whose social, historical and philosophical antecedents are different from 
those of the society whose agricultural development we would like to use as a norm.”212  
But in the 1950s, Hernández’s arguments were embryonic and they lacked precision.  
Correspondence between the Rockefeller Foundation and Hernández was 
inconsistent after the letter to Wellhausen.  It is difficult to determine how supervisors 
reacted to his badgering and eccentricity.  Hernández, we know, sent a letter to Kenneth 
Wernimont, an RF representative in New York, on November 21, 1956.  We do not 
know the substance of this letter.  In his response two days after receiving the letter, 
Wernimont commented “concerning the additional points mentioned” in Hernández’s 
note.  Among these four items, Wernimont instructed Hernández to ship some packages 
to the Rockefeller Foundation’s storeroom.  Also, the foundation authorized funding for 
an eight-day stay for Hernández in New York.  Finally, the termination of a fellowship 
from the Foundation that he had received would expire in mid-December and the 
foundation was “glad to help” with arrangements “for returning to Mexico.”213  
Research commissions from the Rockefeller Foundation slowed for Hernández after 
1956.  He received funding for a trip to study grasses at Harvard the next year, but his 
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frequent work with the office in Mexico City, which closed formally after 1960, ended.  
That is, the commissions ended until former OEE officers at the International Center for 
Maize and Wheat Improvement hired him to do more maize collections in South 
America in 1967 – after government officials advised Hernández to leave Mexico 
because of insubordination he had displayed to a government official (see Chapter 
Five).   
 
CONCLUSION 
As Tore Olsson’s dissertation mentions, scholars of the Green Revolution 
almost universally make mention of Carl Sauer’s famous quote to underscore the early 
substantive forewarnings of the “revolution.”214  In 1941, he famously warned that  
Mexican agriculture cannot be pointed toward standardization on a few  
commercial types without upsetting native economy and culture hopelessly.   
The example of Iowa is about the most danderious of all for Mexico.  Unless the  
Americans understand that, they’d better keep out of this country entirely…This  
thing must be approached from an appreciation of the native economics as being  
basically sound.215 
 
The quote has been by scholars as fodder to criticize the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
future efforts in Mexico, designating Sauer as a prophet for expressing concerns about 
the lack of understanding local conditions.  For some time now, Sauer represented one 
of the few professionals worried about the concomitant effects that came along with RF 
involvement in Mexican agriculture.  Olsson has thoroughly explained the context of 
Sauer’s note to RF officials. 
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 Historians can add Efraím Hernández to the early critics of the Green 
Revolution.  The irony of a “footsoldier” in the Green Revolution becoming a cynic was 
a long process.  After seeing privations in Mexico’s countryside and deciding to apply 
what he learned from one of the flagship agricultural colleges in the United States, he 
decided to return to help.  When he finally found a consistent job with the Office of 
Foreign Economic Administration, he traveled the Mexican countryside and gained an 
intimacy with peasant agriculture.  His rudimentary observations and unsystematic 
ethnobotany work began to convince him that peasants were sources of agronomic 
knowledge.  Finally, after joining the Office of Special Studies, which had an emphasis 
on quick, quantifiable results, Hernández saw the direction of agricultural development 
that Mexican leaders had chosen and he became disenchanted.  As his students shared 
with me during interviews, he grew frustrated during the 1950s with what he called the 
sterile and technocratic approach under which OEE researchers operated.     
 After he became a botany professor at the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura, 
Hernández sharpened his harangues and he found a receptive audience among many of 
his students.  They grew to admire his eccentric personality and his pedagogy - similar 
to the way Liberty Hyde Bailey’s students venerated him in Michigan and at Cornell.  
And his influence on them aroused some of them, like Hernández in his field as a 
researcher, to reject the prevailing paradigm in their occupation.  The substance of his 
developed critiques against the Green Revolution and details of the results of his 
influence on students are the topics of the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
LOOKING INWARD AT THE ESQUELA NACIONAL: 
THE GREEN REVOLUTION’S HOME AND THE REVOLUTION’S 
NEGATION 
 
 
We imitate what we believe to be superior or prestigious.  And this is why the vision of 
an America de-Latinized of its own will, without threat of conquest, and reconstituted in 
the image and likeness of the North, now looms in the nightmares of many who are 
genuinely concerned about our future…We have USA-mania.  It must be limited by the 
boundaries of our reason and sentiment jointly dictate.216   – José Enrique Rodó, “Ariel” 
(1900) 
 
  
  
In July of 1961, Leobardo Jiménez Sánchez wrote a letter to Efraím Hernández.  
One of dozens of young Mexicans who earned scholarships from the Rockefeller 
Foundation during the 1950s and 1960s to study agronomy at flagship U.S. colleges, 
Jiménez was a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin.  Having found time 
away from summer classes, he updated his maestro about his goings-on.  The culture 
shock and language barrier involved with being from tropical Veracruz and living in the 
upper Midwest proved surmountable.  Classes exhausted him, but they proved 
manageable.  Jiménez also thanked Hernández for encouraging him to read so many 
authors that he would have otherwise not read as an undergraduate in Mexico.  The 
remainder of the letter likely provoked a smile on Hernández’s face, which, considering 
his often acerbic personality towards even his closest students, would have been 
grounds for celebration.217          
                                                
216 José Enrique Rodó, “Ariel,” trans. by Margaret Sayers Peden (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1988), 71. 
217 Leobardo Jiménez Sánchez, Letter to Efraím Hernández, July 12, 1961, folder 1961, Archivo Efraím 
Hernández Xolocotzi (Archivo EHX hereafter), Colegio de Postgraduados, Centro de Botánica, 
Montecillo, Estado de México, Mexico (COLPOS hereafter). 
114 
The substance of the note concerned Jiménez’s frustrations, his “more advanced, 
mature ideas.”  “Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the truth is,” he wrote, “that I have felt 
and have had to recognize my ignorance about my own country, of its people and its 
goals.  In this sea of doubt, I must calmly and hopefully, objectively, examine the 
realities [in Mexico] and study them.”  The National Agricultural College, he continued, 
“our school, proceeds and grows, but I do not think it does so at the rhythm and pace 
that our country’s development needs.”  Jiménez followed with nearly a dozen 
questions: Should not Mexican agricultural development have a more “domestic” 
emphasis?; Should not Mexico’s agricultural institutions correspond to the country’s 
needs?; Should not we [Mexicans] study before we proclaim to know “the truth?”; 
Should not our agricultural education be harmonious with the sum of the values of our 
own people?  Jiménez assured Hernández that the caustic questions were not derived in 
malinchismo.218  He worried about how “Mexico is evolving, and about the basic 
human factors that distance us from seeing things clearly.”  Agricultural researchers, 
técnicos (assistants, agents) had a “grand difference” from our farmers, our peasants.   
Before finishing his letter Jiménez, mentioned other items.  He thanked 
Hernández for being among those leaders who trained students to work not solely to 
earn a living, but who “know their importance” and who would “not sacrifice the ejido” 
to make a living as a researcher. Among other items, Jiménez assured his mentor that he 
was not depressed or sad.  He simply shared his ruminations while studying abroad in a 
country where the word “hunger disappears even in dictionaries,” where people (falsely, 
Jiménez wrote) boasted of living better than any other place in the world.  “How could 
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people who have never had stomach pangs understand hunger?  How can these people 
understand that in Latin America there are so many illiterate and under clothed people?  
And they ask why there are so many revolutions?”  The student who later became a 
respected researcher concluded his letter by asking “why?” to many of his frustrations 
and promised to write again.219 
Jiménez embodied the students who flocked to Hernández after he arrived at 
Mexico’s Escuela Nacional de Agricultura (ENA; National Agricultural College) in 
1954.  He demanded answers to the most fundamental phenomena, as his mentor had 
trained him to do during his undergraduate years.  Simple answers never worked to deal 
with complex questions.  His career needed meaning and he (and Hernández) agreed 
that their vocation involved nothing short of helping peasants.  More importantly, 
Jiménez doubted the zeitgeist in 1950s Mexican agricultural development.  He realized 
the contradictions involved in trying to imitate a model of agronomic education and 
development with antecedents north of the Rio Grande rather than the highlands, 
tropics, jungles, and deserts of Mexico.  Furthermore, Jiménez arrived at doubts about 
the efficacy of such precepts at the place where this model was first adopted and 
embraced, the Escuela Nacional. 
Most scholarship concerning the “Green Revolution” includes mention of the 
Escuela, known simply as Chapingo since the 1920s.220  Typically, we know the school 
as the grounds from where the “revolution” found its beginnings.  It was to the school’s 
campus, we know, where Rockefeller Foundation (RF) officers and interns from the 
                                                
219 Ibid.  The ejido is communal land. 
220 I use Escuela Nacional and Chapingo interchangeably throughout this chapter to indicate any relations 
or pertinence to the Nacional College of Agriculture.  Additionally, chapingueros denotes an ENA 
student. 
116 
United States began a cooperative effort to improve Mexican agriculture in 1943.  At 
the campus’ San Martín experiment station occurred some of the earliest experiments 
with agricultural technology and techniques that received praise for helping avert world 
hunger during the 1960s.  This same technology and the same techniques first 
developed and implemented at Chapingo also received criticism by scholars.  As 
detailed in Chapter One, leaders of the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) also 
utilized the campus and surrounding lands to display model farms and draw visible 
attention to modern agricultural technology.  These are all details that most scholars of 
the topic have mentioned.   
Unexamined by scholars in the narrative of Chapingo and the “Green 
Revolution” is the process and significance of how the former was the epicenter of the 
latter.  Put another way, historians have yet to examine the history of how the 
“Revolution’s” first home, its ground zero, was the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura.  
The college, I describe in this chapter, opened in 1854 with the mandate of training 
managers for Mexico’s feudal rural economy.  In 1924, school alumni imbued the 
school with an esprit de corps and a duty to train students how to help emancipate 
campesinos from their lot in life and moved the campus to a new location and a promise 
towards fulfilling revolutionary ideals.  After Mexican leaders invited the Rockefeller 
Foundation to help improve the agriculture in 1943, Chapingo became the site where 
RF researchers and interns began the work and technology that we associate with the 
“Green Revolution.”   More substantively, this chapter describes how in fewer than 
twenty years after the arrival of RF resources and know-how, the college transformed 
from a place known for hollow revolutionary rhetoric, inadequate facilities, and a dearth 
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of research into an international vanguard.  It became the epicenter for modern 
technology to improve agriculture and the training ground for the experts discussed in 
Chapter One and researchers who would facilitate campesino redemption.  By 1960, 
school administrators, local and foreign politicians, students, and researchers regarded 
the college as a source of pride and promise.     
The story of Chapingo during the 1950s and 1960s, however, is not one solely 
one of being the “Green Revolution’s” first home.  Utilizing the Hernández archive, 
along with sources from the National College of Agriculture archives and other 
material, this chapter argues that Mexicans began having suspicions related to the 
changes taking place in their country’s agricultural development, which collectively 
emanated from the Escuela Nacional.  As Jiménez’s letter shows and the discussion of 
Hernández in this chapter describes, people in Chapingo began to discern the 
complexities involved in the attempted transplantation of “La agricultura de Iowa.”  
They also began formulating ideas to negate the characteristics associated with the 
“Green Revolution.”  Taking this line of argument further, this chapter suggests that the 
origins of the death of the “Revolution” took shape at the site of its birth.                 
 
FROM “HIJA BASTARDA” TO AN INSTITUTION WITH A MOTTO 
The history of the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura and that of the modern 
Mexican state were close since both of their inceptions.  After gaining independence 
from the Spanish Empire (1821), the country’s Liberal leaders urged the establishment 
of an institution of agricultural education to on-again, off-again President Antonio 
López de Santa Anna in 1843.  A decade later, under the purview of the newly 
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established Ministry of Development, Industry, and Commerce, Joaquín Velázquez de 
León authored a federal Law of Agricultural Education and purchased land in Mexico 
City.  Within months, on 22 February 1854, a national school of agriculture opened in a 
former convent, San Jacinto.  Two years later, President Ignacio Comonfort decreed the 
school’s training towards two careers: “administradores instruídos” (“trained 
administrators”) and “mayordomos inteligentes” (“trained overseers”).  Both careers 
trained students how to administer and oversee peon labor on Mexican haciendas.221  
The next year, according to a reproduction of an 1857 school brochure, the curriculum 
of the “sole school [of agriculture] in the entire Republic” expanded.  Students entered 
into eight professional fields after graduation: rural estate manager, field supervisor, 
veterinarian, topographic engineer, civil engineer, mechanical engineer, agricultural 
administrator, or professor of agriculture.  Students most often chose the first career 
path.222 
 Over the next five decades, the school’s existence remained unstable and its 
performance was subpar.  The French invasion of Mexico in 1861 prompted its closing.  
Three years later Napoleon, in cahoots with Mexico’s Conservatives, installed 
Maximilian I as the emperor of the country.  During the short-lived empire and for the 
two years afterwards, the Escuela Nacional remained closed.  After its re-opening, the 
school counted only a couple hundred students.  In large part, this was because of small 
appropriations.  According to Marte R. Gómez’s history of the school, funding 
remained low through the 1890s.  The college in between 1892 and 1893, for example, 
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retained no well-defined, respected role in the national fold.  In terms of funding, a 
Ministry of Justice bureaucrat who oversaw the school treated it “like a bastard 
daughter.”  If statistics indicate the school’s lackluster performance during its first five 
decades of existence, between the year it was founded and 1908, the Escuela counted 
only 323 graduates – an average of fewer than seven per year.223  Poor curriculum 
added to the woes.  Part-time professors trained students using foreign textbooks 
(largely in French) and agronomic science from abroad (primarily France).  According 
to a later ENA graduate and researcher, Gilberto Mendoza, teachers primarily trained 
students how to administer farm labor and promoted a “rudimentary” pedagogy, “aimed 
only towards practical training,” not original research.224       
 Two decades later, while much of rural Mexico witnessed civil war, Escuela 
students became intimately involved with the affairs of the national government.  As 
historian Michael Ervin discussed, what became the Mexican Revolution arrived, front 
and center, to ENA youngsters in 1913.  Between February 9 and 19, 1913, Mexico 
City experienced a small-scale civil war known as the Decena Trágica, which resulted 
in leaders of the government, particularly the newly-elected president Francisco Madero 
and some advisors, being assassinated by General Victoriano Huerta.  During the 
Decena Trágica, the president’s brother had been housed at San Jacinto.  The lodging of 
these people brought students in contact with the country’s political upheaval.  Months 
after the incident, U.S. Marines invaded the state of Veracruz.  Several students left 
school to demonstrate their patriotic fervor against the incursion.  Weeks later, in May 
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of 1914, students at the school were present when members of Victoriano Huerta’s 
military cornered a rebel inside the school’s gates and executed him on the Escuela’s 
baseball field.  The murder deeply offended several of the youngsters who were present.  
Gómez later wrote that the incident gave students “nausea against the [Huerta] 
government” for “mocking” the campus.  When the Huerta regime fell in 1914, the 
school’s doors closed, and they remained so until 1919.225     
 During the interim, several of the older students at school joined the 
revolutionary factions.  In 1915, Manuel Palafox, one of Emiliano Zapata’s advisers, 
became the Minister of Agriculture in Mexico City during one of the several seizures of 
the government during a decade-long civil war (1910-1920).  While serving as Minister, 
he visited the Escuela Nacional for recruits to deliver the agrarian reform component of 
the zapatista Plan de Ayala (1911). Palafox assigned students the job of carrying out the 
technical components of reform: conducting land surveys, delineating land parcels, 
configuring land title rights, assessing land appraisals, and other related tasks.  Gómez 
and classmates left for Morelos where they worked with the zapatistas.226   
Other students participated in battle.  Jesús “Chucho” Garza, for example, 
became part of Álvaro Obregón’s private circle, particularly for his role in helping the 
latter after a grenade from Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s forces severed Obregón’s arm 
during a battle in Trinidad in 1915.227  While working with the different revolutionary 
factions, Gómez wrote years later, ENA students “found the moral direction of our 
future.  [We found] a responsibility and calling that demanded that we fight…towards 
                                                
225 Gómez, Episodios, 195-196 and 206. 
226 Samuel Brunk, Emiliano Zapata: Revolution & Betrayal in Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1995), 152-153. 
227 Michael A. Ervin, “The Art of the Possible: Agronomists, Agrarian Reform, and the Middle Politics of 
the Mexican Revolution, 1908-1934” (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 2002), 132. 
121 
the salvation of peasants.”  When the students returned to school in 1919, Gómez and 
company arrived with a sense of purpose.  They had become “political agronomists.”228  
They fused their rudimentary training in agronomy with the ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution, particularly what they considered the “salvation” of campesinos and 
modernization of the countryside.  Per Gómez, they “found the moral norms that 
grounded our futures.  [We found] a responsibility and dignity that would lead us to 
struggle, frequently under adverse conditions, towards peasants’ rescue.”229 
 After the Mexican Revolution, many of the young men landed jobs as influential 
state functionaries.  During the 1920s, several of them became surveyors and 
administrators in agrarian reform around the country.  In 1922, they founded the 
Department of Regional Agronomists, which, as discussed in Chapter One, made up the 
feeble beginnings of agricultural extension in the country.  By 1924, during President 
Plutarco Elías Calles’s administration (1924-1928), as Ervin described, “young ENA 
graduates came to dominate not only on-the-ground policy implementation [of agrarian 
reform], but policy formation and direction” in the government’s highest levels.230  
ENA graduates designed the policies intended to dismantle the hacienda system in 
Mexico’s countryside.  Their influence increased to the point that in 1924 some 
convinced the country’s leaders to support an overhaul of their alma mater.  Marte 
Gómez headed the project.   
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 As he approached every project, Gómez plunged headlong towards improving 
his former school.231  He instituted military discipline.  Students awoke to a bugle every 
morning and they studied until, according to one 1920s student, the last call after ten 
o’clock at night.232  Admissions into the college became tougher.  To determine which 
students deserved to keep their government-derived scholarships, administrators and the 
faculty dangled the funding carrot to impel students to maintain certain marks.  Gómez 
also tried to address what ENA graduate Ramón Fernández y Fernández called the 
school’s “gravest problem”: a shortage of full-time teachers.  Typically, professors 
served as laborers in one job in held a main job in Mexico City, and incidentally 
professors.  Research, hence, remained a scarcity among the college’s faculty.233  
Another scarcity Gómez dealt with – and an indication of how poorly the school was 
supported – concerned something as fundamental as books.  For years, teachers 
handwrote their own texts.234  
 These inadequacies and areas for improvement notwithstanding, Gómez spared 
no money or thought when it came to the new location and symbolism of the school.  
He saw no logical reason for his country’s flagship agricultural college having its 
campus near downtown Mexico City, where it lacked an adequate number of fields for 
testing, laboratories, and other necessary requirements.  Gómez and others arranged to 
                                                
231 To get a sense of Gómez’s many positions in Mexican politics, his many projects, and his self-
promoted zeal, see Marte R. Gómez, Vida política contemporánea: Cartas de Marte R. Gómez, Vols. I 
and II (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978); Gómez, Escritos agrarios (Chapingo, Mexico: 
Colegio de Postgraduados-Escuela Nacional de Agricultura, 1976); and Michael A. Ervin, “Marte R. 
Gómez of Tamaulipas: Governing Agrarian Revolution,” in State Governors in the Mexican Revolution, 
1940-1952: Portraits in Conflict, Courage, and Corruption, Jürgen Buchenau and William Beezely, eds. 
(Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009): 123-138. 
232 Colegio de Postgraduados, Las ciencias agrícolas y sus protagonistas, Volumen I (Chapingo, Mexico: 
Colegio de Postgraduados), 36. 
233 Fernández, Chapingo hace 50 años, 75. 
234 Colegio de Postgraduados, Las ciencias agrícolas, 117. 
123 
move the college to Chapingo, a small town nearly twenty-five miles northeast of the 
Federal District, in the State of Mexico.  The history of the school’s new home 
exemplified what Gómez sought in a college that he wanted to infuse with fervor and 
the ideology of the Mexican Revolution.  It was (is) located outside of Texcoco, site of 
a pre-Colombian Nahua city-state, home to the famous fifteenth century ruler and poet-
philosopher Nezahualcóyotl.  Centuries later, after belonging to a Jesuit mission and 
passing through other owners’ hands, the land became an hacienda belonging to 
President Manuel González.  He was a member of the Porfirian elite, who entertained 
Mexico’s late-twentieth century aristocracy on the grounds.  In 1900, he sold the 
property to Enrique Creel, another member of the country’s privileged bunch, whose 
abuse, along with others, inspired “Pancho” Villa’s rebellion in northern Mexico.235   
Two decades later the school became owned by Mexico’s new government, one with 
leaders who espoused social justice for peasants’, and death to latifundismo and 
haciendas.   
 On 1 May 1924, with President Álvaro Obregón, Ramón De Negri, the Minister 
of Agriculture, and several members of the national government’s diplomatic corps in 
the audience, Marte Gómez inaugurated the new Escuela Nacional de Agricultura.  It 
thereafter became known as Chapingo.  “In this school,” Gómez said at the opening of 
his homily, “there will be no professors, as so many exist today, who teach their classes 
simply to earn an extra income aside from their daily job.”  Instructors would live on 
campus.  Admission would be rigorous and maintaining a scholarship would be 
difficult.  Teachers would train those rural students to take what they learn to their 
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hometowns.  The pedagogy would be theoretical and practical, students would know 
“how to grow wheat on the blackboard,” but they would not be “ignorant practitioners” 
who lacked routine farming skills.236  Students would grow food in the school’s fields 
so that the campus could possibly become economically self-sustaining.  Outside of the 
campus would be an ejido cooperative that reminded students for whom they studied.  
Local farmers could, thus, visit students or faculty members with questions.  Castigating 
the latifundio system and reaffirming the college’s utopic enterprise, Gómez ended the 
inauguration, 
Near this spot is a commemorative plaque marking the place where Hernán 
Cortés after disembarking his ships…started across [Lake] Tezcoco’s waters to 
overthrow the last of the Aztecs. Today, we throw our ships.  We are preparing 
to fight, not for the conquest of a throne or of a people, but for an ideal.  We 
secure our paddle and line our bow with an eye on the past, certain that our 
banner will float in this coveted citadel.  In exchange for prisoners [i.e., 
peasants], we do not offer vessels laden with the spoils of victory.  We offer 
men [i.e., students] of healthy body and spirit, whose motto in life’s struggle, as 
it is for us and as you saw engraved [at the school’s entrance]: “Teach 
exploitation of the soil, not man.”237       
 
Thus, Chapingo opened in 1924 with the grandiose mission of “rescuing” peasants and 
with the support the country’s new government. 
 Gómez blanketed the school in revolutionary imagery and spirit.  De Negri 
encouraged the formation of Mexico’s first ejido cooperative made up of 250 local 
campesino families.  Students thus attended school with a tangible reminder of who 
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they worked to help.238  Felipe Carrillo, the Revolution-era hero and socialist governor 
of Yucatán, had a monument located on campus.  School administrators hosted some of 
the country’s highest intelligentsia.  Jesús Silva, the preeminent national economist, 
lectured on campus during the latter half of the 1920s and years later.  Daniel Cosío 
Villegas, arguably the country’s most famous modern historian, also delivered talks 
during the same period.  A Chapingo student in the 1920s, Ramón Fernández y 
Fernández said that the most high profile intellectuals helped students “feel the cultural 
burst” of the period inaugurated by José Vasconcelos, Mexico’s most influential 
educator.239  The latter invited Diego Rivera to spend several months of 1924 and 1925 
in Chapingo.  Over the two years, Rivera painted some of his best murals in the 
campus’ former hacienda-chapel-turned-Revolutionary-template.  In the same space 
where Mexico’s aristocracy had previously entertained Porfirian elites, Rivera covered 
walls with depictions of Mexico’s indigenous past, and images that bespoke 
revolutionary rhetoric.  The Capilla Riveriana symbolized, according to art historian 
Jennifer Younger, a “visual text” that participated in “contemporary political 
discussions regarding the face of the new Mexican nation.”240  For his part, Gómez 
transformed Chapingo into an ideologically-charged space intended to serve as the nest 
egg for the agronomic foot soldiers assigned with delivering the Mexican Revolution to 
the countryside.            
 The new college received material support, too. In the decade after the move, the 
Escuela’s, federal appropriations, with the exception of one year (1927), continually 
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increased.  Funding between 1924 and 1934 nearly doubled annually.  During the same 
decade, the drop-out rate decreased from 84 percent in 1924 to 29 percent.241  Also after 
the move to Chapingo, the school’s fields of study expanded from solely training 
administrators, referred under the catch-all title of ingeniero agrónomo, to other 
specialized fields such as irrigation, parasitology, plant-breeding, agricultural economy, 
livestock, and industrial agriculture.  Additionally, Mexico’s only school of forestry, 
founded by the country’s most famous conservationist, Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, 
moved to Chapingo in 1933.242   
 Within three years, students also began to demand the proper equipment and 
training for their missions as revolutionary agronomists.  By 1936, Chapingo’s 
directorship position became a revolving door, a moonlighting position that men gained 
via social or political connections rather than merits; and after a period in which the 
school’s facilities deteriorated, students staged a strike. In 1937, students shut down the 
school for nearly four days.  They demanded changes from Mexico’s former 
revolutionary hero and then-Minister of Agriculture, Saturnino Cedillo.  Among their 
demands to then-president Lázaro Cárdenas were a “purification of the faculty” of 
unqualified, part-time teachers, new laboratory equipment, more books, tougher 
admission standards, and expulsion of undedicated students.  After Cárdenas refused to 
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cave in against Cedillo’s request to send in the army to quell the rambunctious students, 
the latter resigned (and later died amid a rebellion he led from San Luis Potosí against 
what he thought radical policies put forth under the Cárdenas’s administration).   
Officials eventually heard students’ grievances.  In 1938, to prevent and resolve 
future problems at Chapingo, students and faculty members formed the Faculty and 
Student Directive Council.  According to a publication in the Mexican federal 
government’s daily newsletter, the council’s formation redefined Chapingo’s dedication 
towards its mission: “The National School of Agriculture will be an institution with a 
firm consciousness.  Those workers who learn there are prepared to participate in the 
social struggle with certainty and decisiveness.”  Graduates shall “respond to the needs 
of the national economy with a profound familiarity with the country’s problems, 
contributing to the liberation of the rural masses.”243  Three years after the strike, an 
overhaul of the college’s classes, faculty, and administration followed.  Chapingueros, 
to be sure, took seriously their mission in 1937.   
When the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP), the partnership between 
Mexico and the Rockefeller Foundation, and the institutional forerunner of the “Green 
Revolution,” formally began in 1943, Chapingo was a college that had changed 
dramatically over its recent past.  It had a faculty and a student body vocally dedicated 
towards improving its science, pedagogy, and commitment towards Mexican peasants.  
Its students displayed a propensity to agitate when they thought the school deviated 
from its mission.  This revolutionary-grounded sense of fraternity in the student body, 
moreover, had a history of getting the attention of the highest rungs of power in the 
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country.  Students, it seemed, refused to easily forsake the school’s motto.  They 
demanded the skills and tools to fulfill their vocational raison d’être.  
 
FROM INADEQUATE TO INTERNATIONAL SHOWCASE 
 Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s Chapingo became a showcase for 
agricultural modernization in the “developing” world, a success story in international 
philanthropy, and within Mexico, the wellspring from which the technicians for peasant 
liberation received their training.  The partnership between the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the Mexican government provided, millions of dollars in financial support and 
modern training in the agricultural sciences.  Students, newspapers, agricultural 
magazines, politicians, and foreign dignitaries subscribed to an idea that by 1960 
Chapingo represented an international vanguard where radical ideas of peasant 
deliverance became fused and substantiated with modern science.  Words like 
“progress” and “innovation” loomed large on campus.        
 Before this transformation, Chapingo, despite efforts and investments over the 
previous two decades, still resembled its ineffectual past rather than a college equipped 
to handle its mission.  In 1941, San Martín, measuring a total of five hectares, 
encompassed the total of the college’s testing facilities.  The school owned a single 
tractor and funding for San Martín was, per one 1940s student, “summarily erratic.”244  
According to a newspaper article in February of 1937, admissions into the school were 
being based on nepotism and a “carnival disguise of entrance examinations.”245  The 
team of three researchers sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation to assess the 
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prospects of a partnership between the Foundation and the Mexican government in 1941 
confirmed the poor state of affairs at the college.  The school lacked provisions for 
graduate work, with “relatively little experimental work” on campus.  Survey team 
members admitted that some of the “most capable young men seen in agricultural 
work” attended Chapingo, but training there remained “neither deep enough nor broad 
enough.”  The quality of teaching on campus left much to be desired.  Administration 
and faculty members changed so often that “the character of the school also changes 
frequently.”  Another critique concerned the general opinion that the school’s graduates 
found their way into “political or semi-political jobs,” rather than research.  It was, they 
added, “little short of tragic” that the college’s farm “on which plants can be grown 
throughout the year and animals are easily kept, is not used for experimental and 
demonstrational work.”  Coupled with these assessments, the surveyors said that faculty 
and administrators considered students “trouble makers” because “they ask for the 
privilege of making experiments.”  The surveyors recommended an effort to insert 
science, a “spirit of inquiry,” on campus to repair the shortcomings.246   
Later the face of the Green Revolution and always known as a straight shooter, 
Norman Borlaug also described Chapingo’s woeful facilities after he arrived to Mexico 
in 1944.  Preparing to join the Office of Special Studies (OSS), over the phone he told 
his phone, “It looks like it’s going to be an uphill struggle to get this project off the 
ground.  There are no modern experimental field stations and there are only a few 
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trained Mexican agronomists.”  Chapingo’s lands for field work remained “mostly 
unused and choked with weeds.”  Locating basic modern equipment to conduct large 
tests, such as a functioning tractor, amounted to a fruitless undertaking.  Gasoline and 
spare tires were “impossible to obtain.”  Sharing more about the site with his wife, he 
added “The only building is an adobe shed with a tar-paper roof” that had been 
constructed recently.  OSS staffers nicknamed this shack-turned-experimentation-lab 
the “Tarpaper Shack” because of its makeshift flimsy rook and the absence of flooring 
and a foundation.  About the OSS enterprise and its base for field testing, Borlaug 
summarized to his wife: “All in all, it’s not a very encouraging situation.”247  
 Students confirmed such harsh assessments.  An editorial in the school’s student 
newspaper from April of 1946 said “The situation in 1940 was miserable.”  Budgets 
barely accommodated pay for professors and other personnel.  Students lived in 
“inadequate, abysmal” dorms.  Study rooms resembled “pigsties, almost entirely full of 
dirt, humidity numbed our muscles, and the sun never reached our books.”  Meals at the 
mess hall were “scarce and nasty.”248  In the early 1940s, according to another student, 
the school library amounted to “a warehouse of books that completely lacked any 
order,” with a librarian who spent most of his time playing basketball rather than 
tending to his duties.249  Finding a specialized book on a given task proved difficult for 
many years. 
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The teaching situation on campus was also unsatisfactory.  The college 
functioned more like a community college, with adjuncts and transitory teachers, rather 
than a full-time faculty.  In an oral history conducted years later, student José Luis de la 
Loma y de Oteyza said that teachers in the 1940s were labeled “nomadic” because of 
their part-time work at the school.250  In a 1945 interview with the student newspaper, 
when asked about the quality of teaching in 1940, the director of the school expressed 
concern and added that he considered the practical side of education – that was, outside 
of books and theories in the classrooms - “very deficient.”251     
 The inadequacies in research and facilities improved quickly after 1943, with an 
infusion of money from Mexico’s federal government.  Experiments with plant 
breeding, one student proudly mentioned in the student newspaper, began in 1943.  
Students began developing studies with local maize to design seeds resistant to disease 
and adaptable to the different ecological conditions near Chapingo.252  During the same 
period, government funds paid for new dormitories, which were “beauties, solid and 
sizeable,” according to one editorial in the school’s newspaper in 1946.  Testing 
facilities, the same editorial boasted, transformed into “complete laboratories, 
modernized, and equipped” better than any agricultural school in Latin America.253  If 
federal funding for the school indicated a commitment towards improving the school, 
then the President Manuel Ávila Camacho put his money where his mouth was: funding 
for the school was $2 million dollars in 1941, the next year the allocation increased to 
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$2.7 million, and in 1943, the school received $3 million.254  By 1949, the campus 
owned facilities for teaching in modern areas of study: microbiology, mineralogy, and 
chemistry.  The school also invested in purchasing several tractors and in construction 
of laboratories with some of the microscopes in the country.255  Students, indeed, 
enjoyed the windfalls of the “Mexican Miracle,” when the country’s sustained 
economic growth between 1940 and 1970, the average annual rate of economic growth 
stood around 6.5 percent.256      
 The Rockefeller Foundation shared its largesse and resources with its Mexican 
partners at Chapingo.  Before the Office of Special Studies, the jointly-shared office 
that became the home of the “Green Revolution” after 1943, found space in the 
Ministry of Agriculture in Mexico City, Chapingo was the office’s home.  In 1946, 
according to a Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report, officials helped purchase state-
of-the-art greenhouse facilities for $25,000.257  A year later, the Foundation paid to 
expand the school’s experimental fields; the fields increased in size from five hectares 
in the early years of the decade to nearly 100 hectares within a couple years.  These 
same fields produced improved maize seeds, which, per an RF annual report, served as 
the genetic base for seeds that went out to the rest of the country’s regions for 
cultivation.  Studies on campus also included work on soil fertility, irrigation, insect 
control, and plant disease.  Chapingo also became the new home to a “commodious 
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building of brick and concrete” to house MAP staffers and researchers.258  By 1949, this 
experiment station represented the center of “pioneering research” of the Mexican 
Agricultural Program’s research program, with “its well-equipped laboratories and acres 
of experimental plantings.”  In the same year, RF officials donated $14,500 towards 
opening a plant pathology department and another department dedicated towards 
entomology.  The RF endowment also helped to purchase more land for field tests; the 
college soon owned more than 120 hectares.259  One year later, RF officials donated 
$12,000 to expand the school’s library and pay for visiting professors.260    
 Professors were not the only people who came and went from the campus during 
the 1940s.  In the Mexican Agricultural Program’s first year in 1943, OSS chiefs began 
hiring chapingueros as interns.  Not long after being hired as an intern, ENA graduate 
José Rodríguez was the first of what quickly became a stream of students who attended 
U.S. universities to study agronomy and returned to join Chapingo’s faculty, take jobs 
in Mexico’s new research stations, or work as extension agents.  Between 1941 and 
1943, the number of young men sent to study at land-grant colleges in the United States 
was nineteen.261  Several others followed.  Throughout MAP’s lifetime (1943-1959), 
according to sociologist Gustavo Esteva, approximately 750 Mexicans participated in 
field work and laboratory training primarily under the tutelage of the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s representatives in Mexico, and the Escuela Nacional was where at least 
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eighty percent of them began their training.262  They also began work as apprentices 
outside of Mexico’s new research apparatus.  According to a letter from Richard 
Bradfield in 1946, interns supplied Mexico with “a nucleus of agricultural leaders with 
a good grasp of practical agricultural problems of the type they would find very difficult 
to get in any other way.”263   
Students from other Latin American countries began study at Chapingo.  By 
1945, students from Colombia enrolled at the college.  Two years later RF officials 
noted that the Mexican Agricultural Program “attracted a growing number of 
agriculturalists” from countries outside of Colombia, some from Central America.   
Many if not all of them passed through Chapingo’s halls.  By the end of the 1940s, at 
least twenty-four students from outside of Mexico received their training at the 
college.264 
 Growth and progress saturated the college’s ámbito in other ways.  On a daily 
basis, students could walk by the tests conducted at the “El Horno” experimental field 
that the Office of Special Studies utilized.  In October of 1946, for instance, people on 
campus would have seen tractors spraying, for the first time, high-tech “D-D” fumigants 
at Chapingo.265  One year later, the Office of Special Studies began what became known 
                                                
262 Gustavo Esteva et al., The Struggle for Rural Mexico (South Hadley, MA.: Bergin & Garvey 
Publishers, Inc., 1983), 65; Olea-Franco, “One Century of Higher Agricultural Education and Research in 
Mexico,” 558.  I must note that some people regard the Mexican Agricultural Project lasted until 1966-
1967. 
263 Richard Bradfield, Letter from Richard Bradfield to W. I. Myers at Cornell University, May 25, 1946, 
Record Group (hereafter RG) 1.1, series 323, box 2, folder 11, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 
Tarrytown, NY. (RFA hereafter).   
264 The Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report 1947 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1947), 
163.  Anneliese Markus de Kennedy, “The Office of Special Studies: A Study of the Joint Mexican 
Secretariat of Agriculture-Rockefeller Foundation Program in Agriculture” (PhD diss., University of 
North Carolina, 1973), 119. 
265 “On Land of the National School of Agriculture Tests are Made of the New Fumigant ‘D-D’,” 
Excélsior, RG 1.1, series 323, box 2, folder 12, RFA.  Fumigants, pesticides, and other synthetic 
agricultural products and their effects have been exhaustively studied.  In Mexico, see Angus Wright, The 
135 
as annual Demonstration Days at Chapingo (see Figure 3.3) and afterwards at other 
OSS experiment stations around Mexico.  Akin to the methods of extension in Chapter 
One, interns and extension agents invited local farmers to tour the school’s fields to see 
yields from hybrid maize, improved wheat strains, and the many projects taking place 
on and near the campus.266  Only a handful of years after Chapingo had been a poor 
excuse for a modern college, the public visited campus for advice and demonstrations of 
tractors spraying agricultural fumigants took place on campus.  
 The changes on campus enthused students, and they vocalized their zeal and 
sense of camaraderie about their role in helping Mexican agriculture.  Así, a weekly 
publication, ran a piece during the spring of 1946 implying that a problem plaguing the 
improvement of agriculture centered on a lack of capable agronomists.  ENA student R. 
Merino took the Así article to mean that the Escuela Nacional failed to impart the 
needed skills to deliver “scientific advances” to peasants.  Consequently, he thought the 
article insinuated that chapingueros were incapable of fulfilling their mission.  Such an 
implication was a crime to Merino.  “The people equipped best to resolve a problem 
with critical judgment and sapience are, without a doubt, the best trained.  They know 
best.”  “Solving rural problems,” he continued, “requires huge investments put forth 
with sound judgment that is best conducted via technical direction…Give agronomists a 
chance and we shall see if their work is worthy.”  He challenged critics to see if he and 
his classmates could not fulfill their mission of “taking progress to the countryside.”  
Furthermore, he trusted that the government would continue to give Chapingo graduates 
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the opportunity to “disseminate and demonstrate to the unbelievers” that the future lay 
in “scientific agriculture, with its advances in genetics, ecology, crop rotation, etc., 
[and] not an intensification of quackery devoid of [empirical] foundations based on 
theory supported by experiment.”267  Students’ tasks and future, Merino thought, were 
moving science from an abstract world in classrooms and laboratories to reality.      
 The next month Guadalupe Escamilla echoed students’ faith in science and their 
role in facilitating campesino redemption.  “We are living in an era in which the world 
is changing,” he began, “science has changed everything.  The human mind has 
conceived ideas that astonish and take humanity down an uncertain path because we 
don’t know if we should believe it [scientific advances] or not.”  Agriculture and 
industry, Escamilla continued, evolved together.  Always present in this evolution were 
technicians/engineers, who have been a major importance of those who have 
contributed to the world’s evolution.  “The minds of these men work tirelessly.  The 
ability to think and the clarity with which they see science help to derive new formulas, 
new secrets to better humanity.  It is grandiose.”  Bringing his piece back to his 
classmates, he continued: 
The students that today pass through Chapingo’s halls and those that educate 
themselves and model their behaviors in the correct manner and strengthen their 
spirits under the tutelage of researchers and scientists, have been called to 
resolve Mexico’s agriculture problem.  We believe that we deserve to deliver 
this duty because we have studied towards this end, not politicians who pry into 
our business…Our agriculture will never advance in the hands of these people 
[politicians]. 
 
Why, he asked, do not politicians put agriculture into the hands of técnicos 
(students/interns)?  Only this group could “take advantage of genetics, the knowledge 
about chemical changes in soil, physiology, and biometry – all of which have yielded 
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magnificent results.”  The Ministry of Agriculture, Escamilla finished, had installed 
experiment stations around the country, which was wonderful.  The government’s role 
now lay in taking “advantage of the knowledge gained” at these stations by those 
“found at the forefront of these projects,” the ingenieros agrónomos.  “When this 
happens, the contingent of those at Chapingo will be ready to serve Mexico and put it in 
the civilized world.”268  
 Chapingueros in the 1940s, as Merino and Escamilla’s words indicated, adopted 
an esprit de corps, a faith in several ideas in relations to the happenings at the campus.  
They took offense to the insinuation that they left school unprepared to honor their 
social compact with the Mexican Revolution.  As Merino’s editorial in the student 
newspaper demonstrated, ENA students adopted an us-against-the-world attitude 
towards those Mexicans championed the work of técnicos.  Those “unbelievers” and 
their “quackery,” he implied, would be proven wrong by ENA students and their 
diffusion of science.  Escamilla shared such thoughts.  If politicians were to get out of 
students’ way, he implied, then agronomists, those trained at Mexico’s pioneer college, 
would help transcend Mexico into the world of civilized nations.  Such displays of 
fraternity towards helping peasants and militant faith in modern science were common 
in the remaining student newsletters of the late 1940s and the early years of the 1950s.        
 Four months after Escamilla’s 1946 editorial, Henry Wallace lent credence to 
Chapingo’s status.  Years before being one of Franklin Roosevelt’s three vice 
presidents, and years before a sad exit from national politics, Wallace had been a farmer 
from Iowa.  His family had made their fortune with the Hi-Bred Corn Company, one of 
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the first hybrid seed corporations in the world.269  And having been one of the 
godfathers of the Mexican Agricultural Program, with his encouragement to the 
Rockefeller Foundation to become involved with helping Mexican agriculture in 1940, 
Wallace took an interest in visiting the Escuela Nacional to see the advances there since 
the arrival of RF-sponsored researchers and RF philanthropy.  In the eyes of ENA 
students, faculty members, and Mexican leaders, praise from one of the world’s most 
influential farmers served as legitimacy for the changes taking place in Chapingo.  
Escorted by Marte Gómez, other dignitaries, and former president Lázaro Cárdenas, 
Wallace arrived to Chapingo in the morning on 7 September 1946.  Local and 
international press members accompanied the group.     
 Wallace spent much of the day at the school.  On his way to the campus, he 
stopped to visit the ejido cooperative outside the school’s campus, which, according to a 
student reporter, the guests “admired” ENA students’ discipline.  By 10 a.m., after 
greetings from students in their military-style uniforms, Gómez led tours of Diego 
Rivera’s famous frescoes that paid reverence to Chapingo’s mission.  The contingent 
proceeded to visit a museum being built dedicated towards hydrology.  They visited the 
school’s soon-to-be finished, new library.  They passed through other recently-
completed projects: animal stables, swine pens, poultry houses, and a chemistry lab.  
The highlight of the visit, however, took place at Chapingo’s experimental fields.  As 
they toured, according to a student reporter, Wallace said he “felt thoroughly satisfied 
with the success that the Rockefeller Foundation, in partnership with the Mexican 
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government,” had made, the advances were “obviously visible,” at Chapingo where 
work with maize, beans, sorghum, and other crops represented “magnificent results.”270   
 Before sitting for a meal of barbacoa, Wallace gave strong endorsements about 
Chapingo, the Mexican Agricultural Program, and Mexico’s agricultural progress.  
According to a local newspaper, the work being conducted was of “grand importance 
towards Mexican agricultural self-sufficiency.”  Moreover, the day dawned when 
Mexico could produce its own agricultural foods, no longer having to import products.  
About ENA students, he was effusive.  Their duty was “to elevate the minds of peasants 
and this would surely be accomplished if they were determined.”  In agriculture, he 
added, Mexico had “grand possibilities, incredible possibilities.”271  If Wallace’s praise 
in the local press came out of courtesy rather than sincerity, then one should know what 
he remarked a week after the trip south of the border.  In a letter to Albert Mann, 
Deputy Director for Agriculture for the Natural Sciences Division with the Rockefeller 
Foundation in New York, Wallace said “My impression of the work is of the best.”272  
During the same year, Mexico’s Diario Oficial, the federal government’s daily 
newsletter, announced that the Escuela Nacional received support to open a graduate 
school.273  By all accounts in 1946, the school had transcended its past.     
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Image 3.1  Henry Wallace at Chapingo with Mexican Secretary of Agriculture, Marte R. Gómez.  
Wallace bites into a chile grown on ENA experimental fields (from Rockefeller Foundation Archives, 
September 10, 1946). 
  
The accolades related to Chapingo continued after the Wallace visit.  In 1948, 
ENA alumni designed and led a new college of agriculture at the Monterrey Institute of 
Technology and Teaching.274  In 1949, celebrations took place for the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the inauguration of Chapingo as the home of the Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura.  In attendance to the four-day commemoration was President Miguel 
Alemán.  Other attendees included the Minister of Education, the chief of the National 
Agrarian Commission, scores of other functionaries, and former students.  Nazario 
Ortiz, the Minister of Agriculture, used his speech at the ceremony to catalog 
Chapingo’s achievements.  He boasted about the school’s enrollment, which stood at 
four hundred students and counted students from all over Latin America.  These young 
men, he said, “come to drink” from Chapingo’s “fountain of teaching.”  Ortiz proceeded 
to itemize the projects, state agencies, and institutions where chapingueros had 
contributed or led over the years: the National Irrigation Committee; combatting 
garbanzo bean infestations in the 1920s; helping with an outbreak in the banana 
industry in Tabasco in the 1920s; founding of the National Agrarian Commission; 
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helping Mexico’s “titanic” forest management projects; staffing the Nacional Maize 
Commission; helping fight aftosa fever and locust outbreaks during the 1940s; and a 
variety of other institutions and activities.  In each of these arenas, Ortiz said, 
agrónomos worked with little recognition.  They toiled towards “the possible, in the 
duty of honoring our patria.”  Distinguished guests spent the remainder of the day 
visiting the school’s other displays that testified to the college’s progress, such as 
demonstrations of livestock artificial insemination and tractor demonstrations.  Never 
one to turn away an opportunity to praise himself, President Alemán highlighted 
projects that had begun at Chapingo under his administration: a new, fully-equipped 
two-story chemistry lab; a new medical building to “dutifully” attend to the agrónomos 
to-be; a physics laboratory with the strongest electron microscope in all of Mexico; a 
new facility for studying irrigation; and a new cafeteria.  Alemán also broke ground for 
a new biology lab.275    
 President Alemán (1946-1952) seemed to have inaugurated what became a 
tradition at Chapingo – that of Mexican presidents visiting the campus.  They came 
throughout the 1940s through the late 1960s to open classes every February, celebrate 
school anniversaries, dedicate new facilities, accompany visiting dignitaries, and visit 
students.  Presidents of four administrations visited the school at least once a year 
between the mid-1940s and through the end of the 1960s.276  Alemán visited campus 
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again in 1950.  Nazario Ortiz, the Minister of Agriculture, one state governor, the 
Director of the National Agronomic Society, Mexico’s representative to the United 
Nations, the mayor of the Federal District, the leader of the National Peasant 
Confederation, and Mexico’s ambassador to Honduras accompanied the president.  All 
arrived for the spectacle that Chapingo represented.  Over the previous year, Mexico 
had an agricultural surplus worth about one billion dollars, thanks in large part to 
investments by the Alemán administration (these were years in which the government 
invested heavily in large dam and irrigation projects).  Underscoring Mexico’s need for 
the college’s students, Ortiz said that agrónomos helped with the “nondeferrable” 
problem of soil erosion in different parts of the country and with other issues.  The 
country approached self-sufficiency in wheat, in part because of advances at Chapingo, 
“a dignified institution.”  After Ortiz’s speech, some of the important visitors enjoyed a 
meal.  Being a socialite, President Alemán ate his meal with students.277      
Months after Ortiz’s words El Nacional, a national media outlet, confirmed the 
success led by the staff members of the Office of Special Studies (OSS) on campus.  
They had developed wheat that improved yields in the mountainous region surrounding 
Chapingo, and genetically-improved seeds for other regions were forthcoming.  In 
relations to maize research, twenty-four of the highest yielding maize seeds in the 
country were generated by OSS researchers and their workers and assistants at the 
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National College of Agriculture.  Additionally, some legumes and sorghum varieties 
neared distribution.278    
 The praise for the happenings at Chapingo continued in 1951 and 1952.  Over 
the course of the former year, the federal government had appropriated seven million 
pesos to improve the school’s facilities.  Ortiz thanked the teachers, many of whom had 
likely recently returned from graduate study at US land-grant colleges.  These teachers, 
Ortiz said, collectively facilitated development and improvement in national agriculture.  
He thanked students, too, reminding them of their mission: “meeting the goals of 
progress and wellbeing that they, as did the government, should desperately desire.”279  
Students reciprocated this praise.  In a 1951 editorial in Chapinguito, the campus 
student newsletter, one young man with the penname Ton-Tín said students now owned 
a library “worthy of our school.”280  The next year E.J. Wellhausen, the leader of the 
maize breeding program of the Mexican Agricultural Program, complimented the 
College.  During an interview discussing the State of Mexico extension program begun 
by Governor Salvador Sánchez (see Chapter One), he matter-of-factly said the benefits 
that farmers received from the program “of course” had their origins at Chapingo’s 
experiment station.  In the same interview, Wellhausen answered questions about his 
assessment of the Mexican Agricultural Program’s effect at agricultural schools.  The 
program, he responded, began having “a very definite effect” by 1952.  “The indications 
are beginning to come to the front at Chapingo.  We have…ever since we have set up 
the [experimental] station there, used the students as labor.”  Students worked alongside 
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the MAP experts.  The leaders of the program had “built up a certain amount of interest 
in research on the part of the students,” Wellhausen said before adding more on 
discussions at Chapingo related to locating more funding for ENA professors to carry 
out research programs.281   
  
 
Image 3.2  With press members present, President Miguel Alemán congratulated and welcomed a 
Chapingo student in 1951 (from Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Biblioteca Central, Tierra, March 
1951). 
    
By 1954, the centennial year of the opening of the Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura, the celebration of progress taking place on campus increased.  Its library, 
according to one magazine, owned more than ten thousand books and its staff was fully 
trained.  Administrators were busy devising ways to ensure that professors no longer 
moonlighted at other jobs in Mexico City.282  Hence, professors had more time available 
for research and teaching.  Another magazine specifically listed each of the college’s 
facilities, almost to indicate to readers the size and improvement on campus.  The 
school also had fifty-one professors and a high enrollment rate, which included students 
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coming from Central America and recently some from South America.283  Also in 1954, 
seeds, particularly maize and wheat, from projects that began at Chapingo, were 
shipped abroad.  According to a New York Times article praising the work of MAP 
staffers, the seeds flourished in India and Japan.284   
 At the hundredth anniversary celebration on February 22, the Minister of 
Agriculture spoke to an audience that included President Adolfo Ruiz.  After praising 
the president for his presence and “interest in agricultural education and sympathy 
towards agronomists,” Gilberto Flores explained how historians and agronomists would 
later appreciate the “remarkable” leaders who had the idea of building such a “brilliant 
school.”  Two-thirds of the country’s populace, he said, earned their living in 
agricultural activities, yet these people received only one-fifth of the national income.  
Such a state of affairs for peasants remained “improper.”  However, agrónomos from 
Chapingo rectified the conditions that allowed such a state of affairs to persist.  They 
personified the “vanguard of national agriculture” who delivered the technical aspects 
needed to carry out social justice: finding credit for farmers; formulating guaranteed 
prices for farmers’ products; elimination of agricultural middlemen; construction of 
product storage houses; research at experiment stations; development of improved 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation schemes, soil improvement plans; and extension 
activities.  Finishing his speech, Flores reminded students of the importance of the 
training they received, suggesting that they were some of the foot soldiers on whom 
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people relied to help campesinos.  Finally, he suggested that students to retain a “latent 
spirit” related to the fulfillment of the Mexican Revolution.285   
 If such endorsements ringed of exaggeration on the part of a local figurehead 
whose job title involved praising the school, in 1955 they were lent credibility by an 
influential person from outside of Mexico.  A little more than one year after Flores’s 
speech, after a swing tour through the Caribbean, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, 
Ezra Taft Benson, paid a visit to the college.  The stop was to “inform himself about the 
different aspects in Mexican agriculture and livestock” and attend other meetings.  He 
arrived with reporters, Francis White, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, and Paul 
Minneman, agricultural delegate of the U.S. Embassy.  With a handful of bureaucrats in 
tow, Humberto Ortega, Chapingo’s director, guided the visitors around.  They toured 
new facilities and heard presentations about ongoing and new programs at the school.  
Before heading to Mexico City for other meetings, Benson shared his thoughts: “This 
school honors Mexico.  At this school, the most modern techniques are put into action, 
and students are provided with the necessary facilities to efficiently and thoroughly 
learn.”286   
 Years later, one ENA student’s response to complaints from classmates 
underscore the expansion and progress taking place on campus.  The school had a new 
greenhouse, a new building for agricultural industry studies, and a student lounge.  With 
some serious exceptions, teachers were “more than competent, [they were] brilliant.” 
While many items on campus remained imperfect, Chapingo “without a doubt” 
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advanced.  As an establishment for training, it “yielded to no other school” in the 
country.  Furthermore, the student said, school officials had recently announced that 
Mexico would finally open its first graduate school for agricultural studies, which 
would adjoin Chapingo.287  Mexicans would not have to travel abroad for advanced 
studies in agriculture.  They would soon have an institution of their own to generate and 
conduct research.     
 The Colegio de Postgraduados opened in the spring of 1959.  As chiefs of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and their Mexican partners prepared formally to close the 
Office of Special Studies, Mexicans opened its first graduate school.  Chapingo had the 
resources, particularly with a $50,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation towards 
operations of the country’s first graduate agriculture course during the previous year.288  
And according to an RF Annual Report, a number of the Colegio’s faculty members 
were RF fellows who had studied abroad or OSS trainees who had studied with RF 
researchers.  “The school’s importance,” the report added, “is not limited to Mexico, for 
agronomists from other Latin American countries can go there for graduate work 
without the added burden of learning a new language or of adapting to a greatly 
different educational and social scene.”  So confident were RF officials in their New 
York headquarters in the Colegio de Postgraduados that they doubled their donation to 
the school to $100,000, with a matching grant for the following year.  They were proud 
of the school, which began with twelve students and six professors, and increased 
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within a year to thirteen professors and a student body of twenty-nine.289   With a corps 
of agronomists who owned graduate degrees from the best schools in the United States, 
Mexico had the professionals and the facilities needed at a graduate college.  Reasons to 
be proud and to celebrate abounded in 1960.       
 
    
Image 3.3  A 1956 Demonstration Day at Chapingo.  The speaker is located at far right.  By 1958, the 
school and the Office of Special Studies experimentation station on campus together comprised “the main 
center for agricultural instruction and research in Mexico” (from Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, 
Biblioteca Central, Tierra, November 1956).290 
 
 
 By the end of the 1950s, then, Mexico’s Escuela Nacional de Agricultura 
embodied a success story.  After nearly a century of being a lackluster institution and a 
poor excuse for an agricultural college assigned with studying and disseminating 
modern agronomy to farmers, after the efforts of Marte Gómez, more than one 
president, OEE staffers and researchers, RF money and manpower, Chapingo 
symbolized a vanguard institution.  It was Mexico’s hotbed of science, technology, and 
peasant redemption.  It was a testament to what could be achieved with money and 
determination in a short amount of time.  Hundreds of young men (until 1974, ENA did 
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not have female graduates) considered themselves the legion of scientists endowed with 
the skills and know-how to train farmers.  School administrators and government 
officials proudly visited the school and boasted of its achievements and progress 
towards helping the country achieve industrialization.  Mexico’s presidents paid visits 
to campus and even congregated with students.  Figures like Henry Wallace and Ezra 
Taft Benson visited campus, and both extolled the school’s work.  Foreign students 
flocked to study at the school.  New, modern buildings and equipment decorated the 
campus.  Local farmers congregated to the campus to see modern agricultural science 
and hear about its advances.  Seeds from Chapingo received credit for helping local 
farmers’ yields, as well as yields in Israel and Japan.  After being trained at the best 
land-grant colleges north of the Rio Grande, a young corps of expert agronomists made 
up much of the school’s faculty.  Chapingo showed itself equipped to handle its 
revolutionary mission and, consequently, Mexico benefited from what had happened 
over the previous decade and a half. 
 More important to historians today is what Chapingo represented by 1960.  The 
college represented the seedbed of the “Green Revolution.”  If one attaches certain 
markers with the “Revolution” – genetically improved seeds, promotion of synthetic 
petrochemical-based fertilizers and pesticides, U.S.-style demonstration lot extension 
methodologies, an emphasis on quantitative volume to signify progress, a fealty towards 
“hard” science over social science, technology representing a “magic-bullet” recipe for 
complex social and ecological issues – then it is obvious that each of these trademarks 
had privileged spaces at the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura by the end of the 1950s.  
Chapingo, we must recognize, was ground-zero.   
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CHAPINGO’S DOUBTING THOMAS 
 If presidents, politicians, school administrators, students, and foreign visitors 
were faithful adherents to the religion of progress taking place in Chapingo, then 
Hernández’s was the school’s Saint Thomas.  He had his doubts.  After gaining his 
Master’s degree in botany at Harvard, he taught at the Monterrey Institute of 
Technology and Higher Education, which proved to be, he said later, an opportunity 
that he appreciated, but the two years there “were not to my liking” because of the 
school’s focus on the private sector.  Its utilitarian atmosphere, he shared, trained 
students who worked “towards their own, personal interests” and not those of the 
greater public.  Chapingo, with its “exploit-the-soil-not-man” motto, resonated more 
with his philosophy towards education.  The school was “more open, more linked to 
producers themselves.”291  But Chapingo severely disappointed him.  As we shall see, 
he spent his first years at the school trying to curb the over joyousness many people had 
towards the “progress” at Mexico’s pioneering agricultural institution.     
 By the time Hernández moved to the Escuela Nacional he was arguably 
Mexico’s most accomplished and traveled botanist.292  When he spoke, colleagues and 
students had reason to listen.  His explorations in southern Mexico and Guatemala 
between 1945 and 1949 arguably formed the genetic specimens for theories concerning 
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the weed from which maize had its biological origins.293  He had completed his 
Master’s under the tutelage of Paul Mangelsdorf, one of the world’s foremost experts on 
maize.  He was one of the authors of a go-to text concerning the racial origins of 
Mexico’s most important grain, maize (see Chapter Two).  USDA officials, OSS chiefs, 
and the government, in 1950, had hired him to research how to combat a citrus blackfly 
attack on Mexico’s large citrus industry.294  Over the course of the same decade, when 
he found a few moments away from teaching heavy loads or research, he spent time 
responding to questions and requests of all sorts from all over the world: Texas A&M 
University inquired about a possible plant specimens exchange program (1950); 
Cornell’s Bailey Hortorium asked about palms that he had collected (1951); a thank-you 
note from the Smithsonian Institute for sending Tripsacum samples to add to a 
collection in the United States (1951); a request, after a recommendation from a U.S. 
botanist, for mesquite in New Delhi, India (1951); a USDA researcher inquired about 
plant collection procedures in Mexico (1953); Washington University asked about a 
possible collaboration on fossil flora (1956); Yale University had questions related to 
his grass collections (1956); the Fairchild Tropical Garden in Florida sought to know 
more about his collection of palms from the state of Tabasco (1957); the Academy of 
Natural Sciences for Philadelphia queried about collaborating on a plant collection trip 
(1957); Rogers McVaugh, later considered the expert on western Mexico’s flora, sent a 
request to initiate a plant specimens exchange program between Chapingo and the 
University of Michigan (1957); the University of California, Riverside, requested help 
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with their avocado collection (1958); the director at Harvard’s Atkins Garden & 
Research Laboratory asked for assistance finding a collection assistant for pines, 
because “no one could help him better” than Hernández (1958); a letter from 
Kagoshima, Japan, asked about a possible palm exchange program (1958); North 
Carolina State College wanted a sample of pipe vine (1959).295  He counted the experts 
in world botany among his correspondents. As detailed in Chapter Two, Liberty Hyde 
Bailey, by 1947, a world leader in systematic botany, was among Hernández’s contacts.  
Edgar Anderson, a curator at the famous Missouri Botanical Garden and eventually one 
of the world’s greatest ethnobotanists, told him to “call on me,” if he could provide help 
with some of Hernández’s research. Anderson also considered Hernández an authority 
on palms and said he was “wildly enthusiastic” about work he had written on a 
Tripsacum.296  By 1960, Hernández was “The Man” in Mexican botany.    
Hernández earned respect in Mexican scientific circles, too.  By 1949, he was a 
member of the Directing Council of Mexico’s Botanical Society, the country’s first 
body dedicated to systematic study of botany.297  He was a friend of Enrique Beltrán, 
the leader of the Institute of Renewable Natural Resources, likely Mexico’s first public 
conservation agency.  In 1953, Beltrán published Hernández’s work for his mastery of 
the vegetation of the country, particularly those along the Pan-American Highway.  
Beltrán asked him to assist in an extensive study about agriculture in the Yucatán 
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Peninsula.298  In relations to his familiarity with Mexican vegetation areas, Hernández 
told one colleague that there were few areas in the country that he had not visited or 
studied by the 1980s and he had conducted many of the trips to the far reaches of the 
country during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.299  By 1955, he was Vice President of the 
Mexican Society of Natural History, one of the country’s oldest professional scientific 
organizations.  By 1957, Gabriel Itié, considered one of the country’s most 
accomplished agronomists, called Hernández the country’s best agrostologist.300  
Should his services be limited to professional circles, groups outside of academia, 
including industry, sought Hernández’s services.  Alfonso Reina, a representative of the 
Group of Meatpackers of Northern Mexico, sought services concerning pasture studies 
in 1957 and the request found its way into Hernández’s mailbox.301  Months after this 
request Guillermo Rossell sent Hernández a letter on behalf of President Adolfo López 
Mateos concerning a “valuable study” Hernández presented to the national Assembly of 
the Social and Economic Planning Committee.  “I am convinced,” Rossell wrote, “of 
the conscious and disinterested study of the major problems facing the Mexican 
community reigns in our Assembly, and we urge you to continue with the same spirit of 
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work [you have shown], assuring you of its service to the country.”302  Being an avowed 
nationalist, Hernández likely appreciated these words from such an authority.     
Recognition abroad and praise at home, however, failed to assuage frustration.  
Little about Chapingo or national academic circles impressed Hernández in 1953.  He 
understood that if one was knowledgeable of Chapingo’s status before the 1950s or if 
one was a researcher prior to the same decade, as were Hernández’s colleagues and 
students, then being around the campus or within certain circles may have been 
impressive.  But he looked askance at the sense of arrival of Mexican agricultural 
development that many people espoused.  Whereas many people saw progress and 
advance, Hernández saw room for improvement and years of catching up that had to be 
done.   
When he began working as a botanist, Mexico lacked a well-funded and 
professional research apparatus in biological sciences.  In large part, this was because of 
how young professional studies were in the country and because of a number of other 
reasons.  The results of the first national agricultural census were not released until the 
early 1930s.303  One of the only other bodies connected with research was the National 
Agronomic Society, which was dedicated, Michael Ervin proved, more towards 
agrarian reform (read, politics) rather than science.304  Mexico’s National School of 
Forestry opened in 1916 and disappeared in 1923.  Other centers for forestry studies 
also failed to last - the most significant school closing, for all intents and purposes, in 
1940.  The country’s Institute for Bacteriological Study did not open until 1936.  Before 
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1938, one of the country’s most well-known colleges did not offer a certificate of study 
with a specialty in biological science.  It was not until 1958 that Mexico’s National 
University (UNAM) offered degrees specifically in biology.305   
Other institutions and circles of research related more specifically to agronomy 
and biological sciences fell short both in quantitative and qualitative terms.  With the 
exception of the Office of Special Studies and its production, which was noteworthy, 
only one other outfit could have been said to carry out intense agricultural research.  In 
eight years since it was opened in 1947, the Institute of Agricultural Research, counted 
a handful of interns and despite valiant efforts on the part of its leaders, had one 
“second-rate” publication to its name.  This was a suggestion that Hernández made in a 
speech, without directly naming the institute, in 1955.306  Edmundo Taboada, the 
Institute’s chief, held an advanced degree from Cornell, but his assistants were, 
according to one Mexican researcher, “trained solely as research aides.”307  They were 
not independent, original creators of research.  Moreover, the institute took years to 
                                                
305 Hernández, “La biología agrícola en México” (paper presented at the meeting for the Mexican Society 
of Natural History, location not indicated, Mexico, June 6, 1961).    
306 ----, “El desarollo de las investigaciones biológicas y la preparación de biólogos en México” (paper 
presented for the Mexican Society of Natural History, location not indicated, date not indicated 1955).  
Hernández’s speech makes reference to what he called a Research Institute that was eight years old in 
1955, which by all indications was a reference to Taboada’s operation.  Hernández referenced the slow 
production – because of the magnitude of work that the operation took on – of the Institute in an 
interview; see Colegio de Postgraduados, Ciencias agrícolas y sus protagonistas, 210-211. 
307 Colegio de Postgraduados, Ciencias agrícolas y sus protagonistas, 384.  Karin Matchett offers a more 
nuanced reading of the Institute.  See Matchett, “At Odds Over Inbreeding: An Abandoned Attempt at 
Mexico/United States Collaboration in ‘Improve’ Mexican Corn, 1940-1950,” Journal of the History of 
Biology 39, no. 2 (2006): 345-372; and Matchett, “Untold Innovation: Scientific Practice and Corn 
Improvement in Mexico, 1935 – 1965” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2002).  For another view of 
the Institute, see Gilberto Aboites Manrique, Una mirada diferente de la Revolución Verde: ciencia, 
nación y compromiso social. (Mexico City, Mexico: Editorial Plaza y Valdés, 2002). 
156 
complete research projects because of how of the technical nature of Taboada’s research 
methods.308   
By the 1950s Hernández’s colleagues in botany showed advances, but the field 
remained undeveloped in areas.  Founded in September of 1941, the first years of 
meetings for the modern Botanical Society of Mexico, the country’s most important 
organization in the field, consisted of what Hernández called a “reduced number of 
biologists and foresters” who met in a home belonging to Miguel Ángel de Quevedo’s 
widow for meetings.309  Maximino Martínez, the Society’s president for years, 
dedicated most of his days towards his work as a professor.  When time allowed, his 
research in botany was largely “conducted on his own,” and his work remained 
unappreciated, “with little support from the public and funding” for huge projects like 
taking an inventory of Mexico’s forests and classifying the country’s flora.310  For 
years, Martínez likely funded the Society with his own money.311  Other leaders in the 
field of agronomy, such as Gabriel Itié, worked in an atmosphere in which their studies 
on rangelands went nowhere because they were not supported by the livestock industry.  
This was unfortunate, Hernández said in 1966, because Itié’s work “formed the 
scientific basis that could have transformed” Mexico’s meat industry.312  
                                                
308 This inference comes from an interview with Hernández; see Colegio de Postgraduados, Ciencias 
agrícolas y sus protagonistas, 210-211. 
309 Hernández, “Discurso de clausura del XI Congreso Mexicano de Botánica” (paper presented at the 
Eleventh Congress of Mexican Botany, Oaxtepec, Morelos, Mexico, October 1-5,1990). 
310 ----, “Contribución de la botánica al desarollo de México, Discurso inaugural del Presidente Honorario 
al III Congreso Mexicano de Botánica,” October 1966, folder Congreso Mexicano de Botánica - 1966, 
Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
311 ----, “Perspectiva de la etnobotánica en México, 1990,” October  1-5,1990, folder Seminario de 
Etnobotánica: XI Congreso Mexicano de Botánica, Oaxtepec, Morelos, Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
312 ----, “Contribución de la botánica al desarollo de México, Discurso inaugural del Presidente Honorario 
al III Congreso Mexicano de Botánica,” October 1966, folder Congreso Mexicano de Botánica, Archivo 
EHX, COLPOS.  For more about Mexican botanic studies and research, see Faustino Miranda, “La 
botánica en México en el último cuarto de siglo,” Revista de la Sociedad de Historia Natural XXII 
(December 1961): 85-111. 
157 
Other markers underscored the scarcity of research and education after 
Hernández began his career at Chapingo.  In 1954, according to the College of 
Agronomic Engineers, Mexico only counted 3,000 trained agronomists, which signified 
possession of the equivalent of a Bachelor’s degree.  The same census calculated that 
forty-six of these individuals held a Master’s degree.  A total of seven Mexicans owned 
a doctoral degree related to agronomy.  In 1954, the year that Hernández began teaching 
classes at the college, Chapingo claimed a total of 1,249 graduates over the course of its 
first century of existence.313   
Hernández vocalized what he thought were shortcomings.  In his 1955 speech as 
Vice President of the Mexican Society of Natural History, he surveyed the recent 
history and current status of biological studies, and he mentioned solutions.  
Government agencies, educational institutions, and organizations outside of Mexico, he 
began, had over the last two decades lent an impulse to improve biological research in 
the country.  Consequently, these groups “established new demands and paths for our 
biological education.”  He then delineated the progress and breakthroughs made in 
agricultural biology.  Botanists made notable advances, particularly in plant pathology 
and genetics.  Systematic studies had been made in relations to classification and flora 
studies for the state of Chiapas, and parts of other states like Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, 
Puebla, and Guerrero.  Ecological studies advanced, particularly in eastern regions of 
the central part of the country.  In mycology, researchers made headway in studies 
concerning rust disease in wheat and viruses in maize, tomatoes, potatoes, and 
sugarcane.  Moreover, Mexico owned its first agricultural germplasm bank (at 
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Chapingo), which housed four thousand samples of maize seeds, three thousand bean 
samples, wheat samples, seven hundred potato samples, three sorghum species, about 
five hundred chili samples, and a number of other horticultural specimens.  Of such 
accomplishments, Hernández said, Mexicans could be proud.  There were better 
prepared people for “serious research” in biology than ever before.  Schools and 
government support had yielded notable results.  Help and partnerships from abroad, he 
particularly mentioned the Office of Special Studies, “represented an important factor in 
the results attained.”  Halfway through his speech, he said that the times ahead spelled 
out “favorable conditions” for future researchers.314 
   Problems persisted, nonetheless.  Mexico had a shortage of teachers.  Many 
professors stuck around longer than they should, which forbid the entry of new blood 
and, consequently, a possible sense of dynamism in research.  Additionally, because 
most professors made so little money, many teachers often “run around from one school 
to another to teach a number of classes to earn a minimum living.”  Professors’ and 
students’ time in the lab was also limited, Hernández added.  More than one school was 
not equipped for the classes it offered.  “We are,” he said, “still in the period when a 
zoology professor is given only a board, chalk, and an eraser to teach a class.”  Other 
schools functioned haphazardly, minus a mission to guide their areas of study.  Most 
study programs exercised a rigid structure that forbid flexibility and made future 
students despondent.  Agronomists lacked breadth and creativity towards research.  An 
austere adherence to only knowing their narrow field of study circumscribed students 
from thinking in larger terms.  “In concerns to our colleges of agriculture, it is my 
opinion,” Hernández shared, “that the country’s needs for agronomists to be 
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fundamentally a biologist with agricultural studies, discarding the old concept of 
agronomists trained to be captives in a rigid category.”315 
Having no doubt offended his colleagues and students who listened to his speech 
for his devil-may-care attitude towards what many of them thought were advances in 
education and research, Hernández spelled out five recommendations.  First, schools 
should adopt “elasticity.” Programs of study should have more range and 
interdisciplinary exposure.  Teachers, secondly, deserved more financial security.  
Third, colleges needed more stringent demands on teachers, with the goal being that 
eventually all professors have a doctoral degree.  Fourth, graduate study, when it did 
eventually begin, should be led by many of the young men who studied abroad, and 
their research should have value to Mexico.316   
He expanded on this last point.  “Science had no geographic or political 
borders,” he began.  “Despite this, however, some people were shy to tear themselves 
away from the Ivory Tower, in part because of a lack of confidence in our social and 
philosophical values.”  Twenty students had returned from abroad and they were 
capable researchers who could absolutely help the country’s agriculture with their new 
skills and know-how.  It was time, Hernández argued, that Mexicans apply science, as a 
construct, a methodology for studying phenomena, with an eye towards Mexico.317 
Within two years of arriving at Chapingo and in his first presentation as an 
officer in one of the country’s most respected research organizations, Hernández made 
overt efforts to tame the decade-long academic celebration in the 1950s academic and 
educational circles.  He congratulated the achievements that researchers had made, and 
                                                
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
160 
proudly detailed how far the country had come in a short period.  Yet, he pointed out 
what he found to be flaws.  To counter the issues of low pay and unqualified faculty 
members, he prescribed the straightforward solutions of more adequate pay and more 
demanding standards.  But the more fundamental problems, in his estimation, could not 
be solved with money, time, or pedagogy.  He appealed for Mexicans to take the skills 
they gained from abroad and apply them to their national reality.  The young men 
returning from land-grant colleges, according to Hernández, neglected their duties to 
Mexican schools.  Many remained in their offices or research labs because of what he 
called “a lack of confidence in our social and philosophical values.”  Put another way, 
the images of young Mexican men going abroad and returning to help Mexican 
agriculture that RF officials, Mexican politicians, Henry Wallace, and Marte Gómez 
foresaw remained trapped and sacred in experimental labs or Ivory Towers.  The 
trickle-down effect that many people expected to take place appeared to be more of an 
idea, a vision, rather than a reality. 
In the end, Hernández’s speech in 1955 constituted shouting into the wind.  His 
supervisors at Chapingo apparently did not catch the essence of his words.  In 
December of 1957, Jesús Muñoz, director of the Escuela Nacional, asked for feedback 
from faculty members about the proposed Plan of Study for the soon-to-open Colegio 
de Postgraduados.  After saying thanks for inviting feedback, Hernández told his 
supervisor that he found “various anomalies and deficiencies,” which drew objections 
and suggestions.  Principal among the immediate objections was a lack of purpose in 
the school, a lack of meaning.  The school’s mission, suffered from a dearth of precision 
and purpose.  According to the letter sent to Muñoz, the Fruit Improvement and Weed 
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and Pest Control courses to be taught were poorly conceived and the school was 
unprepared to offer such courses. The courses failed, he suggested, to be part of a larger 
construct corpus of knowledge.  The study plan also failed to certain basic courses to 
supplement Agricultural Botany.  Finally, the school’s proposed courses listed no 
studies outside of experimental sciences, with no link to a guiding rationale.  Hence, he 
suggested obligatory Logic and Scientific Philosophy classes.318  Such basic 
requirements seemed logical to Hernández, but his colleagues and supervisors 
apparently overlooked them while preparing to open the country’s first agricultural 
graduate college.   
When graduate study began at Chapingo, Hernández’s own department, botany, 
had severe deficiencies.  In letters to students and colleagues years after the Colegio 
opened, he discussed these issues in detail.  In its early years, the college hired outside 
help from other institutions to aid in courses because of a lack of qualified botany 
instructors.  At the beginning of the department’s existence, the College hired an ENA 
student, Pedro Mosiño, with a degree in agricultural mechanics to teach plant sciences.  
Hernández constituted the total of the full-time faculty members in his department for 
nearly a decade (the one other full-time teacher was hired in 1968).  Support for 
students was shoddy.  In nearly a decade after offering classes, the Department of 
Botany counted a total of three students who completed Master’s theses.  This trio 
finished after “huge personal sacrifices” and outside funding sources.319   
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Other problems existed at the Colegio.  Among the talks that school officials had 
in the institution’s first years were serious discussions about the format of all graduate 
research.  According to Hernández some of his colleagues suggested that all research 
require statistical analysis (eventually, the college’s president abstained from adopting 
this primacy towards numbers).  Additionally, certain departments that involved 
quantitative studies or extension (e.g., Statistics, Agricultural Economics, and 
Extension), Hernández implied in a correspondence, received priority.  Some of these 
same departments also had the collaborative efforts in their initial phases and academic 
exchange programs with universities outside of Mexico.320  When Hernández 
mentioned the shepherding of resources, the Colegio director replied, “Look, Xolo 
[Hernández’s nickname], you go find your own ‘donation’ and you can manage it any 
way you want.”321  According to notes, Hernández later suggested that the strategically 
aimed money (from outside sources like the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, he 
inferred over the years) and collaborative efforts towards certain departments, “gave 
impulse” to a “U.S.-style focus on learning, research, and extension without an 
appreciation for the socio-economic context” of Mexican farmers during the Colegio’s 
inception.322    
Pedagogical problems abounded at the Colegio and, by extension, at Chapingo.  
Faculty and administration disagreed about what a doctoral degree from the school 
would ultimately mean.  According to meeting minutes Hernández recounted to a 
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student, one professor commented that “a PhD. holder is someone who knows 
everything of a very specific topic” (emphasis mine).  In response, another professor 
argued that such a person would represent “an encyclopedia and we have plenty of 
those in libraries.”  This same meeting participant said that “classes insisted on utilizing 
rote memorization and duplication techniques as modes of teaching, with a focus on the 
demands of [strict] reasoning.”323   
As he had suggested to the Society of Natural History in 1955, Mexican 
researchers lacked intellectual freedom to think of creative problems and research.  
Chapingo and its graduate college adopted what amounted to intellectual or creative 
turpitude, devoid of imagination and inquiry.  Teaching left much to be desired when it 
came to inspiring alternative or dynamic ways for looking at phenomena.  Classes had a 
vertical format, in which students received gospel from professors, only for them to 
recycle what they had read or been told by instructors.  Students, he suggested, had no 
inspiration for asking questions and they remained pious to axioms in books or spoken 
from teachers.  Books, Hernández said later, reigned supreme and “cramming and 
learning material by heart, with absolute detachment from the phenomena [being 
studied]” was common.324  Researchers showed inclinations to classes with statistics 
and measurements.   This all added up, in Hernández’s estimation, to a mechanistic 
approach to education.     
He expanded on these frustrations in his presidential address to the Mexican 
Society of Natural History in June of 1960.  Titled “The Natural Sciences and Social 
Development in Mexico,” he discussed what he called “disequilibrium.”  “For modern 
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man,” he said, “it is important to penetrate more profoundly knowledge, the 
mechanisms and functions of the living things around him.”  But “on occasions, the 
values, the orientation, and the context of the socio-economic world around him have 
no relation with the attention it deserves from natural sciences, or they demonstrate a 
strong disequilibrium between applied technologies and basic science.”  Speaking for 
himself and other officers in the Society, he argued that national intellectual circles 
“display a strong disjuncture in concerns to both of these problems.”  The style of 
education, the pace of research, and the applied sciences failed to align with Mexico’s 
reality.  Researchers still had not “explored the potential of its [Mexico’s] agricultural 
roots.”325   
Biological research and education, Hernández added, remained “aggravated” by 
a slow and disproportionate development.  In botany, Mexicans previously used the old 
phrase to signal the number of trained researchers: “’we are an odd number [of 
researchers], but we are fewer than three.’" In a country of thirty million people, 
Hernández said, the number of botanists reached no more than thirty.  This shortage of 
researchers manifested itself in other fields like genetics, physiology, cytology, and 
ecology.  Given this shortage of trained researchers, some people who simply 
participated in the act of collecting plants labeled themselves botanists.  At meetings, 
congresses, or conferences, many Mexicans asked one another how many official titles 
they owned.  “How many titles does one need?” asked Hernández to his audience, 
which included his colleagues, ENA alumni and, likely, students.326 
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He shared reasons for Mexico’s lag and its consequences.  With a history that 
included at least two invasions, a revolution, and an ethnically and linguistically diverse 
population, national leaders necessarily dealt with priorities outside the sciences.  They 
were compelled to deal with land reform, the restoration of sovereignty over natural 
resources, building infrastructure, opening schools, and the establishment of public 
order.   We must admit, he said, that while Mexicans rested and dealt with other tasks 
the experts in local geography, flora, and fauna became foreigners, “strangers, not our 
own.”  Yet, over the last three decades, national leaders “consciously and 
unconsciously” chose to take on the task of adopting the “technical advance of other 
countries,” to Mexico’s benefit and detriment.  This happened via the importation of 
foreign researchers, the increasing availability and use of foreign literature, and sending 
students to learn technological systems from other countries. As a collective, this 
process yielded favorable results. New institutions had opened.  Administrators at the 
older schools renewed their old structures and changed their “‘encyclopedism’ via 
dynamic knowledge supported by experimentation and research.”  The last three 
decades amounted to an “Agricultural Revolution,” Hernández suggested.327  
There were several anomalies attached with this process, however.  Hernández 
commenced to describe the academic circles and problems that he saw in these spaces.  
It all made him “laugh because I cannot cry,” he said.  On one hand, many foreigners 
arrived with techniques and science to solve Mexico’s problems.  On the other hand, 
like many of his young ENA colleagues, many young men returned from study abroad 
demanding posts and privileges others had earned, without thinking that Mexicans 
know that titles “ornament the capable and the incompetent.”  Other “pseudo-
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researchers” arrived with new advice or instruments, but had yet to acquire the most 
elemental skills.  Finally, many older local researchers in measured their stature as a 
researcher by their “eccentric behavior, infrequent contributions to scholarship, or the 
few times they open their mouths.” 
After probably insulting many officemates, former OSS workers, administrators, 
and former RF fellows in the audience, Hernández told audience members what he 
thought should be the bedrock of development in the agricultural research: awareness of 
the process and the environment in which development occurred.  Quoting one of 
Mexico’s most famous philosophers, Leopoldo Zea, advancement needed to occur 
according to the country’s “social horizon” and “collective consciousness.”  Hernández 
challenged his audience to deal with such abstractions, “What is our social horizon?  
What is our collective consciousness?”328 
He answered the questions and opined about what he considered the mistake that 
Mexicans committed in the pursuit of agricultural improvement with its lack of a 
primacy for all that was local.  “Technology in Mexico,” he said,  
has been cast on a void represented by an almost total ignorance of our reality, 
horizons and aspirations.  As a nation, we have failed to coordinate the human 
elements necessary for taking a basic inventory of our natural and human 
resources, which constitute the knowledge that make up and define our horizon 
and consciousness. I said earlier that foreigners know our mining, our flora, our 
fauna, our indigenous groups. So be it. We have neglected the schools dedicated 
to the taxing tasks of taking [our] inventory.   
 
In the social fields, we find that our mistakes, derived in imprecise methods and 
techniques, compound because of our failure to see objectively that analysis 
from one place produces opposite results [here]. The strangers who address our 
social problems do so based on foreign assumptions and social values, and 
consciously or unconsciously, distort our social landscape.  In doing so, they 
turn us into crude imitations of other places.  Many of us suffer from this 
trauma.  Our research displays this trauma.  And according to certain 
                                                
328 Ibid. 
167 
idiosyncrasies, some of us pursue certain political aspirations or, even still, we 
want to physically look like a researcher.  Today, our task is self-analysis, to 
study our own social roots until this point in time. 
 
He finished by saying that it was necessary to pay close attention to the preparation of 
researchers and programs “devoted to the study of specific problems of the Mexican 
environment” (emphasis mine).  He added that a conscious effort to cultivate 
researchers had arrived and it was time to send the country’s promising youth abroad 
for advanced study, but cognizant of Mexico’s needs and context.329  
 Contrary to the self-congratulatory tone in agricultural education and research 
that many people celebrated in Mexico by 1960, Hernández underscored fundamental 
flaws.  The technology introduced for a productive system failed to align with Mexico, 
thus “disequilibrium.”  Teachers and researchers operated in intellectual vacuums.  
They designed and promoted seeds and fertilizers that proved awesome in terms of 
production, but the transfer of such technology between places with different histories 
and people – one based on a model of yeoman farmers and a powerful, well-funded 
state to subsidize farmers and pay for USDA extension workers, and the other with a 
state only a couple decades old, a miniscule Ministry of Agriculture and vestiges of a 
feudal model of farming – had proven difficult.  Researchers and educators, 
furthermore, sought to imitate (even in terms of dress) and transplant what they had 
learned in a gross manner that failed to account for and or minimized reality.  To the 
unspoken project that amounted to social engineering, Hernández suggested that new 
technology and techniques were welcome, but its promoters should deliver these items 
in accordance with Mexico’s totality - its land, its cultural mosaic, its “social horizons,” 
and its “collective consciousness.”    
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Image 3.4  Efraím Hernández.  This image is from the program for the first congress of the Mexican 
Society of Natural History, where he delivered his provocative speech to Mexico’s influential educators 
and colleagues in June of 1960 (from Biblioteca Central, Universidad Autónoma Chapingo).330  
 
Four months later, in October of 1960, in his address to the congress of the 
Mexican Botanical Society, Hernández again failed to mince words about the 
celebration at Chapingo and Mexican circles of agricultural research discussed earlier in 
this chapter.  His speech was the culmination of the congress.  If people had not heard 
of the ENA professor who admired peasant modes of agriculture and who complained 
about agricultural education, he ensured that they would not forget him.331  The 
audience included officials from the Minister of Education, presidents of every major 
college in Mexico, those in the upper echelons of agronomic and botanic research, as 
well as likely colleagues, Chapingo graduates and students, and faculty and students 
from the other colleges in the country.  “The Mexican Botany Society,” Hernández 
began, “has conferred upon me the honor of presenting to each of you some ideas about 
the interesting and passionate topic of problems in botanic education and extension in 
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Mexico.”  He followed with a warning to audience members that he planned to “paint a 
panorama in primary colors, dark and clear, not softer-toned colors.”332  Audience 
members listened to what turned into a radical proposal for a new approach to 
agricultural, specifically botany, education in Mexico.  
The talk began with Hernández’s outline of Mexico’s state of affairs in 1960.  
He sketched out the “somber” conclusion that the country suffered from setbacks, 
despite admirable efforts over the last fifty years.  “Over this period, our schools have 
grown.  But many remain anachronisms, decorated ‘Ivory Towers,’” that introduced 
problems in the pursuit of trying “to implement exotic methods and to achieve foreign 
lessons” to Mexico.  In this context of lag were ideals stemming from the Mexican 
Revolution that were incorporated into classrooms.  Counteracting these collective 
ideals was a liberal model of work, which undermined educators’ service to the whole 
of society, planting “problems that we have yet to study.”  Furthermore, despite the 
conservation work done over the last decade, in the pursuit of industrialization, citizens 
destroyed their natural resources before scientists could study them, and researchers still 
had no knowledge of twenty to thirty percent of the country’s flora.  All this happened 
while the population grew immensely, he mentioned (over the two decades before 1960, 
population increased from 19.7 million to 34.6 million people).333  Before transitioning 
to his prescription for improving botanic education, he said that it remained imperative 
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for education to maintain a “tight compact, in its content and its orientation” to a local 
context.334                   
 To anyone who studied the topic “with a degree of objectivity,” he continued, it 
was obvious that Mexico’s indigenous groups, its peasants, had a “profound degree of 
familiarity” with their environment.  As a rule, a peasant depended on the utilization of 
natural resources immediately around him.  His existence was contingent on a 
familiarity with his environment.  Peasants’ botanic repertoire existed because of the 
rule they either “know their resources or perish.”  For most humans, Hernández added, 
hunger and survival had become afterthoughts, and hence, they never gave pause as to 
their surroundings or how they would survive.  “But for the Indian who resides at the 
margins of jungles in our tropics, an error in judgment or a lack of appreciation for the 
world around him could mean an introduction into the afterlife.”335   
Hernández elaborated on how campesinos learned botany and agriculture.  “Oral 
transmission, elders, and adults among indigenous groups constitute the mechanisms for 
conservation, and the accumulation and transmission of knowledge.”  This process 
occurred over generations.  Peasants gained knowledge via an empirical method that 
had to stand the test of time and experience.  While people loved to tell peasants “a 
thousand and one times” that maize could not grow on mountainsides, they “had to try 
and fail in order” to not believe.  The objects of their education surrounded them, not 
books or pictures.  If one spoke about wood, peasants had it at their disposal to observe 
its morphology, bark, wood, resin, leaves, and fruits.  They could test the acidity or 
caustic effects of resin.  “In such a setting,” Hernández said, learning was “objective 
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and continuous.”  Education was “grounded in time that lasted from the earliest days of 
consciousness until death” for peasants.336  
 In front of an audience with people armed with advanced degrees, Hernández’s 
speech likely represented anathema.  Campesinos, he posited, owned an acute brand of 
botany.  They constituted sources of agronomic knowledge.  What was more, 
Hernández suggested that the leaders at the centers of Mexican education design 
curriculum, a didactic enterprise that involved interaction and learning, based on 
peasants’ botanical wisdom.  To a group that likely included extensionistas discussed in 
Chapter One and the champions of the progress taking place at Chapingo discussed 
earlier in this chapter, Hernández’s speech probably drew laughs and smirks.  He was 
an idealist, a “tenured radical” spouting nonsense.337     
 The shock treatment to their sensibilities was far from over.  “My experience 
and observations at a variety of colleges and organizations,” he said, “have drawn me to 
the conclusion” that teaching botany happened most effectively via coordinated effort.  
A department should represent an organic body, leaving time for individual pursuits, 
such as publications or research.  Professors should also maintain familiarity with the 
latest scholarship in their fields.  But “to round out the possibilities of achievement and 
to maintain a panoramic vision [of botany] that teachers seek to impart to students, it is 
necessary for professors” leave their Ivory Towers to “experience and see first-hand the 
country’s settings and social needs.”  Extension, Hernández argued, should be the 
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process of researchers becoming listeners and observers of peasant agriculture, not the 
top-down process discussed in Chapter One.338  
 In discussing the state of pedagogy in schools, Hernández told his audience that 
teachers and schools needed repair.  Professors must begin “understanding and 
appreciating” self-criticism.  Speaking about his ENA colleagues, he said, “It is all too 
common that today, teachers make jest of students who speak an indigenous language” 
and asked questions related to the agriculture of their homes.  In contrast, teachers must 
adopt a style in accordance with our “ethnological characteristics and our large social 
mores, build on these huge foundations, utilizing these as paths towards adopting new 
teaching styles.”  Piggybacking this idea, teachers were obligated to put students into 
“personal contact with the phenomena they study and with the problems in which these 
phenomena play an important role.”  Schools, he summed, needed to design lessons 
with “an eye towards our environment and context to teach with clarity, to enthuse 
students, and form schools of thought that promoted Mexico’s intellectual 
development.”339   
 Hernández’s suggestions for implementing the overhaul he encouraged was 
simple.  Classroom and textbook study should be done at school.  The study of 
microscopic material should be conducted via a microscope.  Ecology should be a study 
conducted in the presence of the “conjunction” of nature.  Study of the functions and 
practices of agriculture, should be done in laboratories and in the countryside.  “We,” he 
said, “are fine with using additional teaching aids, but the sooner we get away from 
teaching exclusively with a chalkboard, eraser, and chalk, and textbook experiments, 
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the sooner we shall give vitality and meaning to the elements of life.”  Hernández saw 
experience – taking students to learn from farmers, and forcing them to drench 
themselves in the settings and material that they studied on campus – as an antidote to 
the pedagogical lethargy found in Mexican agricultural education, particularly 
Chapingo.340   
 Hernández saved his conclusion for discussing what represented the ultimate 
form of arrogance and intellectual torpor among researchers and agronomists: 
Demonstration Days and the attempted carbon-copying of a US-style country extension 
agent system.  To the botanist who spent the 1940s canvassing Mexico and gaining an 
appreciation of peasant agriculture, nothing frustrated Hernández more than witnessing 
extensionistas (extension agents) or colleagues stand in front of farmers instructing 
them how to farm.  What was more, since he lived on Chapingo’s campus for years, he 
heard and saw Demonstration Days more than once over the 1950s.  “The human 
factor,” he told the audience, “the object of extension, includes a social totality, any 
number of types of culture.”  The main objectives added up to a deeper comprehension 
than understanding the natural resources, with the goal being to “support and conserve” 
the pre-existing methods.  Consequently, the goal of extension lay not in eliminating or 
revolutionizing how Mexicans farmed.  The objective was to help.  In the mind of the 
botanist inspired by Liberty Hyde Bailey, extension’s goal involved “an aesthetic 
appreciation, scientific and social, of the natural settings with the goal of enjoying a 
more satisfactory life.”  To achieve these ends, he said,  
we begin with the firmly rooted stimulants that had until now gone unused or 
unappreciated: Mexicans’ love towards nature, and his old tradition of going to 
nature to rest and breathe clean air.  [We begin our new form of extension] with 
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a humility for all people, of all levels of education and culture.  We learn by 
observing.       
    
If he had not already offended his audience, Hernández concluded his speech by going 
off the deep end.  He finished by saying that extension and the sharing of peasant 
agricultural knowledge could take place in theaters, national parks, social clubs, and 
schools.  The media for sharing this knowledge could be carried out via pamphlets, 
small books, articles in newspapers, word of mouth, radios, conferences, photos, and 
other public settings.341   
  
CONCLUSION 
In his speech, before delving into a naïve proposal of campesinos teaching 
Mexicans about farming at national parks or over the radio in the 1960s, Hernández had 
loaded both barrels and took aim at the sense of arrival in agricultural research circles in 
Mexico by 1960.  While he understood the pride that colleagues, politicians, students, 
and foreigners may have taken in relations to the changes at Chapingo and in 
agricultural education, he saw fundamental flaws.  The new laboratories, libraries, study 
halls, hybrid seed developments were necessary and helpful, but he questioned if the 
vanguard of agricultural development was leading the promotion of a model of 
agriculture that was incongruent with Mexico’s reality.  In a place with millions of 
peasant farmers who remained in different stages of human/socioeconomic evolution, 
he had suspicions about the diffusion of a body of agricultural knowledge and 
technology from a place so different from Mexico’s.  Hernández spent the 1950s (and 
later) complaining about these premonitions.       
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Historians have yet to discuss perhaps the biggest irony of the “Green 
Revolution.”  Narratives on the topic mention Chapingo as having been the site where 
the Rockefeller Foundation arrived and where the Mexican Agricultural Program first 
began in 1943.  Scholars, however, have not explored what it meant that working at 
Chapingo was someone who foresaw the attributes and markers that we associate with 
the “Revolution.”  What is more, Hernández worked for and with the Rockefeller 
Foundation for years.  It is ironic, then, that someone intimately related to the “Green 
Revolution” also represented its earliest vocal critic.  And the antidote Hernández 
casted as the negation for his worries was for Mexicans to look inward for inspiration 
about the development of agriculture.                   
But was anyone listening to Hernández’s criticisms and ideas in 1960?  The 
letter at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates that people did pay him mind.  
Those students who flocked to his classes listened.  It was in his classes where 
Hernández began laying the material, the pedagogical material that was a counter 
discourse, an intellectual death knell, to the “Green Revolution.”  The methodology and 
some of the outcomes of “La Xolocotzia,” Hernández’s style of teaching and school of 
thought, are the topics of the next chapter. 
  
176 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SOMETHING ROTTEN AT THE ENA: 
CHAPINGUEROS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR MEXICO’S 
AGRICULTURAL FUTURE342 
 
Franco Gerón’s admittance into the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura (ENA) in 
1960 represented – to him, at least – a dream come true.  “Long before” he could read 
as a child in central Veracruz, he knew about Chapingo’s prestige.  In his formative 
years, while working as a school teacher, he sat for the school’s entrance exam and 
failed, and he failed another time after his first attempt.  A year later, he visited the 
campus, began intensive study, sat for a third admissions exam, and finally passed.  He 
arrived with ideas: “I came with the plan that I would study.  Then I would return [to 
Veracruz] to work with the peasants.”343  The plan seemed straightforward.  Gerón 
would work hard, and then he would return home equipped to help peasants and fulfill 
one of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution.       
 In 1966, about a year before graduation, Gerón wrote a poem concerning an 
ontological itch that would not go away.  Titled “Traitor” and framed as a conversation 
between himself and destiny, the poem dealt with his anxieties, specifically the worries 
that his soon-to-be job as an agronomist would betray his motivations for attending 
college.  “I now know why,” the poem began, “my young flesh feels nauseous, Because 
my mind won’t let up from calling me, Traitor!  Coward!  Thief from a foreign place!”  
While millions of countrymen “live off of dust, one taco, and a swig of water,” Gerón 
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lived in a different world at Chapingo.  A “grisly destiny” waited for him after 
graduation.  He would leave school to “devour the inners of my countryman, to bleed 
him.  Like a bat, suck dry the anemic arteries of my country.”  He would live “like the 
rest of them,” other chapingueros who left school “to get fat, own a checking account, 
live in a nice house with a beautiful wife, and own a nice car, and have children with 
blushed faces and own not a care in the world” while people died of malnutrition and 
others were killed, and many of those “didn’t even own enough land on which they 
could fall dead.”  Gerón then promised destiny that he would defy the empty future.  He 
preferred to be a ravenous dog and spit on, “rather than what you, Destiny, have 
selected for me.”  The poem’s last line circled back to the thought that had been in 
Gerón’s head for some time in 1966: “How goes it, traitor?”344  Things had gone astray 
for Gerón from when he arrived at Mexico’s famous agricultural college in 1960 and 
1966.  The subjective imagination that he had of Chapingo over six years had left him 
bitter and unsatisfied; Chapingo had left him disillusioned and anxious.  
 This chapter explores the reasons and the consequences of Gerón’s frustrations.  
Scholarship about Mexican agriculture during the 1960s is dominated by certain 
themes.  After the formal partnership between the Rockefeller Foundation and the 
Mexican government began to end in 1960, a decade followed during which a 
formidable agribusiness sector came into being in Mexico and peasant farmers found 
themselves marginalized and neglected.  The 1960s were also when the environmental 
decay commonly associated with the “Green Revolution” truly took root in the Mexican 
countryside.  Big business, a stratification of the countryside between winners and 
losers, and the genetic erosion of agricultural seeds dominate the narrative.   
                                                
344 Ibid., 53-56. 
178 
Such a reading of the 1960s, however, glosses over more important themes.  
During much of the decade, many leaders in the “developing” world regarded Mexico 
as an exemplar of agricultural advancement.  The first half of this chapter details the 
history of how Mexico, with much help, became a Mecca for the countries in the 
Second and Third Worlds of the Cold War era for building an agriculture sector that 
could sustain a modern, industrializing economy.  In other words, the first half argues 
that the partnership that was the “Green Revolution” - for some time, at least - appeared 
to have truly worked.   
The chapter’s second half describes how Mexican leaders’ plans to continue and 
improve the policies that made it an international vanguard also led to the beginnings of 
a crisis.  A plan involving international philanthropy and Cold War overtones designed 
as a schematic for planning and executing Mexico’s agricultural future failed to account 
for the fact that many Mexicans were going to approve of the plan so easily.  
Consequently, this chapter returns to Mexico’s Escuela Nacional de Agricultura (ENA) 
to show how a plan that encompassed the technology, productivist ideology, and 
technocratism associated with the “Green Revolution” became a conflict about the 
future of Mexican agriculture.  The “Revolution,” I argue again, saw its birth, as well 
the beginnings of its death, in Chapingo.    
 
MEXICO AS THE DEVELOPING WORLD’S STANDARDBEARER 
As the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Mexican government began moves 
to eventually end the Mexican Agricultural Program, it appeared that the marriage 
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begun in 1943 had been a worthwhile project.345  And by 1960, Mexican agricultural 
research and output had defied the past.  Yields for wheat and maize, noted one MAP 
study had increased: maize yields increased dramatically from 626 kilograms per 
hectare in 1940 to 839 in 1960, and wheat yields increased from 763 kilograms per 
hectare to about 1,361 kilograms per hectare in 1960s.346  Acreage dedicated to wheat 
had spread, the number of extension workers had increased, research in several crops 
was cutting-edge, and the country trained more agronomists than ever before.  In fewer 
than two decades, MAP partners had built a model for agricultural modernization that 
included advanced research and diffusion.   They had built a prototype that countries 
could emulate in the pursuit of economic industrialization, and people from all over the 
1960s developing world visited Mexico to learn.  
If President Adolfo López Mateos’s (1958-1964) annual address about 
agriculture between 1959 and much of 1960 was an indication of how the decade to 
come would look, then Mexicans would have had few concerns.  Published in 
September of 1960, a tone of optimism and improvement dominated the president’s 
speech.  Crop and livestock revenues totaled more than 26 billion pesos.  Overall 
agricultural production saw a 6.7 percent production increase and prices grew by 3.4 
percent.  Maize production was the highest ever recorded in national history, with yields 
at record averages.  Parts of Mexico no longer imported maize; in fact, farmers exported 
443,000 tons, a level “without precedent,” said the president.  With the National Ejido 
Bank having loaned more than a billion pesos to ejidatarios and the National 
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Agricultural Bank having lent nearly half a billion pesos, farmers’ access to credit had 
improved.  Two agricultural research stations had opened in 1959, adding to the six 
already in existence.  The country’s irrigation projects had increased in size during the 
year.  Over the same 1959-1960 period, every secretary of agriculture in Latin America 
attended meetings in Mexico that had been sponsored by the international sponsors.  
About the meetings, López Mateos said, “Our country restated its eagerness to 
cooperate in the name of science, sharing in continental interexchange.”347   
 Cutting-edge agricultural research was one of Mexico’s contributions to the 
“continental interchange,” and by the early 1960s, local research proved both helpful 
and profitable to farmers.  In January of 1961, the National Institute of Agricultural 
Research (INIA) took over research after the closure of the Office of Special Studies 
and the Institute of Agricultural Research (IIA).  By the time of its opening, INIA 
investigators continued to develop improved seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
technology that helped farmers.  Researchers developed seeds that increased volume 
levels of more than one crop, so much that Mexico exported some items outside of 
traditional products.  Sugar cane sold abroad, for example, was at its highest levels in 
history, and yields were up ten percent from the previous year.  Rice and bean 
production levels approached export levels, too.  Researchers had also begun working 
on improved sorghum and safflower seeds by the early 1961.348   
To deliver the new technology to farmers, Mexico had a well-funded 
government agency.  After the closure of the National Seed Commission, the National 
Seed Producer (PRONASE) took charge of a national seed distribution system, 
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fertilizers, and other products in 1961.  Writers praised PRONASE’s work within a year 
of its founding, as it quickly fulfilled domestic demands and established “important 
operations” for selling seeds on international markets.349  The same year that 
PRONASE opened, the National Seed Inspection and Certification Service began its 
service of ensuring seed quality, offering farmers confidence in the seeds that their 
government supplied.  Already in 1959, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG) 
officials boasted about the opening of a new seed distribution center in the Bajío (the 
central-western region of Mexico), with plans for opening six more centers to fulfill the 
government’s goal of having installations in every state.350   
Other areas underscored Mexico’s impressive agricultural progress.  The 
University of Guadalajara, one of the country’s largest universities, opened an 
agricultural college in 1960, adding to the three other schools with national prestige in 
Monterrey, Chapingo, and Saltillo.  The University of Sinaloa opened a college one 
year later.351  Also in 1961, private banks found the confidence to begin lending money 
(about 212 million pesos) to help farmers.  The same report suggested that a rising 
number of farmers purchased agricultural insurance, demonstrating a degree of modern 
farming.352  Concurrent to these happenings, SAG representatives in late 1961 began a 
campaign to distribute more than 31,000 tons of newly-developed wheat seeds for 
major farming regions.353   
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 A small army of extension agents delivered these seeds, and technology, and 
advice, to farmers.  In 1961 the number of Rural Youth Clubs (see Chapter One) 
increased because of extensionists’ work.  The number of clubs stood at more than three 
hundred in nearly a third of the states where clubs had begun and the number, which 
“facilitate[d] the teaching of practical skills that will…allow children to live better [and] 
elevate the standard of living,” looked to double.354   At research centers around the 
country, agents and researchers held Demonstration Days for all comers.  One writer 
who attended a Day at the Center for Agricultural Research in Roque, Guanajuato, said 
attendees to the gatherings could affirm, “with their own eyes,” the results of research 
during visits to kiosks and field lots for discussions on new seeds, cultivation methods, 
pest control, and fertilization methods.355  Extension agents also continued to comb 
rural areas.  According to one SAG report from 1961, agents held over 260,000 
consultations throughout the country and distributed 230,000 bulletins about topics 
ranging from household gardening tips, to tick repellant, to increasing maize yields.  
That same year, agents used multi-media, RV-like extension units, “the most modern 
audiovisual media,” said one SAG report, for coverage all over the country and for 
visits to regional fairs.356  For those farmers who lived far from a research station or 
who could not be reached via the mobile units, SAG workers purchased space in 
newspapers to publicize advice.  In 1962, for example, one agent wrote an article for a 
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Culiacán newspaper about how to select, store, and cultivate improved seeds.357  Agents 
employed the same diffusion method in Chiapas, Yucatán, and Veracruz.358  SAG 
officials also expanded the Voces del Campo radio show.  Programs aired daily in some 
places, inviting “farmers and livestock handlers to describe problems…over the air and 
have questions immediately answered,” and promoting the show’s goal of keeping 
farmers “well-informed.”359   
 During this same 1962-1963 period, Mexican leaders intensified efforts to 
organize agricultural progress.  The National Ejido Bank in October of 1962 began 
sponsoring an herbicide distribution campaign to help farmers, specifically 
ejidatarios.360  Months later, SAG officials announced a national fertilizer campaign.  
Working with the heads of fertilizer companies all over Mexico, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock formed a Consultation Committee to oversee the distribution 
and finance needed to distribute fertilizer for more than 2.8 million hectares for maize, 
cotton, tomatoes, wheat, chili, alfalfa, rice, coffee, potatoes, sorghum, tobacco, 
watermelons, cantaloupes, and other crops.361  In the same year, PRONASE’s chief told 
the press that because of his agency’s work, maize yields in certain regions were on par 
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with developed countries.  His agency had also recently received support for improved 
barley seed distribution.362   
Such distribution schemes and research advances earned Mexico the world’s 
attention.  In 1963, SAG representatives and FAO partners celebrated the completion of 
a second international training program hosted by INIA staff.  Students from sixteen 
Latin American countries, Romania, Indonesia, Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, Kenya, Australia, and Iraq took part in educational 
training courses.  At the program’s closing ceremony, INIA sub-director, José Guevara, 
said his country had achieved “notable advances” in research, and “simultaneously 
generated quality technical work and contributions to science on a global scale.”  
Mexico, he added, “awakened the interest of researchers around the world to receive 
training in our country,” and program participants received guidance in several areas, 
“all of which contribute to world-wide agricultural progress.”  An Iraqi trainee thanked 
the host country for its hospitality, adding that what he and others learned “will serve 
towards agricultural progress in participants’ respective countries.”363   
 Mexico affirmed its stature as a global agricultural leader a month later.  In 
October of 1963, after visiting the International Rice Research Institute in the 
Philippines, President López Mateos entered Mexico into a partnership with the 
Rockefeller Foundation to open an international research center, the International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT).  SAG chief, Julián Rodríguez, 
summarized his country’s status as a leader in the world of agricultural science and the 
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implications of CIMMYT’s existence.  “The rapid growth of the world’s population,” 
he told those present at the signing of contract agreements to open the Center, 
“continually exerts pressure on agricultural production…and, to be sure, agricultural 
science has made huge progress over the last years.”  Mexico, Rodríguez added, “had 
[in the 1940s and 1950s] ventured out to encounter agricultural science.  Local students 
studied and trained abroad, to improve and expand research, training, and agricultural 
extension.   
Now we open the doors of our colleges and training centers so researchers from 
other places can share our experience, our programs, and get to know our problems.”  
Rodríguez mentioned Mexico’s work related to genetic maize material and its 
relationships with nearly two dozen Latin American universities, almost every African 
country, Germany, Canada, France, Great Britain, Switzerland, Holland, Israel, Japan, 
and Thailand.  He also proudly remarked that prior to CIMMYT’s opening Mexico had 
already trained more than 300 interns from 29 countries.364  The next month at a UN-
sponsored conference in Rome, Oscar Valdés, Mexico’s delegate, spoke to FAO 
members about CIMMYT’s opening and his country’s agricultural improvement.  After 
mentioning Mexico’s self-sufficiency in several crops, Valdés emphasized that the 
Center was opened, “with the goal of beginning a new chapter in modern technical 
agriculture with the today’s world,” to share “seeds that have allowed Mexico to 
improve production and make the country – after fulfilling domestic needs – a net 
exporter of basic nutritional products.”  The goal, as Valdés told leaders in Rome, was 
“to share the opportunity of other countries sending their researchers here to gain 
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training to work with improved seeds, which, without a doubt, shall improve basic 
agricultural production.”365    
 The costs of so many programs, extension agents, distribution schemes, and 
research center openings were huge, but the world helped defray the outlays.  In 
September of 1963, Mexico became one of the first countries to begin distributing 
money via the Alliance for Progress program to agricultural improvement.  According 
to an editorial in the most widely circulated agricultural magazine, Tierra, “There had 
been plenty of efforts towards improving rural conditions.  It was thought that this 
problem could be solved via improving farmers’ cultivation methods.”   Hence, SAG 
leaders magnified extension services, “guiding farmers along the rough path towards 
progress.”  When these efforts seemed to have failed, Tierra writers asserted that 
farmers’ problem was their lack of access to credit.366  And the Alliance for Progress 
would help growers, particularly small growers, with capital.    
A project motivated by the Cold War during the John F. Kennedy administration  
to aid economic development in Latin America, the Alliance for Progress’ novelty lay 
in its micro-lending approach.  International sources lent funds to Mexican banks, 
which dispatched representatives to visit farmers to inspect borrowers’ potential for 
repayment.  Low interest rates and terms of repayment attracted farmers to the program.  
Instead of borrowing funds with a typical interest rate of 9 to 18 percent over a short 
period, a farmer could borrow small amounts for items on a smaller-than-industrial 
level – for example, heads of cattle, equipment for installing irrigation or drainage, 
machinery – at a 6 percent rate over a period of five to ten years.  Banks asked that 
                                                
365 “Realidad actual de México en agricultura, ganadería y silvicultura,” México Agrícola X, no. 118 
(December 1963), 32-33. 
366 Y Gai Liberté, “Editorial, Progreso en el campo,” Tierra IXX, no. 2 (February 1964), 107. 
187 
borrowers have insurance, so as to ensure a sense of security to lenders.  The first 
installment of an eventual $250-million pesos loan to farmers began in 1963.  Farmers 
in Michoacán and Guanajuato received the first funds in September of 1963.367  By the 
summer of the next year, private banks began lending via the program, and, according 
to a Tierra article, “small-scale farmers feel optimistic about their futures.”368   
Other parties shared the same positive opinion.  At a 1964 summer meeting with 
Alliance for Program partners, Mexico’s Secretary of Finance implied that the program 
aligned well with social justice and the Mexican Revolution.369  A writer for one 
farming magazine suggested that the Alliance for Progress was “not a promise towards 
the future, but a tangible reality for today.”  The credit that farmers received “signified 
the joint work of a country and its government…towards a better Mexico.”370   
Thus, when Gustavo Díaz Ordaz began his presidency in late 1964, the Mexican 
government found itself flush with cash and no reasons to alter the course of its 
agricultural development.  Under López Mateos (1958-1964), irrigation for farmers 
expanded by 3.1 million cubic meters and lands on which farmers used fertilizers nearly 
doubled.  Volume levels over the same period increased for several crops: maize 5.3 
percent, beans 9.5 percent, wheat 5.3 percent, potatoes 13.5 percent, coffee 10 percent, 
sugar cane 4 percent, tomatoes 6.2 percent, sorghum 34.8 percent, and livestock 6 
percent.  Production levels for maize and wheat increased, too: maize increased from 5 
                                                
367 “Nuevo impulso y ayudan el Gobierno de la República y la ALPRO al campesino mexicano,” ibid., 
109-111. 
368 “Entrevista de Tierra: El señor Tyrus Gerard Fain, representante del AID[,] nos explica lo que es la 
Alianza para el Progreso, sus finalidades y las realizaciones logradas hasta ahora en México,” Tierra 
IXX, no. 5 (May 1964), 369. 
369 “La filosofía que norma a la Alianza para el Progreso es similar a la de la Revolución de 1910,” 
México Agrícola XI, no. 125 (July 1964), 22.   
370 “La Alianza para el Progreso rinde sus frutos en el campo mexicano,” El Campo XXIX, no. 869 (July 
1964), 29.  
188 
million tons produced in 1958 to 7 million in 1964; and wheat increased in 1.3 million 
tons to 2 million tons over the same period.  According to an editorial praising López 
Mateos’s tenure, “It appears that the formula that will usher in the most agricultural 
progress - the connection between farmers and the men of science - will translate into 
the improvement of our national agriculture.”371 
Díaz Ordaz made rural areas a focus of his presidency.  During his campaign for 
the president, Díaz Ordaz said that “The countryside’s problems are the gravest issue in 
Mexico’s political, social, and economic future.”  Agrarian reform, he added, remained 
incomplete if it failed to execute certain tasks like modernizing agriculture, changing 
methods of production, offering adequate extension services and training for 
campesinos, determining profitable crops in regions, protecting against soil erosion, 
combatting diseases, opening irrigation projects, settling land distribution, and other 
jobs.372  Díaz Ordaz put his plans into action after taking office.  To protect farmers 
from rural moneylender who were known for their usury and for offering low crop 
prices to growers, he instituted programs in states that ensured that SAG officials 
regulated and guaranteed prices to ejidatarios and small farmers via more supervision 
of the crop warehouse network with the National Basic Foods Company 
(CONASUPO).373   
Within months, CONASUPO’s director announced plans for an expansion of his 
agency’s responsibilities, which would soon oversee a network of 258 maize storage 
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warehouses for farmers and 222 railroad stops for shipping maize to and from 
markets.374  That same month, to help illiterate rural farmers, Mexico hosted an 
international seminar focused on locating effective ways for extension via radio, which 
was important to the host country where over half the rural population could not read or 
write.375   
Díaz Ordaz’s plans included large investments in extension.  Early in 1965, Juan 
Gil Preciado, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, had a meeting on behalf of the 
president to overhaul extension policies.  “The technical assistance [to farmers] failed to 
reach a majority of peasants,” he said, and farmers were not “sufficiently receiving the 
appropriate instructions for protecting their crops,” nor were they informed about crop 
prices, methods for fighting plagues, and ways of maximizing production.  Gil Preciado 
and company, therefore, reviewed and redesigned policies in an attempt to ensure that 
extension services arrived to all farmers.  Thereafter extension agents began 
partnerships with local agricultural bank officials in their zones to provide direct 
assistance to loan recipients.  Agents also began giving more consultations on more 
topics than before - from efficient irrigation, to soil conservation, to furrow 
construction, to erosion control, to seed selection, to fertilization methods, to plague 
control, and to weather and price updates.  As Gil Preciado said in March of 1965, SAG 
workers had to dispense services that benefitted all farmers, “regardless of their status 
as ejidatarios, communal farmers, or rank-and-file landowners.”376   
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A gargantuan effort followed.  Agents, teamed with social workers, continued 
visiting farmers to give advice on improving hygiene, gardening, food preparation and 
preservation, and sewing.  They also continued to double their efforts to recruit 
members to Rural Youth Clubs.377  The government purchased mobile audiovisual 
units, and by the fall of 1965, extensionists were hard at work.  According to a report 
months after Gil Preciado’s extension overhaul, agents worked with 450 Rural Youth 
clubs.  In the same report, agents had attended to 70,000 farmers during one season.  
They had also made about 7,600 household visits, with services that included 
vaccination adminisration to more than two hundred children.  Agents aired more than 
two-hundred hours of radio programs in two dozen states, wrote dozens of newspaper 
articles, produced 145 “agricultural-themed” television spots on satellites, and took 
audiovisual units to more than 20 fairs to hand out hundreds of bulletins and flyers.378  
In a report from earlier in 1964 and into 1965, agents reported to have aired more than 
22,000 showings at 124 theaters around the country – all in the endeavor to spread the 
word about modern agriculture.379   
By 1966, Mexican agricultural looked to have transcended its past.  The 
country’s main government research operation had a small contingent of 245 
researchers, 24 with doctoral degrees and 50 with master’s degrees, who led world-class 
studies in several important agricultural fields.380  Small agricultural training schools for 
rural children who could not attend school after the elementary level had recently been 
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opened.  A small brigade of three dozen mobile extension units traveled with a social 
worker, a schoolteacher, and an agronomist, all of whom assisted peasants with the 
traditional services, and by 1966, “general home economics,” and even advised peasants 
about how to spend their free time in artistic and sporting activities.381    
Mexico’s status as an international leader received tacit approval from George 
Harrar, the president of the Rockefeller Foundation in September of 1966.  During his 
visit to Mexico, Harrar said “Mexico is the most advanced nation in the fight against 
hunger.”  “The first efforts towards alleviating hunger that humanity suffers,” he added, 
“shall emanate from Mexico.”  Saying that the world’s population would increase 
substantially in the next fifteen years, Harrar asserted that the countries who had 
conquered hunger were obligated “to help those that suffer,” and one of the Center’s job 
was helping defeating world hunger.382  Ground zero, in no uncertain terms, for 
vanquishing one of the world’s biggest problems in 1966 could be found in Mexico.  
 
PLAN CHAPINGO 
If Demonstration Days, mobile audiovisual units, better access to credit, 
improved seeds, fertilizer distribution campaigns, television and radio spots, price 
regulation, financial loans from abroad, and an organizational overhaul in the Ministry 
of Agriculture amounted to everything it took to help Mexican peasants, President Díaz 
Ordaz would have accomplished his task by the end of 1965.  However, his plan for 
improving Mexican agriculture also included transforming the crown jewel of Mexican 
agricultural education: Chapingo.  Juan Gil Preciado, the Minister of Agriculture, along 
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with Díaz Ordaz and others in Chapingo’s auditorium, opened classes on campus in 
February of 1965 to outline the president’s project.   
The project’s sponsors named it “Plan Chapingo.”  Its designers began plans for 
it during the López Mateos sexenio, and when Gil Preciado spoke on campus in early 
1965, it should have been further along, but delays postponed completion until 1968.383  
After highlighting the Escuela Nacional’s history and its mission of helping peasants, 
Gil Preciado suggested to the gathered chapingueros that they made up an army of 
agronomic soldiers that, “via science and training, transform farmers’ work into 
something prosperous and make rural areas a determining factor in Mexico’s 
magnificence.”  He went on to emphasize “the transcendental national” duty of erasing 
the history of ignorance and poverty, and how President Díaz Ordaz began, “in a 
vehement and immovable manner,” plans to improve the college.  Seeing agricultural 
education as an area for improvement, the president’s plan would “project Chapingo’s 
beneficence” all over the country.384   
Plan Chapingo’s origins likely began in 1960 and moved slowly thereafter.  In 
October of that year the heads of agriculture in every state began discussions on how to 
deliver agricultural research in a more coordinated fashion.385  Nearly two years later 
President López Mateos announced the founding of a new National Agricultural 
Council, which would be a governing body made up of representatives from each state 
to oversee, he said in 1962, that “rural groups protect and care for natural resources in 
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the country…and increase, diversify, and improve agriculture.”  The Council appeared 
to be the Mexican government’s strategy for coordinating the delivery of research that 
the country had made over the last two-plus decades and streamlining future advances 
to farmers.  Credit delivery, technical assistance, and extension agents would be, per 
one magazine article, “more direct and more efficient towards the benefit of the rural 
sector.”  Crop insurance, extension, guaranteed government prices, access to crop silos 
would fall under the national council’s purview.386  For all intents and purposes, the 
Council would be the institution that designed and governed Mexico’s agricultural 
future.   
Chapingo would become the council’s home.  Agricultural education, research, 
and extension were to be centralized at the Escuela Nacional.  The National Council and 
the many projects that López Mateos and Díaz Ordaz began would emanate from the 
college and, according to a media article, would prepare “new generations of 
agronomists, and at the same time, accelerate the results of research and 
experimentation, and make these results available to campesinos,” keeping in mind that 
national development “needs an increase in production and the economic and social 
improvement of rural groups.”387  The plan had a projected cost of over one hundred 
million pesos that would be covered by the Mexican government, and donations or 
loans from the United Nations, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
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US Agency for International Development, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank.388   
A new headquarters for the National Institute for Agricultural Research (INIA) 
would be built on campus, and the center would have facilities for 500 students to learn 
from the 150 full-time researchers at the college.389  The national Department of 
Agricultural Extension building at the college would be state of the art, with 
photography, and audio and video studios for producing media.  A new Student Center 
would be built, with study rooms, student lounges, and a restaurant.  Professors, 
administrators, and students would all enjoy new housing facilities.  Chapingo’s new 
library would be Latin America’s largest, bragged one writer, with more than 250,000 
books and journals of “the accumulated knowledge by man in agricultural sciences.”390  
Finally, a newly-established national Agricultural Statistics Center would be 
headquartered on ENA grounds.  In abstract terms, Plan Chapingo represented the 
Escuela Nacional’s transformation into a panoptic nerve center where Mexican 
agriculture would be planned, researched, taught, and executed.    
 
ANGST IN CHAPINGO 
 A survey of Chapingo students’ sentiments and attitudes in 1965 may have 
given the plan’s backers, particularly the international lenders and donors, cause for 
concern, however.  Years before Plan Chapingo’s organizers conceived of the project, 
anxieties bedeviled many students.  Chapinguito, the school’s student newspaper, 
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described a dystopian intellectual setting reminiscent of George Orwell’s novel 
Nineteen Eighty-four.  A “Thought Police” seemed to govern the college and a veiled 
angst, influenced by a number of factors, existed on campus.391  By 1965, when Gil 
Preciado spoke to students about Plan Chapingo projecting the college’s “beneficence” 
all over Mexico, a sense of disenchantment among many students was crystallizing into 
hostility.   
The origins of the bitterness in the 1960s could be found in a stifling learning 
environment that began two decades prior.  Since the early 1940s, the Escuela Nacional 
de Agricultura never changed its curriculum in any substantive manner.  It offered eight 
areas of study: plant breeding, agrostology, irrigation, plant parasitology, forestry, 
livestock, industrial agriculture, and agricultural economics.  Each student took three 
years of basic agronomic studies, followed by four years of studies in their specialty 
area.  This plan, according to a 1960s catalog, “integrated teaching modern technical 
and scientific knowledge” that “overcame the encyclopedic” teaching from years 
past.392  Lessons, though, rarely deviated from the securities of a bland lecture from a 
professor, a textbook, an empirical formula, or a chalkboard.  After seven years, the 
ENA degree declared graduates, técnicos (technicians) with the title Agronomic 
Engineer.  But they were not researchers.     
This distinction between researchers and technicians is important.  “Technician” 
derives from the Greek root “tekhnē,” which refers to an art or a craft, or dexterity of 
hand.  The term “técnico,” then, denotes a person with a specific skillset in an area of 
specialty.  They are specialists.  In a contrast to some artists or scientists who generate 
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new knowledge or new ways for examining complex phenomena, a technician is a 
person in a practical field equipped with an adroitness towards dealing with a familiar 
problem or question.  They receive intensive training for problem-solving within a strict 
empirical framework and often the training that they receive is adequate for the tasks 
they are assigned to fulfill.  Not universally, technicians can often shortchange (or 
neglect) complex phenomena or overlook alternative approaches or forms of inquiry.  
When applied to methods for improving certain human conditions – for example, 
helping peasant farmers during the 1950s and 1960s  – técnicos could be considered 
operatives of what anthropologist James C. Scott called “high modernism.”393               
By the latter half of the 1950s, the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura was a 
técnico factory.  Technical Agriculture in Mexico was a major peer-reviewed agronomic 
journal in Mexico during the 1950s and many ENA instructors were more than likely 
trained by the journal’s founders and contributors.  In their classes, professors 
privileged a brand of pedagogy that advocated rote memorization, numbers, and 
formulas.  That the material they taught was derived in empiricism and supported by the 
scientific method lent legitimacy to professors’ teaching methods.  In terms of 
curriculum, the college offered eight specialty areas, with no opportunity for 
interdisciplinary study.  An irrigation specialist knew irrigation and only irrigation.  An 
entomologist student learned how to proportion chemical formulas to eliminate or 
manage plant diseases and not much outside of this task.  A plant breeding student 
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focused on developing disease-resistant or climate-adapted or high-yielding seeds and 
not much else.  Teachers rarely held discussions outside of subject matter and often 
relegated social science topics to areas that fell outside of their lesson plans, outside 
what a técnico should worry about.  “There was no sociology, no specialty aligned with 
the humanities or close to anthropology and other disciplines,” said one 1960s 
student.394     
A military-base atmosphere reinforced the strict, parochial pedagogy.  Bugles 
woke up students every day.  They lived in military-style dormitories.  They wore 
uniforms and lined up for roll call before meals.  A Military Department official 
required students to line up in evenings so that he could deliver the national news, as if 
they were stationed at a remote “battlefront,” said one ex-student - as if Mexico City 
were not only a dozen kilometers away from campus.395  Before national holidays, they 
practiced marching for parades.  Should cadets display poor cadence, the Military 
Department chiefs were not above strong discipline; in one instance, one chief forbade 
students from eating breakfast one morning until they marched in a manner he saw as 
appropriate.396  Some students hazed one another to build, in some of their eyes, 
fraternity and camaraderie.  Social night fell on Wednesdays, the one night a week that 
the auditorium played movies or where student meetings took place.397   
Thus was life at Chapingo for years.  Administrators kowtowed to military 
traditions like marching in formation and reporting for chowtime.  Teachers delivered 
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an underwhelming pedagogy minus dynamism and breadth.  And many students rarely 
questioned how things were done at school for much of the 1950s.                
During the decade, in fact, one may have a hard time believing that any sense of 
dissatisfaction existed on campus.  Students held the college in high regard.  In 1950, 
Francisco Baldobinos offered a list of suggestions for the college.  Chapingo had a 
small student population, but its “importance in a number of areas – social and 
intellectual discourses, and sports – is huge.”  He added that Mexico “is in our 
hands.”398  A year later, another student told classmates that students were 
“soldiers…who must study how to nourish Mexico and earn its spot among the 
advanced countries of the world.”399  In 1956, one Chapinguito contributor called 
school “a place…where Mexico has invested its hopes.”400   
Other parties invested money in the college.  By 1959, for example, Sears, 
Roebuck & Company began sponsoring scholarships for ENA students to study 
agronomy in the United States.401  In the same year, Mexico’s Agricultural Credit Bank 
lent Chapingo 50,000 pesos to purchase land for a new Training Center for Agricultural 
Machinery Instruction, where crash courses for students in Mexico’s agricultural 
vocation schools on heavy farming equipment took place.  At the center, John Deere, 
Fordson, Massey-Ferguson, and International Harvester representatives oversaw 
maintenance and operation of equipment worth nearly one million dollars that 
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companies had donated to Chapingo.  The US government promised to add to the center 
by donating a state-of-the-art machine shop-warehouse for equipment.402   
Other parties from all over the world praised the college during the 1950s and 
early 1960s.  In February of 1959, at least a couple Ministers of Agriculture from Latin 
American countries visited campus to “glance at the school’s facilities.”403  Months 
later, Luis Eduardo Chalita quoted an article from abroad that praised the college, 
mentioning that it was the only agronomic college in Latin America with graduate 
studies in several fields - “an international center for agricultural studies.”404  Two years 
later, other guests included some from Yugoslavia.405  In September of 1962, Israel’s 
ambassador to Mexico visited because Chapingo’s name was “a learning center with 
international prestige.”406  Such compliments were affirmed in 1963, as delegates from 
ten Latin American countries and one FAO officials toured campus and praised the 
progress of teaching and research at school.407   
According to an extensive report by Efraím Hernández, the school deserved a 
degree of praise by 1961.  It employed more full-time professors (35) than ever.  The 
government issued between 200 and 250 scholarships annually to new students.  Less 
than half of these students managed to graduate - studies were rigorous.  No other Latin 
American college offered the eight specialty areas that Chapingo offered.  The college 
owned one of the world’s most notable agricultural seed germplasm banks.  Its graduate 
college, the Colegio de Postgraduados (COLPOS), received financial support from the 
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government, the United Nations, and the Organization of American States, and it had 
more than two dozen students as of 1961.408  The same year of Hernández’s report, 
President López Mateos announced plans that would eventually open an ENA satellite 
campus on Mexico’s east coast to begin research in tropical regions.409  If job placement 
indicated success, then students and ENA officials had no worries in the early 1960s: 
graduates counted on at least “one or two job offers,” or at least had an idea where they 
wanted to land after college, said one student.410  Fungicide, pesticide, and fertilizer 
company representatives, along with government agencies, “snatched” chapingueros 
outside campus gates, said another student.411    
The prestige from the 1950s resonated with students in the following decade.  
Many of them considered the college’s gates to be where revolutionary rhetoric fused 
with the need to find one’s vocation.  In 1960, one student returning to his “always 
homely school,” told classmates that they had “the great fortune of attending school at a 
wonderful place.  It provides us with everything, and in exchange, it’s demanded that 
we study hard.”  He encouraged classmates to manage their time carefully because it 
went towards “a noble cause,” that of helping Mexico.412  The same year another 
student discussed the progress of the Mexican Revolution, mentioning that the 
Revolution continued apace with new generations of “neo-revolutionaries,” who, on the 
one hand, “salute the noble cause of helping the Mexican people,” but, on the other 
hand, “leech and plunder our national budgets.”  In the meantime, “the fight continued 
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with chapingueros” towards being a revolutionary flag bearer and putting forth the 
manpower to “elevate the future of agriculture.”413  A month before the same student 
shared a short piece noting that peasants still suffered from a number of injustices.  
Fortunately, he wrote, “Chapingo – the only true revolutionary school – carried on with 
its mission.”414  Taide Aburto, a classmate, saw the school’s motto – “Teach the 
exploitation of the soil, not man.” – as “fundamentally Zapatista” and found the motto 
to be inspirational when he arrived on campus in 1964.  Professors gave students the 
idea that “we had to work in a social context, and a career” to students.  Chapingo 
allowed “you to make a living while keeping a social outlook.”415      
There was an underside to the optimism, however.  Small signs were visible 
during the latter half of the 1950s.  Sergio Reyes called himself and classmates ignorant 
in 1956.  So much time in classrooms made them ignorant of farmers and agriculture, 
and insecure when they graduated from school.  Only during their final years did 
chapingueros make what Reyes called “tourist trips” off campus, for a total of six to 
eight days.  The majority of instruction occurred in “classrooms with no more material 
than chalk, an eraser, and a chalkboard.”  Courses were so classroom-bound, Reyes 
suggested, that many students who study tropical agriculture cannot identify coffee 
bushes or cacao outside of a diagram.416  Three years later, Gerardo Lartigue spelled out 
an informal survey of campus.  “Hollow words.  Hollow smiles.  Political posing and 
posturing.  Insincere phrases,” his piece began.  Describing classmates, Lartigue said he 
knew “no other way” to begin his editorial.  “Chapingo’s goal,” he continued, “is to 
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train agronomists, quality workers, and most important, upright men.”  But the school 
failed.  Students received “anti-pedagogical teaching from horrible teachers.”  More 
important, students graduated after seven years of “unbalanced” training, lacking 
“familiarity with society and culture.”  The effects of such a “chaotic situation” were 
well-known.  Effects included a lack of interest in classes and research, displays of 
indiscipline, “and worse: a devaluing of the countryside and a total shortage of 
ideology.”  Before encouraging classmates to take hold of their education, Lartigue 
wrote that “An agronomist who devalues the countryside was a farce.  Someone without 
culture or ideology amounted to a hollow man.”417  In Chapinguito’s next issue, an 
editorial discussed a “pessimistic current” and other complaints that floated around 
school.  The young man mentioned the school’s forty-year-old curriculum that 
“followed anti-pedagogical methods,” and how students spent hours “simply cramming, 
memorizing pages and pages that never ends.”  Once “we pass a test, completing our 
mission of being ‘intellectual sponges,’ we forget forever.  Instead of passing the exam 
via intelligence and rationalism on solid grounds about the material, it’s more probable 
that we gain an unconscious aversion towards the subject.”  He went on to mention 
criticisms about campus discipline and mentioned criticisms of the school’s director.  
He added that the Student Body Association held hollow meetings instead of discussion 
of opprobrium towards latifundios who “lord over the martyred Mexican soil, who still 
flagrantly spit in the direction at the misery of Mexican peasants.”  The editorial 
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finished by outlining how well material life was at Chapingo, but many things needed 
improvement, namely a reassessment of values.418 
Others echoed the criticism, underscoring a restiveness and concern that 
students behaved like automations.  During the spring of 1959, Luis Eduardo Chalita 
suggested that school leaders lacked vision and that research on campus remained 
inadequate.  Teachers imparted a brand of agricultural extension taught that was 
“behind the times,” bolstered by the diffusion of a futile bulletin to help farmers.  
Chalita also squashed some of the zeal expressed in a Latin American publication about 
the Chapingo’s prestige, saying the college failed to exercise decisive influence with 
farmers near its grounds.419  Chalita’s harangues continued in 1960.  He criticized the 
few “ill-equipped” extension agents in Mexico and added that ENA halls “remained 
half empty.”420  Students later wrote a petition concerning unqualified teachers, and 
soon afterwards, instructors’ resignations “rained” on campus.421  The same author later 
said that an agronomist was “one of the most uncultured professionals.  His technical 
preparation could be excellent, but he has lost an important intellectual quality,” 
particularly culture.  He suggested that students failed even to read popular magazines 
at the library or respond to music in the student lounge, displaying apathy towards 
anything not related to schoolwork.  “The ignorance among students about the world 
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outside of campus is of Olympic proportions,” he wrote in an editorial titled “It’s Time 
We End Our Confinement.”422   
The despondency and complaints intensified in 1961.  In reaction to a film crew 
on campus, one student asked if the production was a strategy to attract more city 
dwellers to the college.  This would be a problem, the writer suggested, because 
“desktop agronomists were already a plague” in Mexico.423  Students registered more 
complaints against ENA teachers for failing to attend their own classes or, when they 
attended, trying to cover all the material in two or three weeks.424  Students shared 
stories of how many left school to become either “agricultural technicians” or 
“professionals,” who adopted poor attitudes that worsened with time.  “What a pitiful 
lot!  What a waste of human resources because of the modern ways of life!” the students 
added.425  In the same issue, José Héctor Silva shared his interpretation of history, 
saying that science always had a connection to philosophy and culture.  His school, 
though, suffered from the absence of philosophy.  A newly-developed plan of study had 
begun on campus, but, he said, the plan sought to rectify problems “without including 
cultural material, which is required if graduates worked to improve society.”  Moreover, 
the school failed “to have its own philosophy concerning the world in which we live” 
(emphasis in original).  The main reason for this, Silva wrote, was pedagogy failed 
when it did not account for “the value of human spirit towards the existence of man.”426   
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Frustrations mounted later that year.  When the governor of the State of Mexico 
visited, students failed to arrive on time to a talk-lecture because of “general apathy.”427  
One student rhetorically asked classmates if bureaucracy among school administrators 
was “the brake” stopping agricultural education, as students found it difficult to get 
materials for labs.  “Pure bureaucracy” existed on campus, he wrote.428  In the same 
Chapinguito issue, two writers described how one professor suggested, “in a serious and 
dogmatic tone,” that students should not ask for anything more from their education, 
they should not venture further than “’technical aspects’” at school.  Another adage 
heard on campus, the writers said, was to “’only worry about themselves and not about 
everyone else.’”  Such words amounted to “intellectual laziness,” and the writers urged 
classmates to leave their mental comfort zones because “A society comprised of people 
without frustrations or questions never progresses.  A society of technicians could be a 
civilized grouping, but not enlightened.”  Writers reminded peers about the global 
context that they ignored when they adopted an existence with worries that rarely 
ventured outside of schoolwork: Africa’s decolonization; the fight against South 
African apartheid; Patricio Lumumba’s murder in the Congo; US support for 
dictatorships in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Paraguay; the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s interventions in Algeria, Hungary, El Salvador, Guatemala, Laos, 
France, and the Bay of Pigs invasion.  “Always keep in mind,” they finished, “that 
utilitarian science and manuals only produce machines.  It is much more to be 
human.”429  Later that year students wrote an open letter to the school director in which 
they alluded to a pervasive passivity at school, the absence of the word “distinction 
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[even] from campus dictionaries,” and “the lack of competent people who display a 
concern for values and their human, social qualities.”430   
If a penchant for agitation existed in Chapingo by 1962, it was partially swayed 
by contemporary events in Mexico and in Latin America.  At a time when Carlos 
Fuentes’s The Death of Artemio Cruz (1961) drew attention to the moral bankruptcy of 
Mexico’s ruling party, students were not impervious to national controversies: the 
Jaramillista Movement; the army’s invasion of the National Polytechnic Institute in 
1956; the guerilla campaigns in Guerrero; and the controversial arrest of labor leader 
Demetrio Vallejo in 1959.431  Latin American happenings, particularly the Cuban 
Revolution, tremendously influenced students’ frustrations.432  It seemed Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara was prescient when he wrote in January of 1959 how the Cuban Revolution 
“touched the consciousness” of Latin Americans.433  Chapingo’s Class of 1960 named 
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Fidel Castro their godfather, particularly after some students had visited Havana and 
had spent time with some of the July 26 Movement’s leaders in 1959.  Héctor José Silva 
returned praising Cuba for “awakening an interest” in Latin America.434  Silva 
expressed other effusive words the next year, when Cuba’s president, Osvaldo Dorticós, 
visited Chapingo.435  At least one student was peeved when government officials 
forbade him from traveling to Havana for the first ever Latin American Youth Congress 
in 1960.436  Students also defended Fidel Castro’s policies, asking if it was a crime to 
“gain liberty [from exploitation] in your country…from those who have done so much 
harm to his patria?”437  In the month after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, some student 
leaders wrote an open letter to the president of Mexico about the “cowardly aggression” 
of the “mercenary army” that tried to invade Cuba.  They shared their willingness to 
lend “military, moral, and material support” to their fellow Latin Americans in the 
Caribbean.438    
The happenings in Cuba tapped into anti-yanqui rhetoric that had circulated for 
some time in Chapingo.  In 1959, Javier Zuñiga said that he no longer cared to see 
representatives and Mexican interns under the tutelage of the Rockefeller Foundation 
(RF) giving demonstration talks on campus.  He resented the fact that RF 
representatives, while having help fund the opening of the Colegio de Postgraduados, 
had tried to keep a representative on campus in exchange for its donations.  “If the 
Rockefeller Foundation wants to help Mexican agricultural development,” Zuñiga 
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implored, “they have nothing else to do but leave.  They are now in the way.”439  Héctor 
Zamudio later revealed his anti-Yankee sentiment, saying that for every cent that the 
United States invested in Mexico, it sought to take one hundred.  He lamented that 
many compatriots had been “conquered” by cultural mores from the United States and 
that many Mexicans more than welcomed US “’help.’”  “I want everyone,” Zamudio 
continued, “to understand that if we have the presence of the Rockefellers - highlighting 
a palpable case close to home [at Chapingo] - it is not because they want to help us 
develop our agriculture; rather, it is so that we do not develop our agriculture.  Hence, 
misery and ignorance will continue and Mexico will remain a mental prisoner.”440  Near 
the same time, ENA students from Central America added articles with similar anti-
Yankee themes.  A Panamanian classmate wrote articles highlighting the exploitation of 
the Panama Canal.  In one commentary from 1962, he said that the canal functioned as a 
“gringo colony.”441 
The amalgam of anti-Yankee rhetoric, angst towards authorities, and general 
intellectual frustration came to a head in 1963.  In May of the previous year, students 
arrived at administrators’ doors with three demands.  First, they demanded that ENA 
Director Enrique Espinosa be removed from his position.  Second, complainants wanted 
the Directive Council, the student-faculty group that decided on major college decisions 
since 1938, to better address students’ needs.  Finally, students demanded that college 
funding increase.  SAG and ENA officials met to deal with the small ENA mutiny.  
Espinosa soon resigned.  The demand for more funds on campus resulted in less money 
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from SAG officials.  As for the second mandate to have more say in changes that 
occurred on campus, SAG officials’ reaction disappointed many students.  Later, after 
meetings between Espinosa’s replacement and Julián Rodríguez, the Minister of 
Agriculture and Livestock, it was decided that Chapingo’s preparatory school would be 
terminated.  This was a problem among several students because the preparatory school 
functioned as an avenue for many teen-age peasants to receive state-funded elemental 
training on campus that they would not otherwise receive.  Students called the policy 
change, which possibly violated student-faculty Directive Council bylaws, an 
“unfounded and disrespectful transformation” that would affect the students who were 
supposed to be the population that the college purported to help.442    
A few days later, it appeared that students learned about Plan Chapingo from 
Mexican newspapers - not from school officials.  Their response was tepid.  “If we let 
an exaggerated sense of optimism to overcome us, we would celebrate such a plan as 
one of the most important on campus in the last fifteen years.  But we reserve 
judgement.  We remember that the interests of foreign parties on campus do not always 
coincide with Chapingo’s revolutionary ideology.”  In a wait-and-see tone, the article 
finished with hope that school authorities and the government had not aligned 
themselves with interests foreign to advancement of the Mexican Revolution, “and that 
our leaders wisely put these donations to good use that made school more dynamic in 
order to continue fighting for Mexico.”443 
By the summer of 1963, then, during Plan Chapingo’s initial stages, things were 
astir at the Escuela Nacional.  For nearly four years, discontent accumulated among 
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many students.  They badmouthed their teachers and school administrators.  They 
vocalized skepticism about foreign interests at the college, some indulging in strong 
anti-Yankee rhetoric.  And many of them begged for an overhaul of the school’s 
pedagogy, something weightier than the intellectual and ideological impoverishment 
that governed at a college that bespoke revolutionary ideals. 
This restiveness exemplified the construction of what historian Jeremi Suri 
called a “language of dissent.”  Colleges during the early 1960s were hot-blooded 
environments in many countries.  They were places where large concentrations of 
young people furthered their literacy and idealism.  They also represented settings 
where idealism often outmeasured many realities and where young people often 
developed skepticism toward the leadership in many countries.  As Suri wrote, higher 
education during the 1960s became “a distinct government-sponsored activity, with its 
own clearly defined and regulated facilities” where women and men rattled taboos and 
jettisoned old ideas.444 
A handful of chapingueros spent the late-1950s and early-1960s weaving their 
“language of dissent,” their own penetrating critiques of the on-campus world.  And 
often these criticisms translated into larger indicments of Mexican authorities.  Many 
attendees began their academic career seeing their institution as the place that would 
train them to help peasant farmers.  On ENA grounds they would attain the know-how 
to help their poorest rural inhabitants.  Students responded with aggresive critiques 
when such elevated expectations appeared unfulfilled.  These harsh appraisals gathered 
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steam in their student newspaper, in their dormitories, in their personal notebooks (see 
the poem at the opening of this chapter), and in other spots on campus.   
 
LA XOLOCOTZIA 
 Students’ complaints found fertile soil in Efraím Hernández’s classes.  Since the 
1950s, Hernández had griped about what he considered intellectual narrowness in ENA 
classes (see Chapter Three).  He resented the dogmatic teaching among many 
colleagues, arguing often with anyone who would listen that students needed to become 
less servile to the insular, uncreative approach to agriculture at Chapingo.  His classes 
and his way of questioning truisms about agriculture (and most other things) became 
legendary.  An inclination to put everything on trial came to be called “la xolocotzia,” 
and it meshed well with students’ angst in the 1960s.   
 Hernández stood out on campus from the day he arrived in 1953.  Professors 
typically wore ties, sport coats, and dress shoes.  To his first class, Hernández donned a 
green pinned-striped suit, with a collared polo underneath, and moccasins for shoes.  
The pants had a noticeable hole in the rear.  He wrote his name on the chalkboard, 
instructed students to take out a sheet of paper, and he administered a quiz the first day 
of class.  When a student later retold him how they imagined a teacher in a suit and tie, 
Hernández replied, “You didn’t realize [that along with dressing differently], I was also 
a badass botanist.”445  He always refused, one colleague said, to be part of the crowd, he 
had to be “the protagonist” everywhere he went.446  Students usually realized his 
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intelligence within minutes of meeting him and, as former students said, many were 
attracted to a charisma one sensed when they shook his hand.447   
 Hernández was likely the toughest teacher on campus and not above cursing at 
students.  Ramón Mariaca, a Hernández pupil during the 1980s, recalled visiting 
Hernández’s office to retrieve a thesis draft and finding his work in a trashcan.  A 
scolding followed, with cursing and the admonishment that Mariaca should not turn in 
garbage posing as a thesis.448  His approach to teaching was that students did not have 
to be the cream of the crop, nor did they have to share his ideas.  But they had to display 
effort and an indication that they studied for a reason.  A student attending college for 
the sake of doing so – pursuing “the love of knowledge,” knowing simply to know - 
was anathema.449   
For those who withstood the often-gruff personality and for those who showed 
effort, the relationship with Maestro Xolo, as he was known, was special.  To these 
students, the xolocotzianos, Hernández gave money during financial straits (e.g., 
Méndez), lent his car when they went into labor, attended movies, paid for meals, and 
shared numerous experiences.  José Sarukhán never forgot the day Hernández changed 
the subject of a conversation they were having during a road trip.  Maestro Xolo made 
sure his student paused to admire the sunset descending on Mexico.450  Being a 
xolocotziano transcended the typical top-down student-teacher relationship on campus 
in the 1960s.         
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 In his classes, Hernández made students obey academic conventions, yet their 
work also had to have style.  Should a student deviate from either one of these 
expectations, their grade paid a price.  Carlos Bermejo found this out in 1965 when he 
wrote a paper on poultry cages for Hernández’s animal husbandry seminar.  In what 
probably should have been a formal exposition describing why farmers should cage 
poultry, Bermejo turned in three pages of facts listed in bullet point format with a short 
summary at the bottom of the assignment’s last page.  Hernández docked points for a 
lack of clarity and mistakes in orthography.  But the longest comment concerned 
another matter: “It would be wise to read books that are not so technical, namely 
Spanish classics to improve your style.”  Bermejo received 7 out of 10 points.451  The 
grade and comments were vintage Hernández.  He demanded clarity and that students 
obey conventions like accent marks and grammar, and because using the wrong 
adjective or being wordy in an assignment constituted mortal sins, he always 
encouraged all students to have a dictionary on their person.  Just as important, as 
Bermejo discovered, assignments and projects needed to have verve; aesthetics 
mattered.    
 If the rule in ENA classes during the 1960s was for teachers to be boring and 
dictatorial, then Hernández’s classes were the exception on campus.  Students traded in 
the book study, numbers, and memorization for discussions that rarely generated an 
answer and debates that rarely yielded consensus, but always made for critical thinking.  
Common discussion topics were the lack of creativity and social science courses on 
campus.  Another topic was how the improved seeds, fertilizers, extension efforts, and 
other technologies later associated with the “Green Revolution” failed to benefit the 
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majority of Mexican farmers, specifically peasants with a lack of access to irrigation.  
Always respectfully, Hernández suggested of how leaders in the Mexican Agricultural 
Program, the organizational origins of the “Green Revolution,” were “technocratic” and 
“uncreative.”452  Debates were mandatory.  Everyone who argued had to deal with the 
“three whys.”  After they expressed an idea, the first “Why?” followed.  If one could 
competently answer two subsequent “Whys?,” then the person had something to say 
that deserved attention.453  Relative to other classes on campus, in which statistics or 
formulas yielded definitive, concrete answers, Hernández exhorted students to deal with 
abstractions and difficult questions.  Erin Estrada once had an exam that asked for a 
definition of God.  Another time Hernández made her give a lecture to classmates about 
the origins of man.454  To ensure that students left his classes understanding some of 
modern biology’s foundation, Hernández assigned Charles Darwin’s The Origins of 
Species.455  More related to botany, Hernández assigned Edgar Anderson’s Plants, Man, 
and Life, considered the seminal book about ethnobotany since its publication in 1952.  
Students read anthropologist Robert Redfield, considered the founder of modernization 
theory, and his now-debunked – yet, in vogue among academics studying Mexico until 
the late 1960s - studies about “folk ways” among Mexican peasants giving way to 
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modernization and technology.456  Students also read literature.  In one instance, Rafael 
Ortega called one of Aldous Huxley’s books “bourgeois.”  Suggesting that Ortega’s 
contrarianism forbade him from enjoying a fine book, Hernández called him a 
“brute.”457   
 Field trips with Hernández were legendary.  In part, this was because students 
often were joined by their professor in late-night drinking binges or trips to night 
clubs.458  Trips, however, were memorable because of the learning that took place.  A 
funding proposal for a 1961 trip detailed Hernández’s method for teaching botany.  The 
class visited agricultural regions with three goals: to understand the local sources of 
research and extension at research stations; to “gain knowledge of rural populations” 
and how government research got to rural groups and their opinions “about their 
problems and how resolved the problems, and local growers’ opinion about outside 
influence into their communities”; and to understand the agronomic shortcomings 
among rural populations.  “Discussions would be held,” the proposal read, “nightly or in 
the morning before breakfast.”459  Classes spent the entire day learning - walking, 
collecting plants, quizzing one another about the scientific names of plants and their 
uses, sketching plants, and observing agriculture in all its glory.   
Observation meant saturating one’s self in agriculture: plants, the use of plants, 
soils, farmers, ecology, plants’ origins, crop marketplaces, indigenous farmers’ cultures, 
and any other attribute that could remotely be housed under the rubric of agriculture.  
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Students reported back at night or in mornings.  They held discussions among one 
another about everything they had learned and seen during the day.  For advanced 
students, Hernández dropped them off individually, to “soak” themselves in a village, 
and write a “comprehensive report of the experience” and the agriculture of the site.460  
Heaven help the student whose report failed to include scientific details like the site’s 
climate type using the Köppen climate classification system or the precise soil type of 
their site, and an informed discussion on why local populations used or failed to use a 
given cultivar.  Agriculture, in Hernández’s classes, required science and people.  It was 
never only about volume levels, tons per hectare, improved seeds, or fertilizer 
combinations.   
Peasant growers were the greatest sources for learning, without fail.  Students 
had to approach campesinos and ask questions.  Why do you dig to that specific depth 
in the soil?  What is the use of this plant?  If you do not consume the plant or use it for 
forage, is the plant decorative or does it have a religious value?  What other plants are 
grown in this region?  What is the indigenous name of the plant?  Any time students 
approached Hernández with questions about plants, he almost invariably referred them 
to the farmers: “Go ask them [campesino farmers].  I promise that they know more 
about the plant than you.”  He predicated his teaching methodology on the premise that 
students learned best about plants from those Mexicans whose life depended on plants.  
In Hernández’s view, it defied logic that peasants, whose existence depended on an 
acute familiarity with crops, could not have plenty to share about plants.   
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This methodology for teaching was not be confused with a disregard for theory.  
Agriculture, Hernández taught students, was a dialectical concept.  Adapting Hegel’s 
two-pronged thesis-antithesis model for examining phenomena and relationships of 
humans and plants, Hernández taught that agriculture – in its most prosaic sense – 
represented the meeting of man and plant to fulfill a certain need.  The need to grow 
plants could have been to avert hunger, or to fulfill a religious motivation, or any 
number of other reasons.  Contrary to a philosophy to what many ENA instructors led 
students to believe, agriculture was not a series of technical composites (e.g., soil, 
seeds, irrigation) and activities that failed to interact.  Instead, it was a complicated 
dialectic, and Hernández “said it a thousand times.”461   
Known for such eccentricity, colleagues were not surprised when Hernández 
was one of the strongest advocates for major curriculum changes at Chapingo when 
talks for doing so began in 1962.  In February, he and some colleagues began reviewing 
curriculum plans at universities in the United States, the Soviet Union, and other 
colleges in Mexico.462  Five months later, Marcos Ramírez, the new ENA director who 
arrived to replace the previous chief who had resigned after students’ demands, asked 
for more input about possible changes.  One colleague suggested that since many 
Mexican agronomists conducted their training in the United States, “I think we should 
adopt programs and systems in harmony with the United States, which will bring out 
the best in students.”  The only substantial item in the colleague’s letter involved 
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changes to some specialty classes and allocating more funds towards research.463  
Suggestions from others included opting for a semester academic calendar and closing 
the college’s preparatory school, which allowed for reducing the academic careers of 
chapingueros from seven to five years and, consequently, accelerating the number of 
agronomists to help farmers.464   
The meat of Hernández’s reply dealt was his proposition that the technical 
training should continue on campus, but it needed to be combined with an “emphasis in 
pedagogy that led to the acquisition of new knowledge, in very specific terms [of a 
campus specialty], as well as in larger context.”  A study plan should account for 
producing more técnicos, as well as generate new knowledge, with an emphasis on 
better teaching, “it must be emphasized that marked differences emerge when managing 
time towards physical-mathematical science or scientific work applied to technology 
and basic science or research,” he wrote.  Technology’s main purpose, he continued, “is 
the application of the available basic knowledge.  Consequently, education aims to give 
learners the information known in a field while providing for the application of this 
information towards a methodology for solving a practical problem, and towards 
facilitating time and resources to acquire the know-how for solving a problem.”  
Research, however, involved the generation of new basic knowledge and skills.  
“Scientific education aims to give pupils the basics…in different fields, provide a 
methodology and skillset for managing ideas, and teach the scientific method and 
science’s philosophy.”  A margin, he charged, existed between technology and research, 
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and Chapingo needed to figure out how to cultivate both técnicos and researchers.  
“Few people work in an area that straddles both fields.  But to produce capable 
graduates, Chapingo needs to differentiate the two concepts and more effectively teach” 
students.  He finished his report with recommendations of keeping the preparatory 
school and advice on restructuring classes.465   
In a report written in 1965 about the Colegio de Postgraduados’ botany 
department, he spelled out his hopes for the maturity of agricultural studies in 
Chapingo.  He began by saying that “a balanced approach is desirable in the 
development of agricultural research in Mexico.”  In early research in the country, 
“heavy emphasis is placed on plant breeding and plant pathology” and other basic 
disciplines.  But as research matures “it becomes appropriate to extend work to other 
fields of botany.”  After outlining basic fields in plant sciences, Hernández arrived at 
what he meant by expanding work in botany and demanding more of the work done at 
Chapingo (emphasis mine),  
Although research in the plant sciences is important to Mexican agriculture,  
botany as a discipline is basic in the education of Mexican plant breeders, plant  
pathologists, and soil scientists.  It would seem desirable, for example, that  
graduate students in agronomy be able to identify the major crop plants of  
Mexico.  It would seem still more important that they understand the principles  
on which identification and clarification of plants are based…the simple  
knowledge that yield of wheat increases with application of certain fertilizers at  
Chapingo should be regarded as useful but intellectually unsatisfying, for it  
leaves unanswered important questions.  How do the nutrients enter the plant?   
How are they used by the plants?   
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Such inquiries, he added, were the types of challenges that students should tackle.466  
Knowing that adding fertilizers helped a plant grow was never enough.     
By early 1963, Hernández largely sided with the students who sought 
substantive changes on campus.  Students, to be sure, did not inform his opinion of 
Chapingo’s pedagogical malaise; he had been complaining about that since the 1950s.  
But he realized the restiveness.  Thus, when the preliminary talks about Plan Chapingo 
began in the early 1963, he was optimistic that his membership on the Directive Council 
and the transformations to take place at the Escuela Nacional signaled an opportunity to 
address some concerns.   
The optimism proved short-lived.  By spring of 1963, he forwarded a note to 
Basilio Rojas, director of the Colegio de Postgraduados, making reference to the 
administration and management of scholarships that the college was to receive from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and other Plan Chapingo sponsors.  Hernández reminded Rosas 
that “whatever agreement is reached [between contributors and the college], it must 
respect the faculty’s autonomy, along with the college’s administrative and 
philosophical prerogatives.”  He added other notes: donors could recommend 
scholarship candidates, but decisions on who received scholarships and the award’s 
management remained matters of pre-established procedures; research topics remained 
a college decision; all research generated by students and college faculty should remain 
property of the school; and administration of scholarships remained in the hands of the 
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college.467  The tone of the letter to Rojas spoke to the skeptical reception that Plan 
Chapingo and foreign involvement in ENA affairs received from Hernández. 
 
ANXIOUS STUDENTS, INTERNATIONAL PHILANTROPY, AND THE FIGHT 
FOR CHAPINGO’S FUTURE 
Between early 1963 and the end of 1966, Plan Chapingo evolved from a project 
seen by some as a method for transforming the Escuela Nacional into the headquarters 
of Mexico’s agricultural future to a larger argument over what parties would dictate the 
country’s agricultural future.  Government officials spent the years in debates and 
meetings with students trying to sell the project as a method for crystallizing the 
progress that Mexican agriculture experienced during the 1950s and early 1960s.  
Students’ problem with the plan began as a procedural matter, in that they wanted to 
add input and approve of the changes to take place in Chapingo, in large part to address 
many of the issues on campus.  The discussions between government officials and 
student representatives quickly transformed into a debate, mainly on the part of some 
students, about whether foreign interests would determine the future of Mexican 
agricultural education and whether the apparatus that the Rockefeller Foundation and 
local leaders helped build in the 1950s and early 1960s (i.e., the “Green Revolution”) 
would remain in Mexico. 
Consequential student agitation of consequence began in 1963.  Early in the 
year, a deluge of complaints in Chapinguito and troubles on campus apparently 
triggered a visit from the Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock Julián Rodríguez in 
mid-July.  At the gathering, student representatives on the college’s Directive Council 
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vented their frustrations about issues on campus and the lack of consultation between 
them and SAG officials on Plan Chapingo.  Some Directive Council members said that 
a breach in legal tradition had possibly occurred when they had to find out about Plan 
Chapingo, after the agreement between parties and minus student or faculty input.  
Among the 1946 bylaws related to Chapingo becoming Mexico’s national agricultural 
college was the existence and function of the college’s student-faculty governing body.  
Council members jointly decided on campus policies, from the mundane, like 
improvements to dorms or cafeteria meals, to major curriculum overhauls.  Thus at the 
July meeting, student council members were peeved when certain faculty members 
proposed to change the student-faculty ratio of the Directive Council in what appeared 
to be a method for expediting the formality of council approval for changes vis-à-vis 
Plan Chapingo.468  To some Council members, it seemed that SAG officials and other 
Plan Chapingo partners, had skirted ENA tradition and sought to wrest autonomy away 
from students and faculty.  
Rodríguez and another meeting participant responded with an explanation about 
Plan Chapingo’s motivations and objectives.  He began by saying the Escuela Nacional 
remained a “first-rate school” and that his ministry considered ENA graduates SAG’s 
“greatest troops.” Rodríguez’s assistant then detailed how Plan Chapingo represented 
agriculture’s reorientation.  Its focus, the assistant said, was changing towards “lending 
attention” to more immediate problems, specifically increasing production and 
developing an industrial sector.  For a long time, Mexico “paid much attention towards 
crop research and, recently, research on livestock and forestry had increased.”  But the 
future of research lay in fulfilling other needs.  Mexico, the person continued, needed to 
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increase agricultural volume levels, lands in cultivation, and forest exploitation.  The 
country’s leaders wanted, to now “avoid [agricultural] imports and arrive at a place 
where it exported, particularly to Latin America.”469  Mexico found itself in an 
interesting place in its development, the official told Council members.  “It had a 
técnico reserve and human resources,” and found itself in a position to open 
international research “to help other countries, particularly in Africa, in maize and 
wheat.”  Consequently, the government took an interest in, Rodríguez said, 
“coordinating all the arms” of agricultural development.  Money and effort would be 
invested in the Colegio de Postgraduados towards generating more breakthroughs and 
ENA graduates would “form the human element” of Mexico’s agricultural future.  Plan 
Chapingo would “build the second agricultural tier atop the base of practical 
agricultural research.”  Rodríguez concluded his presentation with a reminder to 
Directive Council members that “basic production” increase was the new goal.470     
The meeting left Directive Council attendees miffed.  Efraím Hernández’s 
meeting notes consisted of questions and terse statements.  “What will be the 
philosophical bases for the Colegio de Postgraduados?”  Integration of social sciences, 
he noted.  Finally, Chapingo graduates, “must leave with more ideals and with more 
consciousness!”471  Some meeting participants appeared displeased by legal procedure, 
and two weeks after the first meeting with Rodríguez, they sought legal advice.  
Wanting clarity about how the voting composition of the Directive Council could be 
changed minus their approval, Council members agreed to have a member of the 
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Mexican Supreme Court consult about the legal grounds by which the voting scheme 
could be changed.472   
Relations between those assigned to execute Plan Chapingo and their student 
partners deteriorated thereafter.  Chapingo’s director agreed to a cancellation of the 
meeting with the Supreme Court justice on the grounds that Julián Rodríguez sought a 
closed-door session to speak with students.473  Conceding the abrupt cancellation, 
Directive Council members met again with Rodríguez, and he again used a meeting 
with students as an opportunity to pitch Plan Chapingo and allay Council members’ 
misgivings about the plan and the way SAG authorities were executing its completion.  
Reinforcing what he had explained during the previous month, Rodríguez said that the 
relationship between his office and students was of “grand importance.”  He wanted to 
“convert the Escuela Nacional into an important research-education-extension center, as 
a third national pillar” of education (the other schools with such importance being the 
National Autonomous University and the National Polytechnic Institute).   Cooperation, 
he argued, between students and authorities remained essential.  “The president (Adolfo 
López Mateos),” Rodríguez said, “in the urgency to conduct such coordination, agrees 
that an agricultural center must be located at Chapingo.”474  The government’s plan, he 
continued, “will channel influence towards all government agricultural programs, as 
well as other agricultural schools and colleges.”  He followed with a reminder to 
students of the investments made in Plan Chapingo, 100 million pesos via the Alliance 
for Progress program, the Rockefeller Foundation, and other sources.  “Timing, 
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however, remained urgent…And to get started, students and the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Livestock must be united!”475 
Students responded with a list of demands.  They mentioned their displeasure 
with the costs at school.  They mentioned a lack of discipline on campus and the desire 
for a flexible budget to help students.  “The fundamental problem,” they shared, was 
that “students want something more from their education!”  One student added that the 
school’s budget had an “arthritic management.”  The school also had high faculty and 
administrative turnover, and an unstable curriculum.  Rodríguez responded by asking 
“Is a change [Plan Chapingo] of this magnitude worth so much [trouble]?”  He also told 
students that school directors could not exist in a state of fear of students and constantly 
giving concessions.  Finally, he finished, instability existed at Chapingo in relation to its 
directors.  “You will not be students your entire lives and the Escuela Nacional will 
remain after you leave,” he charged.  The student president had the meeting’s last word: 
“We have been labeled as troublemakers and immature.  We are at the receiving end of 
injustice.”476 
The meeting ended with what seemed to be the point of contention between the 
students and the Mexican government: Who retained autonomy over the resources that 
Chapingo would receive from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the 
Alliance of Progress loans, local or foreign interests?  When Rodríguez conceded to 
respect the Directive Council votes and the student-faculty voting parity, one student 
expressed appreciation.  The student added that campus funding still remained an issue.  
He then inquired about funds from the philanthropic sponsorship.  Rodríguez responded 
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with an explanation of Plan Chapingo’s arrangement structure, “The deal made between 
sponsors and Chapingo called for autonomy on the part of sponsors’ funds, which 
would create a hybrid institution, with national and private interests.”  However, 
Rodríguez suggested, “if the sponsorship leads to a loss of control at the Escuela 
Nacional, under the watch of the Mexican government, it would be inconceivable.”477  
In the span of six months after its announcement and the celebration that followed after 
the announcement, Plan Chapingo was proving to be a thorny issue for its backers and 
students.   
Affairs between students and authorities failed to improve by the end of 1963 
and into the next year.  In his notes from a meeting in late 1963, Hernández baptized 
Plan Chapingo with a special nickname: “’Education Ford’” – alluding to the 
foundation’s sponsorship of the project.478  In the same month, Chapinguito’s cover 
photo of the college’s well-known Capilla Riveriana (named after Diego Rivera, who 
painted some of most famous Mexican Revolution-related murals inside the chapel) had 
a caption saying that the building would soon witness the college “suffer” because of 
Plan Chapingo.479   
In the same newspaper issue, students published a more substantive, Marxist-
tinged attack on Plan Chapingo.  “First, we worry about the purely philanthropic idea,” 
the editorial said.  “Philanthropic efforts, along with conspicuous consumption, 
constitute what are called ‘the costs of representation’ of monopolistic capitalists.”  The 
purpose of “representation” expenses were public relations projects, and “philanthropic 
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expenses have, as a final goal, the security of loyalty and the affection of public 
opinion.”  “One of the surprising aspects of today’s age has been the marked decline of 
these costs made by the aristocracy of the commercial world; it turns out, the role that 
the individual philanthropist plays has reduced further and further.”  This absent-yet-
present role of the aristocracy did not mean that the consequences of monopolist 
capitalism’s presence had been abolished, however.  “On the contrary,” students 
charged, “as in other aspects of capitalism’s function, certain costs have been 
institutionalized.”480  Philanthropy, the editorial continued, has been institutionalized, 
and even if foundations were the method for delivering altruism, the same sources 
exercised an influence, especially in extending private help to institutions of higher 
education.  “We should not, to be sure, presume that this a pure and simple 
philanthropy.”  Mentioning that students should already know the interests and 
nationalities of the philanthropists, the editorial mentioned that “it is particularly 
interesting to discover that Plan Chapingo relates to teaching, research, and agricultural 
extension – more or less the key aspects of Mexico’s agricultural development.”  It was 
possible, therefore, for outside interests to control Mexican agriculture.481 
The writer’s fundamental problem with Plan Chapingo was ideological.  
Investments of the nature taking place at the Escuela Nacional “are necessary to be able 
to continue with the agricultural research plans of basic products,” which represented a 
path to have the general population, and workers particularly, so well fed so that the 
time towards further developing the country’s general economy was shortchanged.  
Relative surplus value increased, they suggested, which was “nothing more than wage 
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excess extracted from the peasant masses and agricultural and industrial workers.”  
Almost as a warning to other Latin Americans, the article said that similar Rockefeller 
Foundation-government partnerships existed in Colombia and Chile, and the same 
patterns of extraction of relative surplus value occurred.  “Perhaps those who have 
modeled themselves after us [Mexicans] consider that our point of view speaks a little 
towards pessimism,” they said.  “This isn’t the case.  We only would like to point out 
that we understand and we are conscious of the situation.”  They concluded   
Let us build new buildings, let us have better laboratories, and let us improve 
teaching - all of which would be a thousand times better than what we 
previously had.  With good direction, we shall have positive advances.  We 
believe, as do many, that Plan Chapingo, in the long-term, will be useful and 
will provide the needed conditions so that agricultural higher education remain 
on a progressive path.482   
 
Students accepted Plan Chapingo, only after sharing a reluctance to do so and strong 
skepticism of the project.   
Relations between students and SAG officials worsened in the months 
afterwards.  Without any consultation from members of the Directive Council, Marcos 
Ramírez left his office as Chapingo’s director to be a spokesman for Plan Chapingo.  
SAG officials failed to properly notify Council members, particularly students, for input 
about Ramírez’s replacement, Gilberto Palacios De la Rosa.  Fed up with such 
treatment, Council members drafted a letter demanding respect for decades-long 
protocol about such matters.  It was “far from acceptable” that students exercised no 
influence concerning what happened on campus.483  Students soon began airing the 
school’s dirty laundry, conducting town-hall meetings about the college’s problems.  
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Those people who were not Directive Council members became exposed to larger 
discussions concerning items like the costs of education at Chapingo, a shortage of 
capable teachers on campus, and the change to the academia calendar.  Absent from 
meetings, according to Hernández’s notebooks, were important SAG officials and other 
Plan Chapingo powerbrokers.484 
Undeterred by the hubbub, new SAG chief (under President Gustavo Díaz 
Ordaz), Juan Gil Preciado in January of 1965 signed contracts with construction 
companies for new buildings at Chapingo.  Attending a ceremony in Mexico City were 
representatives of several construction companies, several SAG chiefs, Plan Chapingo 
spokesmen, Rockefeller Foundation representatives, Ford Foundation representatives, 
Mexico’s FAO liaison, and an official from the Inter-American Development Bank.  
They kick-started the 122-million-peso project that was two years in the making by the 
day of the occasion, to celebrate a mega-plan that would, said one reporter, “Take 
science’s advances and technical agriculture to all peasants, farmers, and ejidatarios, 
ultimately to increase agricultural production while helping the rural groups of the 
country.”485  
In the next few months, 122 million pesos escalated to 133 million pesos, and 
the job of selling Plan Chapingo continued.  Plan backers argued to ENA faculty 
members that it was time for agricultural education to be more research-driven.  Thus, it 
was high time that the research-education-extension holy trinity of Mexican agriculture 
was centralized.   All three areas would maintain their autonomy, officials promised 
faculty members.  Plan spokespersons also promised that the Directive Council and 
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governing bodies at the Colegio de Postgraduados would remain intact.  Yet, 
Hernández’s notes mention the gist of what had become another gripe about Plan 
Chapingo: discussions for its existence never happened, studies on its viability were 
never conducted, and the college appeared set to lose some of its autonomy because of 
the presence of government agencies (the National Institute for Agricultural Research 
and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock).  Loyalty would go towards the 
government, not Chapingo.  In his notes Hernández approved of the changes, adding 
that he and others needed to locate a formula that would not threaten “organizational 
ways that the college might look in the future, along with future conceptual 
organizations of the college.”  Perhaps as a method for garnering faculty support for 
Plan Chapingo, and a way of demonstrating the number of resources that went into the 
plan, faculty members received word that the government had a ten-million peso fund 
that would be allocated to all professors in the coming years.486   
Weeks later students again found themselves at the receiving of another Plan 
Chapingo marketing pitch presumably to make the plan’s completion smoother.  As a 
selling point, a plan spokesman said one of the plan’s goals was that five thousand 
students would graduate from Chapingo within the next ten years.  Making nationalistic 
appeals, officials emphasized to Council members that the plan was “beneficial to the 
country.”  They mentioned other items to palliate old concerns: students could choose 
the site for a new livestock building; all ENA issues would be referred to the Directive 
Council; and the government reopened a new fund for the school.487  
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The next month students received word that the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Livestock had an extra 2.5 million pesos that they could put towards other projects on 
campus.  Among the ideas that became the Directive Council’s focus for the next 
couple months was reopening an ENA preparatory school, which had been terminated 
when Plan Chapingo talk with students began.  The preparatory school would reorient 
the college’s social promise – it would, according to Hernández’s notes, “increase the 
probability of enrolling students of peasant extraction.”488  The Council spent the 
remainder of the year ironing details about the soon-to-be-reopened preparatory 
school.489   
Money never seemed to be a problem in Plan Chapingo.  Weeks after ironing 
out details for the preparatory school, members of the Directive Council learned how 
Mexican officials planned to spend some of the money pouring into the school.  Nearly 
two million pesos would go towards thirteen new houses on campus for faculty and 
administrators.  Graduate students would receive new dormitories.  Visiting professors 
would receive new dormitories.  Newly-donated machinery from Massey Ferguson was 
also to arrive on campus.490  A month before Council members learned about the 
financial windfall, Chapingo should have finished hosting intensive agricultural 
extension courses – covered by the Ministry of Agriculture, which had earlier signed 
donation agreements with the Ford Foundation that included a donation of 9.3 million 
pesos for the ministry’s extension department (another deal that gave 2.4 million pesos 
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to the Colegio de Postgraduados).491  As the early construction finished in 1966, 
magazine writers mentioned that the project’s cost ballooned to 135 million pesos.492      
The money and presidential visits failed to change every student’s mind.  Many 
ENA students appreciated the investments and improvements, but in mid-1966 many of 
them still expressed degree of dissatisfaction in relations to their input in school 
decisions.493  They received no substantive reaction from authorities for the remainder 
of 1966.  The year ended with a group of outspoken students expressing numerous 
complaints and Plan Chapingo in place.   
 
CONCLUSION 
Nineteen sixty-six was also the same year that Franco Gerón wrote the scathing poem to 
himself referenced at the beginning of this chapter, calling himself a traitor, 
demonstrating the level of frustration among many students in Chapingo in 1966.  He 
expressed despair towards the training he received on campus and the technocratism 
that others experienced.  His classmates expressed concern for a lack of their input in 
the transformations at school, which seemed to be converting Chapingo into a bigger 
técnico factory than it already was by 1966 and a place modeled and financed by 
sources outside of Mexico.  In 1967, the ingredients for conflict would boil into a 
national strike that involved students patrolling Chapingo with rifles while the 
government informally threatened to besiege campus.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A MOMENT OF CLARITY: THE STRIKE OF MEXICO’S 
AGRICULTURAL SCHOOLS IN 1967 AND A SYMBOLIC END OF 
THE “GREEN REVOLUTION” 
 
 
Robert Jordan: “Perhaps it is the day.  The day is good.” 
 
Agustín: “Who knows?  Perhaps it is that we will have action.”  
 
– Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls494 
 
Chapingueros jilted tradition at the opening of classes at the Escuela Nacional 
(ENA) on February 22, 1968.  Protocol at inaugurations called for students to stand at 
attention while the Mexican president, the Minister of Agriculture, or another dignitary 
read a speech and afterwards handed out awards on a platform.  But in 1968 a small 
scene ensued when a Student Council member approached the stage to give President 
Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) what amounted to a list of complaints about life at the 
college.  Guards stopped the young man from getting too close, and it appeared that 
they were going to hurt him.  Sensing that a classmate was in danger, other students 
began running towards the stage with their formation rifles in hand.  Security teams 
responded by evacuating Díaz Ordaz to his helicopter due to suspicion of an imminent 
threat.  Juan Gil Preciado, the head of the Ministry of Agriculture (SAG), finished the 
ceremony that morning with a familiar oration about students helping campesinos.495   
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No one planned to harm Díaz Ordaz at the inauguration that morning.  But in the 
eyes of the president and his assistants, there was little to be gained from allowing a 
plucky young man to hand deliver a small catalog of frustrations in front of hundreds of 
people.  More importantly, six months prior to the inauguration, chapingueros and more 
than a dozen other institutions staged a national mutiny that shut down agricultural 
schools around Mexico to the point that the military almost besieged the Escuela 
Nacional.  Thus before arriving to the campus in 1968, Díaz Ordaz and his handlers 
knew that they were walking into a combustible atmosphere and they were overly 
vigilant. 
This chapter discusses the protest that engendered the hostile environment that 
the president entered.  Using newly-available records from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
untouched records from the Ministry of the Interior, and the Efraím Hernández archive, 
this chapter chronicles the ten weeks of what I call the symbolic end to the “Green 
Revolution” in Mexico.  I argue that although the agricultural colleges’ strike during the 
summer of 1967 did not involve a massacre or immediate changes, it was a watershed 
event.496  It was the instance when the angry chapingueros discussed in the previous 
chapter joined with other people designated to deliver the “Green Revolution” to the 
Mexican countryside to demand an alteration to the direction of agricultural 
development.    
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PRELUDE TO A HUELGA 
In sharp contrast to the helicopter scene a year later, the opening of ENA classes 
on February 22, 1967, portended happy days to many people.  Workers had finished 
most of Plan Chapingo and many important people were on hand to celebrate the 
project’s completion and the beginning of classes.  Foreign ambassadors, the heads of 
other schools, government functionaries, and Mexico’s head of state arrived to see the 
college’s new library and state-of-the-art research centers.  President Díaz Ordaz told 
his audience that Mexicans’ hopes for the future were invested in its técnicos.  Juan Gil 
Preciado challenged chapingueros: “I have the most fervent wishes for each of you 
when you enter the splendid new buildings at this college, from your work in 
classrooms and in the field, you will learn how to become the crucibles” of the 
country’s agricultural destiny.  Later during tours of campus E.J. Wellhausen praised 
Plan Chapingo, saying it “opens a new stage in agricultural development.”  He added 
that the centralization of research, extension, and education – what people called the 
“Holy Trinity” - in one location would be an attraction to people from all over Latin 
America.  Three of the most important farming magazines in Mexico, as well as one 
national newspaper, fawned over Plan Chapingo and its inauguration.497   
 Chapinguito writers panned the congratulatory tone of the inauguration a couple 
days after people left the college. On the newsletter’s cover was a picture of students 
standing at attention during the February 22 ceremony.  Behind the cadets were banners 
that ENA graduates displayed for all those present to read.  The signs praised President 
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Díaz Ordaz and expressed faith in the changes his administration had instituted at the 
Escuela Nacional.  Alumni had apparently heard about complaints emanating from 
campus over the past five years (see Chapter Four) and the signs sought to undermine 
those grumbles.  Chapinguito’s caption to the picture sarcastically asked if alumni 
lacked the decency to refrain from using the opening of classes as an occasion to 
respond to unhappy students.  Pedro Zapata made a point of saying that graduates had 
“left a good amount of trash” at the college that day.  Another photograph also featured 
a biting caption.  Under an image of an entourage of alumni following Mexican 
politicians who toured Plan Chapingo installations, newsletter editors wrote “The 
opening of classes here isn’t a political gathering.  Don’t make the campus a gross 
venue for brownnosing and cheap politics.”498  Writers wished that their older 
agrónomo brethren would have toned down their mawkish adoration for Díaz Ordaz 
and the changes that his administration had begun at the Escuela Nacional.  
 Other complaints about life at school littered the newsletter.  Salvador Luna 
brought up an old topic: the lack of social science courses at school.  “We learn,” he 
wrote, “how to identify plant diseases and how to improve seeds.  [We learn] new 
farming methods, and in general, we know how to increase crop yields.  But only a few 
of us worry if our research ever reaches the people who could benefit from it.”  If 
students tried to worry about research translating well in the countryside, Luna 
continued, “it becomes difficult for us to ponder.  This is a symptom of a lack of social 
training.”499  The message was that students lacked a social consciousness or a concern 
about whether or not the material they studied helped peasant farmers.  A different 
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article was an interview with a professor who said that students left school as well-
prepared técnicos, but unprepared to work in the real world because of their “ignorance 
about human relations.”  When interviewers asked if the lack of “cultural training” 
affected the campus environment and chapingueros’ professional lives in the future, the 
professor responded, “Of course.”500   
 New issues accompanied these older problems in 1967.  Students argued with 
one another about hazing (novatadas).  One writer encouraged classmates to behave 
like humans and abandon the tradition, which included beatings and staged drownings 
for new arrivals (labeled pelones for the mandatory buzz cut that they received).501  The 
hazing problem devolved into violence eventually when one day pelones rose up so 
fiercely that one Chapinguito writer asked those who incited the uprising to find a 
“sane” route to address novatadas.502  Also by 1967, school administrators began 
regularly admitting women, which heightened the anxieties of some at the college.503  
To complicate life further, the Ministry of Agriculture brought the Cold War to the 
school in February.  Ricardo Acosta, the SAG Vice Minister, began asking for the 
identity of writers for a leftist newsletter on campus.  Mocking Acosta and his search, 
Pedro Zapata warned his clandestine peers to “take note” of the communist hunt that 
was under way.504  Chapingo in early 1967, then, was a hub of edgy young adults who 
all but begged for an incident that would allow them to let off some steam.   
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 But the problems on campus could not slow down the attention that the world 
continued to give Mexico because of its agricultural development.  As in years past, 
people from all around the world continued to witness the agricultural marvel occurring 
south of the Rio Grande.  A month after Acosta began his search for communists, Food 
and Agricultural Organization representatives from Iran, Africa, the United States, 
Venezuela, and India stopped at the Escuela Nacional.  One member of the group said 
that they were “summarily pleased” with the host country’s progress and its projects 
with other nations.505  United Nations experts shared similar words weeks later, saying 
that Mexico’s advances in agriculture over recent years helped facilitate economic 
industrialization.506  On May 3, SAG heads sealed separate deals with officials from 
Pakistan and Turkey to sell improved wheat seeds.  Mexico’s Minister of Agriculture 
gave his Asian partners a tour of the Escuela Nacional after finalizing the transactions.  
Ahms Doha, Pakistan’s Minister of Agriculture, commented that work done at the 
college would benefit rural families and “give impulse” to crop production.507   
A disruption to the golden years of Mexican agriculture had already begun, 
however.508  The same month that Gil Preciado gave tours and accepted praise for his 
country’s improvements, ENA Student Council members agreed to not use some of the 
new facilities that arrived because of Plan Chapingo.  They thought that the new U.S.-
style student lounge with televisions and a bowling alley contrasted too strongly with 
the peasant conditions of the Mexican countryside.509  At the same time, students at 
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“Hermanos Escobar” Agricultural College in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, were finalizing 
a scheme for taking over their college via force.  Anxious chapingueros and those 
concocting plans in Chihuahua would soon fuse their frustrations. 
 
“HERMANOS ESCOBAR”  
Before the spring of 1967, many people regarded “Hermanos Escobar” 
Agricultural College (ESAHE) as one of the four premier agricultural colleges in 
Mexico (the others were Chapingo, the “Antonio Narro” College in Saltillo, Coahuila, 
and the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education).510  After graduating 
from the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura, Rómulo and Numa Escobar became 
respected agronomists and eventually made a fortune in the publishing business during 
the porfiriato (1876-1910).511  They generated enough wealth that in 1906 they 
ventured into philanthropy and founded a small private agricultural school in Ciudad 
Juárez, Chihuahua.  The university eventually adopted the name of its founders and 
people knew it as “Hermanos Escobar.”  For years, the school attracted young people 
from all over and its graduates earned respect in professional circles. 
But “Escobar” students began demonstrations that undermined this prestige in 
1957.  That year, undergraduates staged the first of several revolts that continued over 
the next decade.  One conflict reached the point that administrators in President Adolfo 
López Mateos’s (1958-1964) cabinet personally intervened.512  Authorities heard the 
                                                
510 On the history of agricultural schools, see Juan Manuel Zepeda del Valle, “Estudio histórico de la 
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same grievances in each protest.  Students railed against the quality of teaching at the 
college.  Like Chapingo, pedagogy in Ciudad Juárez revolved around rote memorization 
and bookwork, with instructors failing to teach basic and applied research.513  The 
college’s facilities left much to be desired, as there was a shortage of classrooms and 
laboratories.  College administrators also reportedly lent tractors and plows to school 
donors rather than students.514  The facilities were such disgraces that during the 1967 
shutdown people entertained the idea of burning down a dormitory because its 
conditions were so poor that nobody would miss the building.515  The biggest problem 
by 1967 was alleged financial malfeasance by the Escobar family, or what unhappy 
cebolleros (ESAHE students’ nickname) called “Compañía Escobar.”  According to 
what students later told a newspaper, the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture doled out a 
250,000-peso appropriation to “Compañía Escobar” every year with the intention that 
the money would translate into improvements at the institution.  Instead, this subsidy 
found its way to the pockets of the Escobar family who managed the school “like a 
lucrative business,” students later said.516     
                                                                                                                                          
Histórico: This folder contains copies of documents belonging to the Archivo General de la Nación 
(AGN).  In my search for these records, I consulted more than one record group and spoke with at least 
three archivists at the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City.  This pursuit included showing 
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finding aid.  Still, the folder in question was not available.  According to communication with an author 
who has cited the folder in question, these are, indeed, AGN records.  Said historian cited the material in 
this manner: “AGN, box 16, folder 4 (103 G-12), June 1967-August 1969.”  The Archivo Histórico folder 
of these documents is labeled in this manner: “[AGN], box 136, folder 4 (103 G-12), June 1967-August 
1969.”  I have concluded that these documents are not yet available to the public and that said historian 
knows an AGN employee who sent him copies.  It is also possible that the author inadvertently indicated 
box “16” instead of box “136” in their citation.     
513 Núñez, 1967, 68. 
514 Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 12, 1967, Investigaciones Políticos 
y Sociales (IPS hereafter), box 1452B, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN hereafter), Mexico City, 
Mexico (Mexico City hereafter); “Manifiesto a la Opinión de los Estudiantes del I.P.N.,” June 28, 1967, 
IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City.    
515 Ortega, 1967, 27. 
516 “Estado de Chihuahua,” May 29, 1967, Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo. 
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Other topics and rumors fueled anxiety on campus.  According to Pablo Martell, 
some malcontents in Ciudad Juárez talked about the poor state of education in Mexico 
and controversies at other colleges.  They heard rumors about a cabal of mobsters who 
managed the University of Guadalajara and about instances of student repression in 
Sonora and Michoacán.  They also got wind of the efforts to shut down the Escuela 
Nacional’s preparatory college and chapingueros’ less-than-warm reception for Plan 
Chapingo.  One bit of gossip that piqued the interests of Martell and others involved 
stories related to former Minister of Agriculture, Julián Rodríguez.  The rumor at 
agronomy colleges was that Rodríguez, an “Escobar” graduate and one of the three 
movers behind Plan Chapingo (the others were Juan Gil Preciado, Minister of 
Agriculture in 1967, and Marcos Ramírez, ENA director for a short while before 
chapingueros demanded that he leave and played music as he left school grounds), had 
close financial ties to a transnational agribusiness, Anderson Clayton.517   
These discussions and rumors stoked the suspicions of a small group of ESAHE 
students in early 1967 and the most agitated eventually hatched what Martell later 
called an “unorthodox” plan.518  They formed an underground group that they named 
“Avante” (“Forward”).  Members held secret meetings in which attendees discussed 
problems in Mexican colleges and more immediate issues like how to address the 
problems on their own campus.  Related to both topics, they talked about the 1918 
youth movement in Argentina, a protest that was a catalyst for the modernization and 
                                                
517 Pablo Martell Santos, 1967, 11-13.  About those who led Plan Chapingo, see Colegio de 
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518 Martell, 1967, 14.
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democratization of colleges throughout Latin America.519  Avante leaders soon decided 
to take action and they put together a network of couriers that they sent to colleges 
throughout Mexico.  The messengers’ goal was to “generate national solidarity” with 
anxious students around the country and spread the word that something was in the 
works in Ciudad Juárez, according to Martell.  By the spring of 1967, the messengers 
had established contact with groups in several places: the Federation of Chihuahua 
Students in their home state, chapingueros at the Escuela Nacional in the State of 
Mexico, students at the University of Guadalajara in Jalisco, others at the College of 
Agronomy in Ciudad Mante in Tamaulipas, and young people in rural agricultural high 
schools and colleges in several states.520   
Avante members staged what Martell later called a “revolution” on May 8, 
1967.  He and others arrived to campus that morning with hundreds of fliers and two 
hundred baseball bats.  Restaging their own version of Martin Luther’s hanging of the 
Ninety-Five Theses, Avante leaders hung a notice at ESAHE gates indicating that the 
college remained closed while a meeting took place in the school’s auditorium.  
Students at the gathering debated whether or not they should shut down their college.  
By the time discussions ended and a vote had taken place, ninety percent of those who 
had voted agreed to support a closure and decided that the university would remain 
inaccessible until the federal government took over management of the institution.  
Those with baseball bats cleared people off campus, took control of the school’s 
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entrance, and began patrolling on the grounds.521  Avante’s baptism into rebellion on 
May 8 initiated a movement for the federalization of a premier private college in 
arguably Mexico’s most capitalist region and secured control over the same institution 
via force.   
Things advanced slowly after the initial putsch.  After dispatching classmates to 
Chapingo and other places to explain the situation in Ciudad Juárez, members of a 
newly-formed ESAHE Strike Committee attempted to have a meeting with SAG chief 
Juan Gil Preciado.  He refused to talk and instead sent members of his staff for a 
fruitless meeting on May 18.  Eight days later, twenty cebolleros began a public hunger 
strike because Gil Preciado failed to give them an audience and classmates had received 
threats that the army would “crush” them if the unruliness continued on campus.  On 
May 29, other students traveled to Chihuahua’s capital to see the governor for a meeting 
that never happened.522  Thus, a little more than three weeks after the start of their 
“revolution,” Avante’s leaders found themselves snubbed by the governor, threatened 
with military intervention, and ignored by the head of the one government agency with 
whom they wanted to talk.         
The cold shoulder from the Ministry of Agriculture was not an accident.  Juan 
Gil Preciado, the agency’s chief, had two reasons for ignoring the insurrection on his 
hands.  First, he was a political heavyweight with more than three decades of success in 
the treacherous world of Mexican politics.  By the age of eighteen, he helped run an 
elementary school in his home state of Jalisco.  After a stint in the military, he worked 
as an administrator at the University of Guadalajara, as a political party leader in the 
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same city, and as a director in Mexico’s national agrarian reform agency.  By 1953, the 
ambitious tapatío won a seat in his home state’s local Congress and a few years later 
became governor of Jalisco.  His promotion to Minister of Agriculture in 1964 was 
another stop in a successful career that could hypothetically lead to the presidency.523  
For a man with the political ambitions and record like Gil Preciado, cebolleros must 
have seemed like a nuisance to be brushed aside.   
The second and more important explanation for Gil Preciado’s lack of urgency 
to negotiate with ESAHE representatives was because by the end of May he had inside 
knowledge of the anarchy on his hands.  Like his colleagues in Gustavo Díaz Ordaz’s 
administration, Gil Preciado blurred ethical lines in the hunt for communists in Mexico 
during the Cold War.  After it became known that cebolleros had opened dialogue with 
other schools, he put together an informant network to ensure things did not get out of 
control.  SAG supervisors oversaw a ring of informants – unflatteringly called perros de 
oreja (watchdogs) - that covered at least seventeen agricultural schools in no fewer than 
sixteen states.524  Spies, who were likely students, attended student meetings and later 
reported to Gil Preciado’s ministry about talks at schools and the support that students 
around the country expressed for the protest in Ciudad Juárez.  The first report from 
Chihuahua arrived to Mexico City on May 29.     
Gil Preciado had few reasons to worry based on the content of the earliest 
reports.  Records from May 30 indicated that activities in Ciudad Juárez carried on 
“calmly.”  At “Escobar,” the college’s president griped about strikers’ burning of 
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wooden workstations (to provide light at night and to give warmth for those who 
patrolled campus at night) and their slaughtering of goats that belonged to the college 
(for food).  Things fared just as poorly off campus.  Some huelguistas (strikers) ended a 
hunger protest in exchange for news that authorities in Mexico City would relay their 
grievances to President Díaz Ordaz.  Some of their classmates boarded a bus, reporting 
that they intended to force a meeting with President Díaz Ordaz in Mazatlán, Sinaloa, or 
to carry out a hunger spectacle in Mexico’s capital if a discussion with a high 
government representative failed to take place.525  Neither the meeting with the 
president nor the protest in the country’s capital occurred.  Instead on June 2, these 
cebolleros found themselves being taken to a hospital to get treatment for malnutrition.  
The next day a local newspaper published a story saying that those refusing to eat 
engaged in a spectacle that was “pure farce” and cheated public sympathies because 
classmates reportedly brought them meals.  Notwithstanding a loud public rally that 
included a total of thirty people in its audience, Avante’s insurrection looked more like 
a tantrum than a revolution by June 3.526     
That day’s notes contained news that may have interested Gil Preciado, 
however.  Pablo Martell, Vice President of the “Escobar” Strike Committee, boarded an 
Aeronaves airplane bound for Mexico City on the evening of June 2.527  He and 
classmates appeared in the correspondence from SAG spies at the Escuela Nacional the 
next day.  In the same update was news that eight representatives of the National 
Student Federation of Agricultural and Forestry Sciences (FNECAF), a network of 
activist college and high school students from seventeen schools around the country, 
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also arrived on campus.  The visitors spent a good portion of the day in preliminary 
talks with the ENA Student Council about the possibility of transforming the 
happenings in Chihuahua into a general strike at FNECAF affiliates.528  Gil Preciado 
would have a headache on his hands if Chapingo, the symbol of agricultural 
modernization in the “developing” world, and more than a dozen other institutions 
decided to join forces in a general walkout.   
 
A NATIONAL STRIKE IS BORN 
The Escuela Nacional pulsed with tension before FNECAF representatives 
arrived.  About one week after the start of troubles in Ciudad Juárez, a handful of ENA 
students learned about the happenings up north while they traveled back to Mexico City 
after a field trip with Efraím Hernández.  After returning to campus, Student Council 
members approached Gilberto Palacios De la Rosa, their college’s director, about 
lending support to those in Chihuahua.  Palacios De la Rosa allowed Council members 
and SAG employees to discuss the idea of supporting “Escobar” students on May 15.529  
Ministry spokesmen disappointed a handful of those at the meeting when they explained 
that their agency held no legal grounds for federalizing “Escobar.”530  This explanation 
failed to placate some of those in the auditorium who found it obtuse that officials could 
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not intervene in a situation involving misappropriation of funds from their office.  
Although two chapingueros left to “Escobar,” the Escuela Nacional stayed out of the 
business up north through May.  But ingredients for conflict – the shutdown in 
Chihuahua, animosity vis-à-vis Plan Chapingo, and the apparent disinterestedness of 
their government towards fraud – remained in Chapingo. 
Things changed quickly after Martell and FNECAF representatives arrived 
asking for a general strike at the Escuela Nacional on Saturday, June 3.  FNECAF 
members met twice that day to discuss a nation-wide protest.  According to the perro at 
the college, despite “ample discussions,” strong rhetoric on campus that day (one person 
called “Escobar” a “pedagogical plantation”), and signs of support for expanding the 
protest, chapingueros could not agree and settled on having more talks in two days.531  
In the meantime, cebolleros in Ciudad Juárez dealt with local newspaper writers calling 
them “phony communist agitators” and other people calling them vandals.532      
June 5 proved to be the decisive date at the Escuela Nacional.  According to the 
on-site informant, FNECAF representatives met at Chapingo in the afternoon and 
agreed to send a notice to President Díaz Ordaz, indicating that the government had 
forty-eight hours to intervene in Ciudad Juárez or else disorder would ensue in several 
places.  This, of course, represented a weak threat since ENA students, attendees of the 
country’s most important agricultural school, had yet to commit to the movement up 
north.  But immediately after dinner on June 5, Student Council members arranged for 
much of campus electricity to be disabled as a signal to everyone that an important 
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meeting had begun in their main auditorium.  After a contentious debate that went past 
midnight, the majority of chapingueros agreed to support a stoppage of all activities on 
campus that would remain in place until the government federalized “Escobar.”533        
A national movement appeared unnecessary before the news arrived in 
Chihuahua, however.  Hours after many chapingueros returned to their rooms following 
their crucial vote, a Ciudad Juárez newspaper reported that people in Juan Gil 
Preciado’s office and others from Mexico’s Ministry of Public Education agreed to sit 
between protestors and the Escobar family to hash out an end to the conflict within one 
week.  The article also mentioned that the Escobars agreed to cede their college to 
government management after authorities promised to recognize the family’s 
“investments and [their college’s] prestige.”  Picketers, according to an informant, had 
cancelled rallies around the city that day and things on campus carried on “calmly.”534     
But it was too late for calmness outside of Mexico City.  Almost immediately 
after their decision to support “Escobar” students, chapingueros hung a roji-negra 
protest flag outside the school’s gates, suspended classes, and took over the college.  
Many of them began shifts at Chapingo’s main entrance to monitor who entered and 
exited.  With the exception of administrators and “kitchen personnel,” all researchers 
and professors could not walk onto campus.535  The takeover made it impossible for 
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investigators to work at the National Institute for Agricultural Research and the 
National Extension Center, and for the Colegio de Postgraduados to hold classes.  Each 
part of Plan Chapingo’s “Holy Trinity” - research, extension, and education - ceased to 
function.  The gigantic, internationally-financed project in which Mexicans (and foreign 
experts) had invested their hopes and money for the country’s agricultural future 
screeched to a halt.  Operations that had opened in late February did not make it to June 
6.   
The strike became a national phenomenon and much of agricultural education 
came to a standstill over the next couple days.536  Within forty-eight hours of 
Chapingo’s closure, eight cebolleros finalized plans to stage a hunger strike at Mexico’s 
largest university, and the strike also became a topic among members of the National 
Federation of Technical Engineers, the National Center for Democratic Students, as 
well as the Mexican Communist Party.537  By June 10, the University of Guadalajara 
(UG) shut down.  Students there voted to walk and “in orderly fashion,” said one perro, 
gave faculty time to gather belongings before hanging a roji-negra flag on campus.538  
Other schools in Nuevo León, Guanajuato, Tamaulipas, and Guerrero ceased operations 
within two days of the closure at the University of Guadalajara.539  At the “Antonio 
Narro” Agricultural College in Coahuila students refused to take scheduled exams, hung 
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a flag at the school’s entrances, and forbade most people from entering and exiting 
within a week after the general protest began.540  During the same days, FNECAF 
leaders also began efforts to spread word about their uproar by visiting union houses in 
Chihuahua to ask for support..541  A newspaper headline from Ciudad Juárez on June 12 
captured the gravity of what had taken place over the last few days: “The Strike Affects 
5,000 Students.”542        
 The mutiny grew in intensity and geographic breadth over the next two weeks.  
Two days after writers said that 5,000 people were affected by the strike, one SAG 
agent reportedly told strikers that “it was not difficult for him to have federal troops 
stationed in Sonora travel to Ciudad Juárez to pacify a group of ten agitators.”543  
“Narro” students canvassed city streets to publicize the protest via megaphones, and 
collect donations one day after strikers received threats about the military being 
unleashed on protestors.544  Reports from the next couple days detailed the strike’s 
reach by June 20: the University of Michoacán was shut down; thirty-three rural schools 
in several states halted classes; hundreds of supporters took to Guanajuato’s streets to 
ask for donations; in Oaxaca, a state college shut down and local Ejido Bank employees 
began a donation campaign for the strike; and in Mexico City, fliers denounced 
government officials’ refusal to negotiate with students.545  One newspaper indicated 
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that one rally speaker said that no fewer than ten thousand people were affected by what 
was taking place all over Mexico (double the estimate from another source days earlier).  
This same paper also noted that protestors claimed that they expected three hundred 
thousand college attendees everywhere to support their cause if the military intervened 
in the conflict.546  Avante’s protest that began with baseball bats in early May had 
transformed into a national news item that threatened to become a massive youth 
movement by early mid-June.   
 
 
Image 5.1  Strikers in Ciudad Juárez (from Biblioteca Central, Universidad Autónoma Chapingo).547 
 
Two of the most widely circulated farming magazines published editorials that 
confirmed the uproar taking place in the country.  Tierra, the Mexican government’s 
journal for rank-and-file readers, ran a piece that subliminally accused students of 
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abandoning farmers.548  An editorial in México Agrícola showed no mercy for those up 
in arms.  Those out in the streets and outside of their classrooms did so because of 
“whimsical caprice,” not because of poor teachers and bad facilities in Ciudad Juárez, 
said the writer.  He also dismissed all “fabricated complaints” from strikers who had 
failed to bring government officials to the negotiating table by the day he had written 
his piece (June 25).549 
 Magazine readers could not fault the editorial’s passion, but they could have 
critiqued its accuracy.  Far from snubbing protestors, the Mexican government tried to 
squelch the clamor taking place soon after June 6.  El Fronterizo reported on June 11 
that high-ranking SAG representatives found that strikers’ demands “appeared logical” 
and agreed to discuss changes.550  Days after the Escuela Nacional joined the huelga, an 
unhappy Ricardo Acosta told FNECAF members that plans were in the works to end the 
protest.  He included comments about the demonstration lacking justification – troubles 
in Chapingo took place because of “permanent troublemakers” (read, communists) on 
campus, he said – and other words about changing the membership of the ENA Student 
Council.551  Officials suspended all services (food and laundry) at Chapingo and sat for 
at least one other unrewarding meeting with students a week after Acosta’s less-than-
happy words.552  The acerbic editorial in México Agrícola, therefore, amounted to a 
misinformed rant with no insight about how serious the government regarded the fracas.   
                                                
548 “Editorial, Enseñanza Agrícola,” Tierra XXII, no. 6 (June 1967), 415. 
549 “Editorial, Una Huelga sin Justificación,” México Agrícola XIV, no. 160 (June 1967), 7. 
550 “Estado de Chihuahua,” June 12, 1967, Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo. 
551 “Escuela Nacional de Agricultura,” June 12, 1967, Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo.  The same 
report indicates that students tried to have a meeting with former president Lázaro Cárdenas. 
552 “Señor Si… [unintelligible in report],” June 18, 1967, Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo; 
“[unintelligible text], NO DELINCUENTES,” June 18, 1967, Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo; 
“Principales acontecimientos derivados del conflicto planteado por los alumnos de la Escuela Superior de 
Agricultura ‘Hermanos Escobar’, de Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, al día 20 de junio,” June 20, 1967, 
253 
The author’s dismissive tone was wrong on another front.  Strikers displayed 
levels of organization that exceeded a sophomoric tantrum based on “whimsical 
caprice.”  Immediately after their June 5 vote, chapingueros coordinated patrol teams 
that guarded campus twenty-four hours a day during the school’s closure.  They also 
designated teams to clean campus, to help with the laundry, and to take care of meal 
preparation.  In relation to the latter task, those who refused to leave campus feasted on 
poultry and cattle that belonged to the college, and received provisions from 
sympathetic professors.  For those students who detested the over-the-top military 
atmosphere in Chapingo, the suspension of food deliveries provided them poetic justice 
because they ate a prized horse that belonged to one of their drill instructors.  Everyone 
who stayed at the Escuela Nacional had to work, said Francisco Romahn de la Vega, 
“Those who did not work could not be fed.  Everything…fell on students.”553   
Thus, while many frustrated young people in “developed” countries sought to 
transcend the world by attending concerts and dabbling in drugs during the Summer of 
Love, thousands of youth in Mexico took material action to transform their own realities 
in 1967.  A handful of agronomy students succeeded in putting the brakes on 
agricultural education.  They also figured how to fend for themselves while their 
government refused to engage in substantive negotiations.  What was more, students 
carried out their small coup only months after Plan Chapingo’s inauguration, which had 
represented the beginning of Mexico’s agricultural future in the minds of many people.   
                                                                                                                                          
Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo; “Escuela Nacional de Agricultura de Chapingo,” June 20, 1967, 
Archivo Histórico, UACh, Chapingo. 
553 Francisco Romahn de la Vega, Chapingo estudiantil en movimiento, 114-115; Núñez, 1967, 116.  
Chapingueras were a big help in preparing meals for strikers on campus.  Those in Ciudad Juárez were 
not so lucky when it came to food.  While they survived on ESAHE animals, they also had to institute 
rations. 
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THE LANGUAGE OF A STRIKE AGAINST A “STAGNANT” EDUCATION 
 Other than showing support for ESAHE students, why did the movement take 
off quickly?  What was at stake to strikers?  If officials at the Ministry of Agriculture 
paid attention to the quotes from rallies and other propaganda contained in the small 
cascade of reports arriving to their office in May and June, they would have found 
answers to both of these questions and could have gleaned three larger conclusions.  
First, they would have noted that the education system they oversaw – SAG chiefs, not 
officials in the Ministry of Public Education, managed agronomic training since the 
1940s - suffered from severe maladies.  Gil Preciado and company would have also 
noticed that huelguistas argued that the agricultural progress that so many people had 
championed for years failed to help peasants.  Finally, SAG officials would have picked 
up that protestors were so bent on reshaping the future of agricultural development that 
they were willing to face the military.     
 Whereas authorities gave lukewarm attention to chapingueros’ complaints about 
lackluster teaching and poor curriculum during the early 1960s, the 1967 uprising made 
it clear that fundamental flaws existed in all of Mexico’s schools.  At a rally in Hidalgo 
Park in Ciudad Juárez on June 7, Miguel Valdiviezo said that the education at 
“Escobar” lacked dynamism; in his words, training was “stagnant.”554  His partners 
shared similar words days later.  After denouncing “Compañía Escobar,” they 
complained about academic shortcomings and a scarcity of practical studies in Ciudad 
Juárez.555  In Guadalajara on June 12, José Alatorre assailed the Escobar family’s 
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profiteering and added that his and others’ cause “battled for the improvement and 
uniformity of all curriculum plans” everywhere.556  The same day an informant in 
Nuevo León recorded similar comments about educational inertia, noting that protestors 
said institutions everywhere remained behind the times by at least twenty-five years.557  
Two days later Rafael Ortega told more than one hundred people that national education 
suffered from a “gigantic lag.”558   
Such criticisms and thoughts had formerly been limited to ENA newsletters and 
dorm rooms or to small brouhahas in Chapingo during the early 1960s.  But in the 
summer of 1967 the critiques emanated from protests in Guadalajara, Nuevo León, and 
Chihuahua and support for the movement resonated with students in Morelos, 
Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Oaxaca.  The fight to federalize “Escobar,” therefore, 
represented a crisis that assembled soon-to-be agronomists to talk and inventory 
problems at their respective institutions.  In the process, many of them discovered that 
they shared the same frustrations about the same problems, namely that the educational 
infrastructure that their government began building in the 1940s was flimsy and 
obsolete.   
 Strikers, however, did more than confirm that problems existed.  They made 
larger indictments about how the poor educational infrastructure spelled trouble for the 
future because it failed to align with Mexico’s rural realities.  At a rally in Ciudad 
Juárez on June 7, José Luis Escobedo told listeners that the huelga was “the people’s 
fight because Chihuahua and Mexico stood to benefit” from improvement in colleges.559  
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Two days later, FNECAF leaders crafted a letter blasting agricultural education.  
Curriculum everywhere was designed by people “who had no global vision about the 
country’s needs.”  Hence, students received the same degree for the same profession, 
minus uniformity or a system of accountability for quality, which resulted in the 
majority of institutions finding themselves in a “frankly unsustainable situation.”  
Schools lacked minimal needs, and consequently, “those who graduate are not equipped 
to deal with the problems in national agriculture.”  Furthermore, strikers wrote, “We are 
firmly convinced that agricultural education…demands decisive and informed changes, 
an overhaul.”560  Rally leaders expressed similar thoughts at a demonstration on June 
10.  After setting up their mobile sound equipment, huelguistas told an audience that 
their movement centered on “faith in a bright future” and concern for the next 
generation of agronomists.  They also renounced the Escobar family’s misdeeds and 
their lack of care for the type of graduates their college trained.561  One sign in Ciudad 
Juárez summarized complaints in the summer of 1967: “A profession is incomplete 
when its training disclaims teaching.”562 
So that their message would resonate, those up in arms appropriated the 
language of Mexico’s ruling party to make their point; that is, they linked their cause to 
peasants.  At a rally in Ciudad Juárez on June 7, Jorge Hernández took the microphone 
to say that he and his comrades fought for “a better education that trained agronomists 
to better serve campesinos.”563  In another part of the city days later, Miguel Valdiviezo 
told a crowd of more than one hundred people that the government failed to design a 
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training system that delivered the “advice that peasants [really] needed.”564  Strike 
Committee members in Chapingo sent a note to newspapers responding to criticisms 
from members of Mexico’s Agronomic Society four days after Valdiviezo’s words in 
Ciudad Juárez.  According to the letter, part of the strike was “aimed at overcoming 
obstacles in agricultural education… and putting education within the reach of the 
people.”565   
By linking their protest to campesinos, FNECAF leaders disrupted political 
rhetoric in the 1960s.  For decades, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional owned the 
privilege of speaking for peasants.  Party officials based their legitimacy on the premise 
that they knew what was best for campesinos.  Consequently, people presumed that 
politician’s decades-long celebration about agricultural progress – the period that began 
in 1943 when the Mexican Agricultural Program began and continued with Plan 
Chapingo’s inauguration in 1967 - constituted proof that PRI officials knew what they 
were doing and that peasant redemption was forthcoming.  Strikers in 1967, however, 
dismantled this presumption.  They told the public that the work celebrated by PRI 
leaders, as well as those in the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the 
other institutions who advised and financed Mexico’s quarter decade of agronomic 
advances amounted to more smoke and mirrors than material changes in the 
countryside.  
To bolster their arguments, students also told the country that they were willing 
to die for their movement.  In response to one critic who said that the government 
should send in the army to end the conflict, one informant reported that strikers said 
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they were not afraid.  “Whatever happens, happens,” Edward Merrem said at a June 14 
public rally at a monument for national hero Benito Juárez in Ciudad Juárez.  He also 
told his audience of 140 people that if the government’s answer to huelguistas’ 
“justified demands” was military intervention, students were not scared.  They were 
prepared “to put their flesh to bayonets for the triumph of their cause.”566   
An informed historian today recognizes the strike of 1967 as a refutation of the 
“Green Revolution” and high modernism.  If we consider the “Revolution” a system 
built on the belief that technical solutions could solve complex problems, then it should 
be clear that strikers were articulating the failure of such dogma in 1967.  It should not 
be difficult to see that students rendered the scheme that the Rockefeller Foundation 
introduced and that the Mexican government wholeheartedly championed for nearly 
three decades as a collective failure because it failed to help the millions of farmers who 
people presumed were benefitting from hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilizers, and other 
awesome technologies: peasants. What is more, protestors were so adamant about 
altering the direction of agricultural development that they were willing to face the 
military.    
 
REVIVAL, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND THE END OF A STRIKE 
 Due to students’ conviction in early and mid-June, the strike dragged on for 
weeks before it ended on July 15.  Some colleges began discussions about returning to 
normalcy when administrators and students began to realize how much disruption the 
strike had caused to the academic year.  When it appeared that things would end with no 
solution to the situation in Ciudad Juárez and redress for other grievances, the National 
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Polytechnic Institute (IPN; the “Poli”) joined en masse on June 29.567  IPN students’ 
talks of radicalizing and transforming the agricultural colleges’ protest into a youth 
movement prompted authorities to refrain from a military invasion at the Escuela 
Nacional and to negotiate with FNECAF leaders.  ENA faculty members also played a 
role in helping seal a peaceful end to the strike.  More importantly, faculty members 
realized that the changes that had taken place at their college since the 1950s (i.e., 
Chapingo’s transformation into the institutional vanguard of the “Green Revolution”; 
see Chapter Four) had an underbelly. 
 Relevant talks for ending the conflict began on June 28 when a handful of 
professors in Chapingo met with SAG Vice Minister Ricardo Acosta.  At Juan Gil 
Preciado’s request, Acosta met with Efraím Hernández and colleagues solely to gather 
information.  Instead of gathering information, the Vice Minister talked to professors 
and displayed Cold War authoritarianism.  After some teachers offered their opinions, 
Acosta explained his Ministry’s intransigence up to that date.  Officials could not 
intervene in Ciudad Juárez to “Sovietize” a private college because of legal procedures, 
he said.  Perhaps to underscore how the strike was exacerbating tensions at his campus 
and thus to encourage talks to end the rebellion, ENA Director Gilberto Palacios De la 
Rosa added that some chapingueros had begun talks about staging a counterstrike.  
Acosta responded with his ministry’s reading of the situation in Chapingo: a group 
“dedicated to periodically harass authorities existed” on campus and this same group 
was a communist cell with its own newsletter, Autocrítica (a search for newsletter 
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authors began in February of 1967, as mentioned earlier).  The existence of Marxist 
agitators on campus gave the Ministry of Agriculture “plenty of authority” to end the 
protest, but chose not to get involved “precipitously,” said the Vice Minister.  After 
fielding a few comments from professors, the minister adjourned the conference by 
bluntly telling faculty that they should support the government, work with the available 
resources, research the possibility of revising education policies, and repudiate the 
madness taking place.568   
Thus, the first meeting to end the strike amounted to an exercise in faculty 
members’ patience for bureaucratic authoritarianism instead of discussion of 
substantive issues.  According to Acosta, his agency could not intervene in Ciudad 
Juárez because of constitutional procedures, but the ministry could intervene at the 
Escuela Nacional because of the existence of communist agitators on campus.  Put 
another way, the government saw the anarchy at hand around the country as youthful 
frustration inspired by leftist activists and not about addressing frustrations in education 
or helping peasants, as strikers purported.  To his credit, Acosta was correct in his 
assertion that Chapingo had a small group of Marxists that published Autocrítica.  But 
he somehow failed to read the tea leaves in the reports from his perros de oreja.  Rarely 
did reports mention class struggle, socialism, or Marxism.  Instead, SAG informants 
highlighted items that should have sounded familiar to Acosta, ENA administrators and 
professors, and anyone near Chapingo for the last eight years.  Strikers decried 
pedagogical stagnation and demanded a new approach to agricultural education and 
planning.  Efraím Hernández’s notes from the first meeting captured the different 
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interpretations vis-à-vis the huelga’s causes.  Following Acosta’s bit about communists, 
Hernández wrote a rhetorical question and answer to the Vice Minister: “What about 
education’s disorder?  It is real!”     
Another meeting with better results and more Red-baiting took place two days 
later.  After attendees shared ideas, Acosta said that there would be no budging on the 
part of the government towards federalizing “Escobar” because of lack of funds and 
because of certain legalities.  He then repeated suggestions from the previous gathering, 
intimating that a brand of communism, particularly one inspired by Che Guevara and 
Fidel Castro, existed in Mexico.  Teasing the minister, Hernández again wrote another 
sarcastic note to himself: “[Acosta] repeats [his] ‘007 Acosta versus SMERSH’ story.’”  
Hernández likened the Ministry of Agriculture’s crusade against communists to Ian 
Fleming’s James Bond novels and the main character’s fight against a Soviet spy 
agency known as SMERSH.  Faculty eventually received permission to form a 
mediation committee to hear out FNECAF representatives and report back to the 
government.569  Professors gave themselves until noon on July 7 to come to some kind 
of conclusion.  Not far from everyone’s mind was the unspoken threat that the military 
would intervene if an agreement could not be reached by the proposed deadline.570 
 The inclination to allow faculty to talk with FNECAF representatives after June 
30 likely amounted to a calculated move.  Acosta probably knew on June 30 that the 
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Ministry of the Interior (SDG) had its own spy network with reports that the Juárez 
hubbub had spread to the Poli, one of the largest colleges in the country, a day earlier.  
According to SDG records from June 29, FNECAF members and student activists led a 
spirited rally at the Poli that begged for support.  A cebollero took the stage at an 
auditorium to castigate the “lack of coordination” at his school and to tell the 250 
people in attendance that he and others needed the “decided support” of all students.  
Another speaker said that he and others would “neither bend nor break” in the face of 
arrests or reprisals if the military intervened.  One politécnico (an IPN attendee) told 
classmates that FNECAF members sought justice in Ciudad Juárez so that graduates 
could “serve el campesinado in a social capacity.”  Arturo Martínez from the National 
Center for Democratic Students, a group of Marxist-leaning activists, exhorted people 
to recall past displays of government repression.  He told those in attendance to 
remember the military’s invasion at the Poli in 1956 and another intervention at the 
National Autonomous University, and a student movement in Michoacán that resulted 
in several arrests of people who later became political prisoners.  Martínez added a 
challenge to politécnicos, encouraging them not to fear arrest because “there isn’t 
enough cement and steel rods in Mexico to build enough prisons for every student when 
they fight towards a just cause.”  He finished his homily by saying that Mexico’s youth 
“should work like the youth in other Latin American places….who take to the streets 
and fight for their rights.”  Although the plans were eventually cancelled, the 
demonstration ended with talks about a march to SAG offices the next morning.571     
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The tenor and plans shared at the rally at the Poli on June 29 probably made 
their way to Juan Gil Preciado and Ricardo Acosta.  It would be difficult to think that 
SDG officers would fail to share intelligence indicating that the agricultural colleges 
strike had spread to Mexico City and seemed to be transforming into a massive uprising 
with Gil Preciado and Acosta.  Consequently, Acosta’s permission for faculty to begin 
talks for peacefully ending the disruption to research and training at the Escuela 
Nacional on June 30 came about because of news from the previous day.  The Vice 
Minister’s alleged mercy had its reasons.   
Serious talks did indeed occur after June 30.  On July 1, FNECAF 
representatives and ENA faculty mediation committee members discussed a plan for 
federalizing “Escobar.”  Efraím Hernández noted suggestions that the government could 
take over the college, pay an indemnity to the Escobars, and form a council that 
oversaw the management of a new institution minus the influence of its former owners.  
FNECAF members also told the committee that Mexico had an education predicament.  
“In reality, the problem is national,” they said.  The country needed more trained 
agronomists and Chapingo’s status as an SAG dependency (and not as an autonomous 
college) produced “specialized graduates” instead of more técnicos.  As a solution, 
students said the country needed more training centers and improvements at those that 
existed.572  A day later professors heard that spokesmen in Ciudad Juárez had taken 
concrete steps towards ending the strike.  Those up north relayed to Mexico City news 
that they had sent word to Chihuahua’s governor about a government-student council 
that would decide how to handle the situation at “Escobar.”  In response, the governor 
apparently demonstrated an ability to work with strikers, proposing that his office could 
                                                
572 Hernández, no title, July 1, 1967, notebook #12, 161 and 163-164, Archivo EHX, COLPOS.   
264 
open a new public university in Ciudad Delicias.  As talks advanced in Chihuahua and 
other talks continued in Chapingo, it appeared by July 5 that the national protest would 
end soon.573   
Despite this progress, things worsened in the next couple of days.  According to 
an SDG operative at an IPN rally on July 6, about five hundred students heard about 
classmates from IPN Vocational School No. 7 being “savagely beaten” by granaderos – 
members of the Federal District’s police force known for its excessive use of force 
during the 1960s - as they gathered outside the Ministry of Agriculture the night before.  
Audience members also heard rumors that the army planned to invade Chapingo within 
twenty-four hours.  News about the beatings outside SAG offices and the impending 
raid prompted about three hundred protestors to begin a march in Mexico City’s streets.  
When police broke up the procession, students settled for blocking streets and yelling at 
granaderos with shouts of “Viva Chapingo!” and “Death to the apes [police]!”  The 
large trek to government offices ended poorly, but not before one participant invited 
others to bring classmates to a demonstration the next morning, when they would 
“force” a march to the Ministry of Agriculture.574  At a rally that same night, more IPN 
students agreed to stage an indefinite stoppage of activities in support of “Escobar” and 
learned about the confrontation with the police earlier in the day.  One item stood out in 
the SDG informant’s report about the night of July 6: some students promised to “get 
hold of every bus that they could and travel to the Escuela Nacional, taking Molotov 
cocktails and every kind of weapon” to defend chapingueros if the military invaded the 
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next day.  The next morning, handbills with words about revolution from a small group 
calling itself the Revolutionary Leftist Student Movement circulated at the Poli.   
Another spy report from the same day indicated that more IPN schools voted for a 
stoppage of activities to support “Escobar” and Chapingo and that some IPN students 
spent the night of July 6 building homemade bombs.575  The disorder in Ciudad Juárez 
had morphed into a potentially violent uprising in Mexico’s capital by early July.     
Optimism dimmed at Chapingo, too.  The faculty mediation committee’s July 7 
deadline passed and no agreement could be reached between students and the Ministry 
of Agriculture.  As a last ditch effort to convince Juan Gil Preciado and Ricardo Acosta 
to think twice about what they would do next, Efraím Hernández drafted the 
committee’s conclusions.  After talking with students and government officials, 
professors made three observations: first, students expressed a “genuine surprise” for 
the cold shoulder from the Ministry of Agriculture; second, the strike severely disrupted 
national agricultural research and education; and third, commission members 
understood that “the movement in Chapingo centers on serious problems about 
agricultural training all over Mexico,” such as national education policies, Plan 
Chapingo’s arrangement, and recent changes at the Escuela Nacional.576   
The most damning parts of the report, which apparently never made it to SAG 
officials, were its last two pages.  Prior to the July 7 deadline, ENA strikers wanted to 
allow negotiations in Ciudad Juárez to be finalized before lifting the closure at the 
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Escuela Nacional.  Juan Gil Preciado and company refused to allow more time.  Thus, it 
appeared – though never said - that the army would invade Chapingo.  Before the worst 
occurred, Hernández craftily lambasted the Ministry of Agriculture’s lack of patience, 
suggesting that the time officials had given the committee to try to resolve things was 
“clearly short” and failed to give chapingueros time to deliberate over whether to return 
to normalcy or to wait to hear back from Chihuahua.  Then the report outlined what 
Hernández regarded as the fundamental reasons why the strike began and why it 
appeared to be ending in military intervention:   
The management of an educational institution by an authority fundamentally  
dedicated to other activities – as is the case here - gives ground to an  
undervaluing of academic dynamism and damage to school grounds, as well as  
campus morale and academics.  Such an arrangement plants the seed for  
excessive power struggles and eliminates the professors’ role as a rational group  
and as a mediating body.577   
 
Hernández’s personal notes elaborated on the lesson he sought to give to the 
Ministry of Agriculture.  On an index card, he wrote four fragments: “direct decisions 
rested with the Ministry of Agriculture,” “to produce the objective professional from the 
Escuela Nacional, we must produce thinkers,” “a platform for free expression and to let 
off steam about problems,” and “Point Four[,] U.S., Department of State.”578  Known 
for loading his sentences with penetrating messages, Hernández disguised the prose in 
the committee’s statement as an indictment of the maladies in Chapingo since the 
1950s.  He critiqued SAG officials’ control over the college, suggesting that the 
ministry’s mulish dedication to producing uncreative técnicos engendered a learning 
environment that failed to produce “objective professional[s]” and “thinkers.”  SAG 
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supervision of the college, he continued, promoted a setting in which some of the 
hallmarks of any institution of higher education – the freedom of expression and the 
right to argue – ceased to exist.   
Finally, the fragment about “Point Four” referred to the ultimate problem that 
Maestro Xolo had with the celebration that had taken place at Chapingo since the 
1950s, when the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and other groups began 
investing time and money into the Escuela Nacional.  Begun under President Harry 
Truman in the 1950s, the Point Four Program was an initiative that provided “technical 
assistance” to “developing” countries under the premise that assistance prevented the 
spread of communism.579  Xolo covertly suggested that SAG leaders’ motivation for 
their training of stolid agronomists unprepared to help peasants was to ensure that the 
groups who helped design and finance agricultural planning in Mexico remained 
satisfied (Plan Chapingo received funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, 
a Point Four institution).  Hence, the quote that the management of an institution “by an 
authority fundamentally dedicated to other activities” represented Hernández’s way of 
saying that Acosta and Gil Preciado operated under the tutelage of bosses in 
Washington, D.C.  That colleagues signed the report proved that what Hernández had 
shouted for so many years – that Mexico’s model for agricultural improvement should 
begin locally, not with the United States – was finally resonating with colleagues in 
                                                
579 Nick Cullather offers an instructive discussion about the Point Four initiative; see Cullather, The 
Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University of 
Press, 2010).  For a critical reading of the Point Four initiative with relations to technical help to 
agriculture in the “developing” world, see John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution: Wheat, 
Genes, and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 144-156. 
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1967.580  The huelga proved to be a moment of clarity for students out in the streets, as 
well as their professors.   
 
 
Image 5.2  A granadero hits a protestor who wanted to demonstrate outside of Mexico’s Ministry of 
Agriculture (from Archivo General de la Nación).581 
 
Military intervention did not take place on July 7, but the strike did not end 
either.  On July 8, Gil Preciado agreed to talk personally with five student 
representatives in Mexico City after hearing from ENA professors about huelguistas’ 
grievances.582  The meeting yielded no significant results.  Gil Preciado elaborated on 
the legalities of getting involving in state matters.  Disgruntled students repeated 
complaints about “Escobar’s” annual subsidy and presented solutions similar to the 
ones that they had previously mentioned to faculty.  Hernández’s notes summed up his 
reading of the results of the failed summit: “We tried every possible avenue to solve 
[the] ‘Hermanos Escobar’ [issue] but we could not commit to a solution.  The reopening 
of activities [at Chapingo] does not mean that the movement has been abandoned or that 
                                                
580 It should be noted that only three of the other nine committee members signed the report. 
581 “Estudiantes de la Vocacional No. 7,” July 7, 1967, IPN, box 1457B, folder 28, AGN, Mexico City. 
582 Hernández, “Mesa Directiva Sociedad Alumnos ENA,” July 7, 1967, notebook #12, 178, Archivo 
EHX, COLPOS. 
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the work towards repairing problems [at school] is done.”583  While professors 
discussed how to address the impasse, discussions between protest leaders and 
government officials failed to take place.584 
 The invasion also did not occur because the scene at the Poli deteriorated 
quickly.  A day after the failed talks with Gil Preciado, politécnicos and others 
continued their support for the strike, hanging signs that said “We repudiate [you], 
[President] Díaz Ordaz!” and “Death to the Ministry of Agriculture and the merchants 
of education!” at different campuses.585  Within the next two days, at least fifteen 
schools refused to hold classes and things at the Poli worsened when two thousand 
members of an IPN counterstrike attacked “Escobar” supporters by driving a bus 
through a barricade in front of one of the college’s entrances.  In another incident, an 
SDG informant reported that some strikers spent the afternoon bringing gasoline into a 
building to prepare bombs and planned to visit SAG offices the next morning.586  Then 
on July 11, at least twenty-three IPN schools initiated a seventy-two hour shutdown 
during which the “Escobar” issue needed to be resolved or else more bedlam would 
begin.587  An SDG report two days later indicated the size of the strike that the Mexican 
government had on its hands: a quarter of a million students around the country found 
themselves outside of classes in support of agricultural college attendees.588   
 
                                                
583 ----, “Junta con C. Secretario,” July 8, 1967, notebook #12, 179-181, Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
584 Hernández’s notebook contains notes from two faculty meetings, but does not include talks with 
students.  See Hernández, “INIF Junta Profesores,” July 10, 1967, notebook #12, 182, Archivo EHX, 
COLPOS; and Hernández, “Comisión Mediatora,” July 11, 1967, notebook #12, 183-184, Archivo EHX, 
COLPOS. 
585 Gutiérrez, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 9, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City. 
586 ----, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 10, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City; ----, 
“Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 11, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City. 
587 ----, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 12, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City. 
588 ----, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 14, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City. 
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Image 5.3  IPN Protestors blocked streets in Mexico City (from Archivo General de la Nación).589 
  
The massive shutdown was short, as the strike ended peacefully on Saturday, 
July 15.  Earlier that morning, politécnicos received notice that ESAHE strikers and the 
governor’s office in Chihuahua had reached a settlement.   Students in Ciudad Juárez 
called the Poli via telephone to relay the major points of the agreement reached up 
north: 650 ESAHE students would immediately be transferred to the University of 
Chihuahua for classes over the next couple months; in 1968, the same public university 
would open a new agricultural college; the governor’s office would offer former 
cebolleros help with their move and financial assistance; Praxedes Giner, Chihuahua’s 
governor, also promised to ask the Ministry of Agriculture for funds with which to give 
a raise to teachers at the new institution; a student-government council would figure out 
how to proceed with problems at “Hermanos Escobar”; and tuition would be reduced at 
“Hermanos Escobar.”590  Two days later, about seven hundred students packed buses 
and cars outside IPN gates in Mexico City bound for Chapingo, where a huge bonfire 
                                                
589 “Aspecto general del grupo estudiantil,” July 6, 1967, IPS, box 1457B, folder 28, AGN, Mexico City. 
590 Gutiérrez, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 14, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City.   
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celebration was scheduled to take place.  Some of the buses flew signs for people to 
read: “Fight while studying!”591   
Days after the bonfire México Agrícola, the same magazine that ran a piece 
castigating strikers nearly a month earlier, published another editorial that contained a 
small bit that likely pleased students who had demonstrated.  The writer criticized those 
who had protested, asking them if their fuss was worth the disruption to their studies.  
He added that the only positive to be realized from the rebellion was that “Mexico’s 
youth is not deaf to lessons to be learned” and “does not again fall victim to the same 
illusions.”  A parenthetical clause in the editorial’s introduction, however, had words 
that absolved Avante leaders and those people all over the country who supported them, 
“The authorities, once they analyzed the issues and considered the youngsters’ position 
was reasonable, had no qualms about taking the measures needed to resolve the 
situation” (emphasis mine).592  Without directly saying so, the writer conceded that 
strikers’ complaints were valid – the Escobar family had shirked its responsibilities as a 
private entity receiving public funds, “Escobar” was a deficient institution, and Mexican 
students’ demands were “reasonable.”  Put another way, the huelga was warranted.593     
  
CONCLUSION 
The 1967 strike had important results other than those in Ciudad Juárez.  First, it 
served as an interregnum.594  It was, as Hiram Núñez has suggested, a “rupture” to the 
                                                
591 ----, “Instituto Politécnico Nacional,” July 18, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, Mexico City; Núñez, 
1967, 91. 
592 “Editorial,” México Agrícola XIV, no. 161 (July 1967), 7. 
593 “Escobar” stayed open for years after 1967 and continued to receive SAG support; see Ortega, 1967, 
28. 
594 My view of the strike as a pause in the status quo is inspired by James C. Scott’s discussion about a 
very different topic: the Mexican Revolution.  See his Foreword in Every Forms of State Formation: 
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discourse that governed Mexican agricultural education and development since the early 
1940s.595  Many chapingueros used the situation in Ciudad Juárez as a springboard to 
channel frustrations that had been building for years.  After talking with FNECAF 
affiliates, ENA students discovered that they were not the only agronomists-in-the-
making who disliked their educational training system.  They learned that others all 
over the country dealt with the frustration that what they studied in classrooms failed to 
help a country filled with peasant farmers.  As strike leaders explained to politécnicos in 
their efforts to gain IPN support on June 28, agronomy students everywhere realized 
that “the problems at ‘Escobar’ were in no way an isolated or random 
case…Agricultural education is characterized by complete anarchy.  Schools with no 
rhyme or reason and without adherence to a rational, orderly plan existed 
everywhere.”596  Thus, the mutiny in the summer of 1967 represented the signpost when 
those trained under the high modernism that undergirded the “Green Revolution” 
rejected the status quo and announced that Mexico’s agricultural future needed revision.    
 Second, the huelga denoted the moment that agronomy students, particularly 
chapingueros, realized that what became known as the “Green Revolution” involved 
politics.  They realized that it was their government that wholeheartedly embraced the 
mechanistic training that left many students disenchanted and unprepared to help 
peasants; accordingly, they blamed the government for adoption of such a flawed 
system.  The strike, therefore, represented a public event in which young Mexicans 
questioned the legitimacy of their government and disparaged President Gustavo Díaz 
                                                                                                                                          
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel 
Nugent (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 1994), ix.  
595 Núñez, 1967, 75. 
596 “Manifiesto a la Opinión de los Estudiantes del I.P.N.,” June  28, 1967, IPS, box 1452B, AGN, 
Mexico City.    
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Ordaz, granaderos, and SAG officials.  Proof of the rebellious sprit that the strike 
engendered was visible at the 1968 opening of ENA classes discussed at the beginning 
of this chapter.  After Díaz Ordaz exited by helicopter, the government began 
dismantling some of the traditions at school, as guns were removed from campus not 
long after the incident and presidents quit attending ceremonies at the Escuela 
Nacional.597  A couple months after the inauguration incident chapingueros angst 
towards the government continued and many of them became leaders in Mexico’s youth 
movement that culminated with the Tlatelolco massacre on October 2.598  
 Finally, Efraím Hernández’s life changed after the summer of 1967.  During the 
tense days of early July, when faculty tried to prevent what looked like an eminent 
student massacre in Chapingo, Ricardo Acosta inexplicably did not show up for more 
than one meeting with the faculty mediation committee.  Maestro Xolo eventually 
cracked and told the Vice Minister that professors trying to help end a tenuous situation 
deserved better treatment.599  Acosta doled out punishment for what he regarded as 
insubordination months later.  In January of 1968 Hernández told an acquaintance “Per 
orders above me, I will probably be traveling outside of Mexico quite often during the 
coming months.”600  Between July and January, Acosta had arranged for the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center to hire Xolo to collect agricultural 
seeds in South America.  Like other intellectuals in Latin America who had the gall to 
                                                
597 Marín, Chapingo estudiantil en movimiento, 170-171. 
598 See Chapingo y el movimiento estudiantil popular del 68, Hiram Núñez Gutiérrez, Jorge Gustavo 
Ocampo Ledesma, and Rosaura Reyes Canchola, eds. (Chapingo, Mexico: Universidad Autónoma 
Chapingo, 2011) for more about the Escuela Nacional’s role in the 1968 student movement.  Also see 
Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, 33. 
599 Rafael Ortega Paczka, interview with author, December 2, 2013, Chapingo, Estado de México, 
Mexico.  Ortega seems to have been the only person with whom Hernández shared details about why he 
was exiled. 
600 Efraím Hernández, “Ing. Ignacio Cano Flores,” January 26, 1967 (sic), folder Correspondencia – 1968, 
Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
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challenge the ruling party in their country during the Cold War, Hernández was sent 
into exile.  His unsolicited sojourn was in South America.  He was away from his 
daughters and students for much of 1968.   
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CONCLUSION 
THE IRONY OF MEXICO’S AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 What happened to Mexican agriculture after the strike of 1967?   To be sure, the 
unrest at colleges did not immediately result in substantive changes.  Government 
officials did not proceed to announce a reorientation to agricultural development 
instantly after the summer of 1967.  And in the countryside, many growers who had 
adopted certain technologies and cultivation methods after the 1940s did not alter their 
approach to farming after the strike.  But life at the Escuela Nacional de Agricultura 
changed substantially after the late 1960s.  Ironically, peasant farmers, whom professors 
and students often overlooked during previous decades, became sources of intellectual 
inspiration for research.  
 National agriculture took on two characteristics after the late 1960s.  The first of 
these traits was large-scale production, agribusiness.  Many people who had adopted 
modern farming (i.e., the Green Revolution) and who had access to the requirements 
that facilitated success over the 1940s and the decades afterwards – controlled 
irrigation; big parcels of land for commercial-scale production; and credit for inputs like 
fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds that one needed to purchase more often than previously 
– fared well during and after the 1970s.  Several growers, particularly in the states of 
Sinaloa and Sonora, became players in international export markets for wheat and 
ancillary crops like tomatoes.  Sorghum production boomed, too.  In terms of research, 
Mexico continued to be a beacon in the “developing world” during the early 1970s.601  
                                                
601 For more on the dual-track configuration of Mexican agriculture after the 1950s, see Angus Wright, 
The Death of Ramón González: The Modern Agricultural Dilemma (Austin: University of Texas, 1990); 
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 Most farmers did not enjoy the windfalls stemming from the Green Revolution, 
however.  Certain news items that tarnished the Revolution began appearing as early as 
the summer of 1967.  Tierra, the journal of the Ministry of Agriculture, published an 
editorial reacting to a recent United Nations (U.N.) report.  Mexico, according to the 
report, was one of the world’s most “notable examples of rapid economic 
development,” in large part because of advances in its agricultural sector.  But the 
Tierra writer also mentioned the “other side of the coin,” the underside of such 
advances.  U.N. observers noted that outside of a few regions – primarily those places 
with controlled irrigation and places populated with “more advanced farmers” – 
agricultural progress had failed to arrive.  Three percent of farmers, the editorial 
remarked, accounted for 50 percent of the crops that made it to market.  Furthermore, 
many of those growers operated on a commercial scale while the remainder of the rural 
population remained “totally at the margins of progress.”  Six million people lived in 
households that practiced subsistence agriculture on small parcels and these farmers 
worked their land for a total of only 150 days per year and often remained without work 
outside of that period.  Hence, much of rural Mexico remained underemployed for 
much of the year.  Although the editorial mentioned that the situation in the countryside 
could improve, the writing was on the wall in Mexico in 1967: the global recognition as 
an exemplar for agricultural development masked the dire realities of millions of 
ejidatarios (communal land owners) and small farmers.602   
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 Other signs of the Green Revolution’s shortcomings appeared in the same year.  
Agronomists who had studied in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s began 
noticing in the mid-1960s that many farmers, particularly those in rain-fed areas, had 
not embraced improved and fertilizer-responsive seeds, processed fertilizers, and other 
technologies.  Consequently, students from Chapingo, government authorities, and 
researchers with the Rockefeller Foundation designed a multi-year project intended to 
devise methods for delivering the Green Revolution to small communities in the state of 
Puebla.  The project, which came to be called Plan Puebla, lasted years and went on to 
have mixed results.603  That many of the people who advocated the Green Revolution 
saw the need to devise such a study, however, represented an admission that “progress” 
had not arrived to farmers who practiced temporal (rain-fed) cultivation.    
 Thus, while a handful of people benefitted from the advances that had begun 
during the 1940s, the reality for the majority of Mexican growers was quite different.  
Many agriculturalists over the 1960s and 1970s found themselves elbowed out of the 
countryside by market forces and moved to cities, thereby abandoning farming 
altogether.  Meanwhile, millions of those who stayed the course and continued 
                                                
603 About Plan Puebla, see Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo, The Puebla Project, 
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practicing subsistence farming found themselves in a precarious coexistence alongside 
commercial growers.604   
 A similar two-track process unfolded at the Escuela Nacional and its graduate 
college during the 1970s.  On the one hand, pedagogy and the direction of research 
resembled previous decades.  Professors approached research and teaching using a top-
down model that adhered to empiricism and rigid science.  Hence, Chapingo continued 
to be a wellspring for técnicos and others who still spread the gospel of modern 
agriculture under the premise that farmers had little to contribute or share.   
On the other hand, an alternative approach to research developed.605  Efraím 
Hernández’s informal exile to South America allowed him to fuse his ideas with 
science.  Before bureaucrats in Mexico City sent him on a time-out, Hernández was 
known as the eccentric and respected professor who advocated the thesis that 
campesinos were sources of agronomic expertise.606  While such an idea sounded novel, 
it also lacked theoretical foundations and evidence outside of personal conviction.  But 
the seed collection trips through the backwoods of Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru over 
much of 1968 gave Hernández time to hone in his hypothesis and he returned to Mexico 
as an ethnobotanist.607 
                                                
604 Alain de Janvry best describes the existence of capitalist and peasant agricultural modes of production 
in rural Latin America in his discussion about “functional dualism.”  See The Agrarian Question and 
Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981): 81-93. 
605 About the history of agricultural research and its guiding principles during the 1960s and the 1970s, 
see Juan de la Fuente Hernández et al., La investigación agrícola y el Estado mexicano, 1960[-]1976 
(Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Chapingo, Subdirección de Investigación Departamento de Diagnóstico 
Externo, 1990). 
606 By the late 1960s, one of Hernández’s biggest claims to fame was his leadership in Mexico’s 
Dioscorea Commission, which is credited with conducting groundbreaking research about steroids that 
helped produce contraceptive pills.  On Mexico, peasants, and the Dioscorea Commission, see Gabriela 
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607 Hernández published his most influential article about the methodologies of an ethnobotanist in 1971.  
Few people know that he drafted the seminal piece while he was in South America during what appears 
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Some explanations are necessary.  In the most basic terms, botany is the study of 
plants.  A botanist deals with a plant’s genetics, morphology, and life cycles.  
Ethnobotany is more complex.  According to Richard Evans Schultes, one of the 
discipline’s founders, ethnobotany can be considered a hybrid of botany and 
anthropology.  It is, Schultes wrote in 1941, “the study of the relations that exist 
between man and the plant environment,” as well as the study of the use of cultivated 
and undomesticated plants by indigenous groups.608  Researchers are required to 
integrate the presence of humans and the dynamics that the human species carries - 
culture, beliefs in the metaphysical, aesthetics, ethnicity, gender, food tastes, etc. - into 
their research to examine what people call the plant-man relationship.    
In South America, Hernández found what agricultural investigation in Mexico 
had been missing for decades: the presence of people in a dynamic natural setting.  
Researchers and extensionists had worked for years under the precept that farmers were 
passive repositories for knowledge who would adopt technologies and growing methods 
via appeals to their visual or auditory senses (see Chapter One).  Hernández regarded 
such rules as unsatisfying because they defied what he had witnessed for decades – that 
of peasants being capable farmers who had acute knowledge about plants.  He found 
that research needed to deal with plants and humans, with both components being part 
of a larger setting.  He elaborated on his ideas in notes to himself in December of 1970 
(written in English): 
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It seems that if we start with the consideration of man and his culture[,] the  
relationship of man and plant never assumes its proper dimension and we soon 
lose ourselves in man’s belief[s], fears and fantasies so that his place in the 
ecosystem is never understood.  We must, for this reason, start with the larger 
reality, the ecosystem and work down to man and plants.  Viewed from this 
aspect, this course [i.e., ethnobotany] would review man’s role in the ecosystem 
and the consequences of the numerous interactions set up.  A search for the 
biological roots of these relationships should lead to the understanding which 
should serve[,] in turn[,] to clarify future tendencies.609       
 
Hernández thereafter approached botany with a wider lens for examination, what he 
called “the larger reality,” or ecosystems.  Under such an approach, logic dictated that 
farmers were not containers for information or growers naturally inclined to adopt 
certain technologies because of powerful appeals to their senses; to the contrary, they 
were participants in the farming process.  Agriculture, as he had told people for years, 
constituted an interactive process conducted in a larger space with live actors and 
natural processes (see Figure 6.1 for one of Hernández’s schematics of ethnobotany).  It 
took years to happen, but Hernández captured his botanic Moby Dick in South America 
– he located a scientific discipline that could test his convictions about campesinos. 
 
Figure 6.1  One of Efraím Hernández’s models of ethnobotany.  The interaction of the arrows of 
“tiempo” (time and space), “medio” (ecology; environment), and “cultura” (culture) added up to the 
phenomenon of ethnobotany (from Archivo EHX, likely written in late 1977, notebook 32, 22). 
  
                                                
609 Hernández, “Ethnobotany,” December 31, 1970, notebook 18, 63, Archivo EHX, COLPOS.   
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Hernández’s conversion into an ethnobotanist coincided with big happenings in 
national academic circles.  The Tlatelolco Massacre of October 1968, an incident 
involving the killing of students who demanded political reform in Mexico City, 
eventually spurred the country’s ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, to 
democratize politics.  Thereafter began the country’s “apertura democrática” 
(“democratic opening”) under President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976).  In Mexico City, 
the opening allowed for sharing among intellectuals, some of whom would go on to 
become prominent figures in academic circles for their studies related to peasants.   
Hernández began attending meetings with some of these researchers in 1972.  
Among the scholars at the gatherings were figures whose names would loom large in 
modern Mexican social sciences during the 1980s and 1990s: Enrique Florescano, 
known for his work on agrarian history; Eric Wolf, Ángel Palerm, and Arturo Warman, 
anthropologists known for transforming ethnological studies; and Friedrich Katz, 
arguably one of modern Mexico’s greatest historians.  Peasants were a common topic at 
every meeting and Hernández was at home with these men.  He began strong 
friendships with some of them, particularly Palerm and Warman.  Thus, at the point in 
his career that he had bonded botany to anthropology, Hernández also began 
professional and personal relationships with a handful of the people whose work would 
collectively reinterpret peasants’ role in Mexican and Latin American history. 
A year after joining these meetings, which reportedly often lasted into the wee 
hours of the morning, Hernández and graduate students began multi-institutional studies 
supported by authorities at Chapingo.  The projects were part of a larger program 
known as “El T.A.T.,” Traditional Agricultural Technology.  Studies began with 
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intensive discussions in the classroom.  Then students ventured to the field.  Hernández 
dropped off pupils in disparate remote places where they began systematizing the 
agricultural knowledge of several indigenous groups.  Students had to immerse 
themselves in the communities where they lived.  They had to become students of the 
local growers.  Over the 1970s and the 1980s, xolocotzianos and others under the 
mentorship of Arturo Warman and Ángel Palerm could be found following campesinos, 
asking a variety of questions: Why did they choose a particular seed over another?; 
How did they know when a parcel that they had previously cleared was prepared for 
cultivation?; How much did terracing a hillside help capture rainwater for irrigation 
purposes?; Why did a farmer plant in a shaded area versus somewhere else?; What did a 
certain herb or leaf do for a given cough or illness?  
Hernández explained T.A.T.’s guiding principles in an article for a small 
newspaper in 1973.  He and others sought “to deal with the key parts of agricultural, 
livestock, and forestry exploitation.”  They did so “not as strangers and superiors to the 
minds” of peasants, he wrote.  Rather, they would be sensitive to local farmers and 
“anxious to learn and contribute with what we have learned elsewhere [i.e., modern 
science].”  He continued, “We will try to approach questions related to farming under 
the principle that the most important element of our resources is humans.”610   
This approach proved to be a hit at Chapingo and the Colegio de Postgraduados, 
and many people, indeed, learned from peasants.  Hernández’s Ethnobotanical 
Methodologies seminar became a mainstay at the Colegio after 1972.  Other colleges in 
Mexico followed suit.  Ethnobotany also became a topic panel at national conferences.  
                                                
610 Efraín Hernández Xolocotzin Guzmán, “La Tierra que Nos Alimenta,” Pueblo Nuevo 1, no. 1 
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“El T.A.T.” eventually morphed into more complex studies.  By 1977, Hernández led 
well-funded projects that explored the smallest details of traditional agriculture and 
more complicated projects related to agroecosystems.  His students would go on to 
publish studies that detailed how peasants practiced what today is called sustainable 
agriculture and how they had an acute knowledge of certain plants that prevented or 
helped cure modern illnesses.  Peasants, students discovered, had intricate ways of 
conserving seed biodiversity and complicated methods for overcoming environmental 
constraints like farming alongside a steep mountain or farming with a lack of 
irrigation.611  By the 1980s, Hernández took satisfaction in being able to tell people “I 
no longer have to scream and yell too much to get people to understand me.”612 
 He experienced more poetic justice during the 1980s.  Mexican exports of 
products that had previously been high because of Green Revolution technology slowed 
over the 1970s, and by the 1980s, the country imported basic grains.613  A deluge of 
criticisms against the Revolution followed, and Hernández took solace in the fact that 
he had spent decades harping about the flaws he saw in the model of agricultural 
development that national leaders had previously embraced.  Over the same years, 
people started recognizing his contributions.   In 1981, he received an Honoris Causa 
degree from the Colegio de Postgraduados.  Chapingo bestowed an honorary degree 
                                                
611 Collections of these studies can be found in some work published while Hernández still lived and two 
compilations after he passed away.  See Efraím Hernández X., ed., Agroecosistemas de México: 
contribuciones a la enseñanza, investigación y divulgación agrícola (Chapingo, Estado de México, 
Mexico: Colegio de Postgraduados, 1977); Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi, Eduardo Bello Baltazar, and 
Samuel Levy Tacher, eds., La milpa en Yucatán: un sistema de producción agrícola tradicional, Tomo 1 
(Mexico: Colegio de Postgraduados, 1995); and Hernández, Bello, and Levy, eds., La milpa en Yucatán: 
un sistema de producción agrícola tradicional, Tomo 2 (Mexico: Colegio de Postgraduados, 1995). 
612 No author, “Notas de vida Efraím Hernández Xolocotzi,” N.D., 8, Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
613 About basic food policies in the countryside during the 1980s, see Jonathan Fox, The Politics of Food 
in Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
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five years later.614  Other honors included officials’ naming of a forest in Mexico City 
after Hernández in 1984.  He was also the namesake for a botanical garden established 
in 1986 in northern Mexico.  The Society for Economic Botany named him 
Distinguished Economic Botanist in the same year (in the letter acknowledging the 
award, he recognized his debt to colleagues, teachers, and “of course” Latin American 
peasants).615  Other people who became (and remain) preeminent scholars in research 
on sustainable and organic farming, such as Stephen Gliessman and Miguel Altieri, 
recognized his work.  Gliessman, for example, invited Xolo to a conference in the 
United States in 1981.  Five years later, Altieri told Hernández that he would be 
“exceedingly interested” in visiting Chapingo and interviewing him and others involved 
with agroecology, ethnobotany, and rural development.616  What is more, graduate 
students from U.S. universities traveled to Mexico to study under Maestro Xolo’s 
tutelage.  History came full circle, as Americans went south to learn about agriculture 
from a group of researchers who claimed peasants as their teachers.   
Thus, agricultural development during the 1970s and 1980s was deeply ironic.  
During previous decades, Mexico was famous for its advances in research and increases 
in production of basic crops.  People flocked to the study in the country and witness the 
spectacle of the Green Revolution.  All the while, Efraím Hernández and a handful of 
others expressed skepticism and advocated a vision of agricultural development that 
saw the country’s most destitute farmers as sources of intellectual inspiration.  
Authorities and colleagues largely ignored such ideas over the 1950s and 1960s.  Then 
                                                
614 The Colegio moved to its own campus and became a separate institution from the Escuela Nacional de 
Agricultura in the late 1970s. 
615 Efraím Hernández X., Letter to Dr. Garrison Wilkes, January 28, 1986, Archivo EHX, COLPOS. 
616 Stephen R. Gliessman, Letter to Efraím Hernández, October 12, 1981, Archivo EHX, COLPOS; 
Miguel A. Altieri, Letter to Efraím Hernández, March 5, 1986, Archivo EHX, COLPOS.  
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came the 1970s, the decade when many people began realizing some of the 
shortcomings of the Green Revolution, and it was Hernández’s brand of botany that 
attracted the attention of foreigners.  It seemed that the debate over agricultural 
development discussed in this dissertation was partially won by those Mexicans who 
looked locally for inspiration.     
 New debates related to the direction of Mexican agriculture have emerged, and 
some of the responses to current issues resemble ones heard in the past.  A visitor at 
Chapingo can see fliers renouncing free trade agricultural policies that national leaders 
began in the 1990s.  The same person can hear suggestions on campus that the Mexican 
government should not forget about the country’s smallest farmers.617  If someone 
travels a couple kilometers away to the Colegio de Postgraduados, he or she will likely 
see posters related to the dispute surrounding transgenic maize in the countryside.618  
Among the arguments that some Mexicans make against the introduction of transgenic 
maize is one about fusing modern science with campesino knowledge to formulate a 
national plan for food sovereignty and security.619  The irony of Mexican agriculture 
continues.     
    
               
                                                
617 For more on the debates about free trade and agriculture, see Tom Barry, Zapata’s Revenge: Free 
Trade and the Farm Crisis in Mexico (Boston: South End Press, 1995). 
618 See Elizabeth Fitting, The Struggle for Maize: Campesinos, Workers, and Transgenic Corn in the 
Mexican Countryside (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011) about transgenic maize.  About the history 
of plant biotechnology, see Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant 
Biotechnology (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005). 
619 Lourdes Rudiño, “No a los Transgénicos de Plantas Nativas: Conabio,” La Jornada Baja California, 
December 12, 2015, http://jornadabc.mx/tijuana/12-12-2015/no-los-transgenicos-de-plantas-nativas-
conabio.  The person who made this assertion was José Sarukhán.  Experts have considered him one of 
the world’s best tropical ecologists since the 1970s, and he is the national coordinator of 
Mexico’s National Commission for Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity.  From what I can gather, 
Sarukhán was Efraím Hernández’s first graduate student. 
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